Global Fissile Material Report 2009: A Path to Nuclear Disarmament

More documents

Recommendations

Info

If declarations are made early and new information as plants are cleaned out or newrecords are discovered is shared as well, this verification process could provide muchmore confidence than the large uncertainties in the declarations might at first suggest.Together with the knowledge gained concerning the material production complex, thisinitial verification stage will provide a firm basis of confidence upon which to build thenext, more detailed stage of verification.Once nuclear-weapon states release information on the production histories of materialsby site and facility, 132 and are ready to provide adequate access to these sites and/or provide representative samples of the fissile materials themselves—a more rigorousverification approach could begin. The “nuclear archaeology” methods that could beused for this purpose are the subject of Chapter 4.Figure 3.5. During the Cold War, the global inventoryof atmospheric krypton-85 was known frommeasurements. Western analysts were able toestimate the amount of this krypton inventory associatedwith activities in the West, including reprocessingof military and civilian spent fuel. The sizeof the Soviet plutonium stockpile therefore could beestimated from the remaining krypton inventory inthe atmosphere without any knowledge about theRussian production complex. 133Declarations: Fissile Materials versus Nuclear WeaponsAt some stage, states will have to make public their nuclear weapons holdings andproduction history. Some states have already made a beginning. In a series of treatiesbeginning with the 1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT), the United Statesand the Soviet Union agreed on numerical limits on their deployed nuclear forces, todisclose some information about their forces and accepted the need to facilitate verification.134 As part of the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), the UnitedStates and Soviet Union exchanged data on the number, characteristics, locations andproduction facilities of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and associatedlaunchers and support structures. 135 There was an accompanying verification arrangementinvolving on-site inspections. 136 The 1991 START I treaty established limits on deployedU.S. and Soviet strategic weapons and created rules for counting these weaponsand for verification (Chapter 5). 13738 Global Fissile Material Report 2009
The United States and Russia agreed in September 1994 to exchange detailed data ontheir nuclear arsenals, but this plan was not implemented. A 1997 U.S. National Academyof Sciences report on the future of U.S. nuclear weapons policy proposed that adata exchange between the United States and Russia about nuclear arsenals shouldinclude: 138• “the current location, type, and status of all nuclear explosive devices and the historyof every nuclear explosive device manufactured, including the dates of assemblyand dismantling or destruction in explosive tests;• a description of facilities at which nuclear explosives have been designed, assembled,tested, stored, deployed, maintained, and dismantled, and which produced orfabricated key weapon components and nuclear materials; and• the relevant operating records of these facilities.”As illustrated in Table 3.1, there is potentially a parallelism between declarations of fissilematerial holdings and declarations of nuclear weapons arsenals. It shows also howthe level of detail could be incrementally increased from simple aggregated numbers tosite- and facility-specific data and ultimately specify items by location, mass, and composition—possiblyby “serial number” and deployment status in the case of nuclearwarheads. This would be the equivalent of a “nuclear weapons register,” first proposedin the 1990s. 139 Fissile Materials Nuclear WeaponsAggregateBy Type and CharacteristicsTotal inventory/Historical data onstocks, production, and consumptionDetailed current and historical dataon materials (isotopics, physical andchemical form) and their productionTotal stockpile/Historical data onstocks, assembly and disassemblyDetailed current and historical data onstockpiles of nuclear warheads (typeand operational status)By Site/Facility Same by site/facility Same by site/facilityBy ItemLocation, mass, composition of eachitem containerSerial number, location, status of eachwarheadTable 3.1. Declarations of fissile material andnuclear weapons at increasing levels of detail. 140Nuclear weapon states could declare their fissilematerial and nuclear weapon holdings in stages,with greater levels of specificity about the amounts,characteristics and locations of fissile material andnuclear weapons.The most detailed declarations listed here have a precedent in the Chemical WeaponsConvention (CWC), which requires parties to “specify the precise location, aggregatequantity and detailed inventory of chemical weapons it owns or possesses, or that arelocated in any place under its jurisdiction or control.” A verification annex to the CWCspecifies in detail what has to be declared. Parties are required to designate storage facilitiesand to ensure that “chemical weapons at its storage facilities are configured toallow ready access for verification.” 141Israel and perhaps other countries might consider public declarations about the size oftheir nuclear arsenals much more problematic than declarations of their fissile-materialholdings. 142 In such a situation, a country might declare only its fissile material stocksand assign some of the material to an ambiguous category, such as “other uses.” 143Global Fissile Material Report 2009 39
