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Nation-Building and Contested Identities: Romanian & Hungarian ...

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The “Münchausenian Moment”uinely liberal <strong>and</strong> “Westernizer” context (vs. a supra-national conservativecanon), the nationalist movements had to face the challenge of power-politics,<strong>and</strong> this inherent conflict finally led to the discursive separation ofnationalism <strong>and</strong> liberalism. The dissolution of this “liberal nationalist”canon was due to the simultaneous upsurge of two new discourses. First,there was the emergence of a new type of anti-liberal nationalism, connectingsocial protectionism with a nationalist (<strong>and</strong> often ethnocentric)rhetoric (following the Central-European examples, like Schönerer <strong>and</strong>Lueger). This transition marked a shift in the conservative political tradition,from an elitist-aristocratic conservative canon to a new populist one. 6At the same time, the liberal political elites changed their theoretical <strong>and</strong>practical attitude towards the state. Gradually, they ab<strong>and</strong>oned theirambiguous position (rooted in the contrast of the – imported – propensityfor decentralization <strong>and</strong> limitation of state-power, <strong>and</strong> the more etatistpractical exigencies of “imposing structures of modernity” on the society),<strong>and</strong> rephrased their stance in much more etatist terms. This can beobserved, for example, in the case of the second generation of post-1867<strong>Hungarian</strong> liberalism, coming to power in the 1890s, where an emphaticsecularism <strong>and</strong> social modernization matched a strongly etatist (<strong>and</strong>assimilatory) policy towards the nationalities <strong>and</strong> a cult of violence ininternal affairs, envisioning an imaginary <strong>Hungarian</strong> Empire. 7One of the most interesting (<strong>and</strong> least discussed) aspects of East-Central European intellectual history of the first three decades of the 20 thcentury is exactly the emergence of “mutant” political discourses: both interms of the “autochthonization” of international paradigms (liberalism,socialism, etc.), as in terms of the blurring of the traditional symbolicframeworks which organized the discourse before World War I. The originalityof Zeletin was inherent in the way he sought to reformulate the ideologicaltenets of the <strong>Romanian</strong> liberal tradition in the 1920s. Contrary tothe “more official” ideologue, I. G. Duca, who sought to grasp the essenceof <strong>Romanian</strong> liberalism in terms of the trans-contextual commitment tothe “values of individual liberty,” 8 (i.e., avoiding the question of the specificityof the “local mutant,” anchoring the prestige of <strong>Romanian</strong> liberalismin the respectable pedigree of the political culture of the “Big WesternBrothers”), Zeletin attempted to devise a genealogy, <strong>and</strong>, what ismore, to legitimize the local modification of this ideology in Romania.Repudiating the “idealist” trend, he sought to grasp the meaningof liberalism through its social message, opening two fronts against traditionalinterpretations. First, criticizing the common assumption thatliberalism was merely an intellectual fashion imported from the West,he attempted to localize its emergence in the cleavage between theboyars, utilizing quasi-Marxist analytical tools to document the tangible63

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