Nation-Building and Contested Identities: Romanian & Hungarian ...

Can Democracy Work in Southeastern Europe?29 See Per Ronnas, Urbanization in Romania: A Geography of Social and EconomicChange since Independence. (Stockholm: The Economic Research Institute,Stockholm School of Economics, 1984), p. 246.30 Ronnas, Urbanization in Romania, p. 236.31 See Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen, pp. 333-334.32 Regarding Romanian historiography and its relation to politics between 1944and 1977, see Vlad Georgescu’s path-breaking study Politicã ºi istorie: Cazulcomuniºtilor români, 1944-1977 (Politics and history: The case of Romaniancommunists, 1944-1977) (Bucharest: Humanitas, 1991).33 For more on Ceauºescu’s July 1971 “Theses,” see Cristina Petrescu and DragoºPetrescu, “Restalinizarea vieþii culturale româneºti: Tezele din iulie 1971”(The Restalinization of the Romanian Cultural Life: Nicolae Ceauºescu’s Thesesof July 1971), Arhiva Cotidianului (Bucharest) (25 October 1996), pp. 1-3.34 See Programul Partidului Comunist Român de fãurire a societãþii socialiste multilateraldezvoltate ºi înaintare a României spre comunism (The Romanian CommunistParty’s Program for establishing a multilaterally developed socialistsociety and Romania’s advancement towards communism) (Bucharest: EdituraPoliticã, 1975). Regarding the teleological approach to the “national” history,see pp. 27-64.35 On the first edition (1976/1977) of the national festival Cîntarea României, seemy “Cîntarea României sau stalinismul naþional în festival” (A national-stalinistfestival: Romania’s Song of Praise), in Lucian Boia, ed., Miturile comunismuluiromânesc (Myths of Romanian communism) (Bucharest: Nemira, 1998),pp. 239-251. On Daciada, see Georgescu, Politicã ºi istorie, pp. 124-125.36 Hirschman analyzes the arguments put forward by the opponents of reformduring the last two hundred years and discusses three main theses: (1) “perversity”(any action intended to improve the economic and political life wouldexacerbate the conditions intended to be improved); (2) “futility” (plus çachange, plus c’est la même chose); and, (3) “jeopardy” (the reform, thoughdesirable, would compromise the achievements already made). See Albert O.Hirschman, The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy (Cambridge:The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1991).37 Quoted in Tom Gallagher, Romania After Ceauºescu: The Politics of Intolerance(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1995), p.83.38 Quoted in Vladimir Tismãneanu, Fantasies of Salvation: Democracy, Nationalism,and Myth in Post-Communist Europe (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 1998), p. 79.39 László Fey, “Rãdãcinile ºovinismului maghiar antiromânesc” (The roots of theanti-Romanian chauvinism of the Hungarians), Revista 22 534 (16-22 May 2000),pp. 6-7.40 Attila Sántha, “Românul, locuitor al României” (The Romanian, inhabitant ofRomania), Dilema 369 (10-12 March 2000), p. 8.41 For more on this, see Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Transilvania subiectivã (SubjectiveTransylvania) (Bucharest: Humanitas, 1999), pp. 136-142, and Gallagher,Romania After Ceauºescu, pp. 85-96.42 For an analysis of the Hungarian-Romanian relations during the 1989-1995period, see László Póti and Pál Dunay, “Relations with the Former SocialistCountries, 1989-95,” in Béla K. Király, ed., Lawful Revolution in Hungary,295