Page 5: Table of ContentsAbout the IPFM 1Fo
Page 8 and 9: ForewordOver the past year, the imp
Page 12: Verified warhead dismantlement. A c
Page 17 and 18: China. Over the past year, there ap
Page 19 and 20: Figure 1.2. National stocks of high
Page 21 and 22: 1400 kg that were used annually in
Page 30 and 31: 2 Fissile Materials andNuclear Disa
Page 32 and 33: The number of nuclear weapon states
Page 34 and 35: Figure 2.3. An Advanced CruiseMissi
Page 36 and 37: discussed both rationing access to
Page 38 and 39: 3 Declarations of Fissile MaterialS
Page 40 and 41: Declarations of fissile material in
Page 42 and 43: Figure 3.2. History of U.S. plutoni
Page 46 and 47: Even without such concerns, it coul
Page 48 and 49: Appendix 3A. The U.S. Plutonium and
Page 50 and 51: of nuclear materials, including all
Page 52 and 53: also on all exports and imports of
Page 54 and 55: Appendix 3B.Estimating Plutonium-Pr
Page 56 and 57: Thermal power 20-25 MWt Effective c
Page 58 and 59: 4 Nuclear ArchaeologyVerification o
Page 60 and 61: Between 1992 and 1998, the U.S. Pac
Page 62 and 63: econstructed from the plant’s was
Page 64 and 65: Figure 4.5. Integrated operation of
Page 66 and 67: Figure 4.7. Fissile material produc
Page 68 and 69: • Traces of neptunium. Radioactiv
Page 70 and 71: • conduct all verification activi
Page 72 and 73: When necessary, the verification re
Page 74 and 75: The various aspects of verified war
Page 76 and 77: The numbers of warheads and compone
Page 78 and 79: Quantities of fissile materials in
Page 80 and 81: Figure 5.5. Nuclear-WeaponsIdentifi
Page 82 and 83: There has been considerable skeptic
Page 84 and 85: Below, the ongoing efforts in Russi
Page 86 and 87: down per year. At this blend-down r
Page 88 and 89: Until one or both of these strategi
Page 90 and 91: Of those options, the study found t
Page 92 and 93: With regard to the reprocessing of
Page 94 and 95:
weapon-grade plutonium at its Dimon
Page 96:
IPFM graphics redrawn from Bulletin
Page 100 and 101:
Any new production of HEU for react
Page 102 and 103:
The IAEA could similarly use instru
Page 104 and 105:
2007. 327 Russia continues to produ
Page 106 and 107:
The fusion research facility ITER i
Page 108 and 109:
in fact, produce tritium in reactor
Page 110 and 111:
On the other hand, some argue that
Page 112 and 113:
Although we are assuming a world wi
Page 114 and 115:
Countries with reprocessing. Countr
Page 116 and 117:
Figure 8.6. Enrichment level of the
Page 118 and 119:
Transition PeriodThe discussion so
Page 120 and 121:
9 Societal VerificationThe concept
Page 122 and 123:
After the war, Szilard and others e
Page 124 and 125:
The historical record with regard t
Page 126 and 127:
The limitations of the safeguards s
Page 128 and 129:
Understandably, states that provide
Page 130 and 131:
Appendix AFissile Materials and Nuc
Page 132 and 133:
high-density spherical mass. The co
Page 134 and 135:
Figure A.4. The fast-neutron critic
Page 136 and 137:
IsotopeCritical Mass[kg]Half Life[y
Page 138 and 139:
Appendix BWorldwide Locations ofNuc
Page 140 and 141:
IndiaCountry Location/Name Region/P
Page 142 and 143:
RussiaCountry Location/Name Region/
Page 144 and 145:
Country Location/Name Region/Provin
Page 146 and 147:
14.Military Power of the People’s
Page 148 and 149:
44.The French company Areva is plan
Page 150 and 151:
73.An industry source specified 9.1
Page 152 and 153:
102.United Nations Security Council
Page 154 and 155:
Chapter 3. Declarations of Fissile
Page 156 and 157:
153.The design of the UK’s 50 MWe
Page 158 and 159:
185.For example, graphite of the Fr
Page 160 and 161:
210.Robert Norris and Hans Kristens
Page 162 and 163:
237.Arms Control and Nonproliferati
Page 164 and 165:
263.See e.g. Report on the Savannah
Page 166 and 167:
dissolved, leaving 753 tons of LWR
Page 168 and 169:
311.See e.g. Mycle Schneider and Yv
Page 170 and 171:
343.H. A. Feiveson, Latent Prolifer
Page 172 and 173:
368.A. Glaser, “Characteristics o
Page 174 and 175:
398.A recent U.S. Air Force survey
Page 176 and 177:
IPFM Members, Other Contributors to
Page 178 and 179:
Li Bin (Beijing, China, shared memb
Page 180 and 181:
Annette Schaper (Frankfurt, Germany
Page 182 and 183:
Other Contributors to Global Fissil
Page 184 and 185:
SGS Research and Administrative Sta
show all

Global Fissile Material Report 2009: A Path to Nuclear Disarmament

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?