Global Fissile Material Report 2009: A Path to Nuclear Disarmament

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Declarations of fissile material inventories or of the sizes and deployment of nucleararsenals are—above all—a transparency measure. Perceived security risks would bethe main concern put forward by nuclear weapon states to explain their oppositionagainst making public declarations of their fissile material inventories or nuclear weaponsholdings. In the present context, in which we consider deep cuts in the nucleararsenals and a world preparing for nuclear disarmament however, the security benefitsof declarations would by far outweigh the risks.Declarations could both provide confidence in the disarmament process and eventuallyallow for more effective verification. A culture of regularly declaring both civilianand military fissile material stockpiles would also encourage states that have excessstocks to gradually dispose of them.In many respects, declarations can therefore pave the way for nuclear disarmament,but making declarations early is equally important because it spotlights the importanceof keeping good records. The UK Report on HEU offers a cautionary tale aboutthe problems that its authors encountered in using old records: 126“This review has been conducted from an audit of annual accountsand the delivery/receipt records at sites. A major problemencountered in examining the records was that a considerablenumber had been destroyed from the early years of the programme… Even where records have survived, other problemshave been encountered, including ... distinction between newmake and recycled HEU … some early records make no specificmention of waste and effluent disposals … [for] some records …assessments had to be made to establish units. Other records donot identify quantities to decimal places and … may have beenrounded … [and] in some cases no indication of enrichmentvalue was available. Average figures were used, or knowledge ofthe process used to assure that the material was indeed HEU.”In other words, even for the state itself, where access to information is not an issue,it may be difficult to compile accurate declarations of past production and use. Varioustypes of irresolvable inconsistencies including “inventory differences” are to beexpected. For example, in the case of the U.S. declarations, the inventory differencesadded up to 2.8 tons of plutonium and to 3.2 tons of uranium-235 in HEU. 127 This is upto a few percent of the total production, which appears reasonable, given the historiccircumstances and practices. In absolute terms, however, these numbers combined areequivalent to an uncertainty of more than 1000 nuclear weapons, which will be a concernin a world considering deep cuts in the nuclear arsenals. Uncertainties in Russia’sdeclarations would likely to be at least as significant. 128 This situation can only getworse with time.The weapon states therefore should start the process of preparing for declarations now,even if they do not plan to share the information at this point. States need to establishgood accounting systems for their fissile material holdings for their own purposes andthe data should be selected and archived in a way that facilitates independent verificationat a later date. Appendix 3A describes the Nuclear Materials Management andSafeguards System in use by the United States.34 Global Fissile Material Report 2009
Content of Declarations and Sequencing of Information ReleaseAt a minimum, a national accounting system for fissile materials would have to tracknational plutonium and HEU inventories. The U.S. system tracks 17 categories of nuclearmaterials today, including depleted, natural, and enriched uranium in differentenrichment ranges; plutonium (weapon-grade and lesser grades); other fissile isotopesincluding uranium-233, neptunium-237 and americium-241; and additional materialssuch as tritium and thorium. Based on such a system, a phased series of declarations offissile materials of increasing detail could be extracted.Initial Declarations. As a first step, declarations could be made of total holdings of plutoniumand highly enriched uranium. In its most basic form, such a declaration wouldessentially consist of two numbers and could be made in a single sentence. This is theapproach taken by the United Kingdom in 1998. 129 Better, however, would be to includein initial declarations the total quantities of HEU and plutonium in:1.Warheads, warhead components and associated working stocks in the warhead-productioncomplexes overall and at individual sites;2. Material that has been determined excess for military purposes but is still in weaponsor weapon components;3. Reserves for naval and other military-reactor use and in the naval fuel cycle (not includingin spent fuel), divided into quantities in classified and unclassified forms;4. Spent military-reactor fuel; and5. Civilian stocks, divided into unirradiated and minimally irradiated forms (includingin critical assemblies and pulsed reactor cores), and irradiated material in reactorcores and spent fuel.Declarations organized along these lines would not go much beyond information thatthe United States has already made public. As one example of a declaration, Figure 3.2shows the history of U.S plutonium production by year and site published in the 1996plutonium declaration. Since virtually no plutonium has been disposed off or otherwiseremoved from the U.S. inventory since 1994, the total U.S. stockpile of separatedplutomium remains at 92 tons today. It falls in two categories: 38 tons in the weaponscomplex and 54 tons declared excess for weapon purposes.Similarly, the 2001 U.S. HEU declaration provides detailed information about production,acquisition, and utilization of HEU as of September 1996. In addition to historicdata, listed by year, enrichment level, and production site, the report lists storage locationsof the material through September 1996 (Figure 3.3). The total HEU inventory of741 tons can be used as a baseline to determine the subsequent evolution and structureof the U.S. stockpile. In 1994, the United States declared 174 tons of its HEU inventoryto be excess to military needs. In late 2005, the United States declared an additional 200tons of excess HEU excess for weapons—of which 128 tons, however, will be reservedfor HEU-fueled naval reactors. 130 Also, the United States regularly reports on progressmade with blend-down efforts. Combined, this information allows for a rather detailedreconstruction of the evolution of the current U.S. stockpile (Figure 3.4).The information is of such generality that it could not be directly verified. But it is—and has been—useful for preliminary review and consistency checks by other states,international bodies and independent analysts.Global Fissile Material Report 2009 35
Page 5: Table of ContentsAbout the IPFM 1Fo
Page 8 and 9: ForewordOver the past year, the imp
Page 12: Verified warhead dismantlement. A c
Page 17 and 18: China. Over the past year, there ap
Page 19 and 20: Figure 1.2. National stocks of high
Page 21 and 22: 1400 kg that were used annually in
Page 30 and 31: 2 Fissile Materials andNuclear Disa
Page 32 and 33: The number of nuclear weapon states
Page 34 and 35: Figure 2.3. An Advanced CruiseMissi
Page 36 and 37: discussed both rationing access to
Page 38 and 39: 3 Declarations of Fissile MaterialS
Page 42 and 43: Figure 3.2. History of U.S. plutoni
Page 44 and 45: If declarations are made early and
Page 46 and 47: Even without such concerns, it coul
Page 48 and 49: Appendix 3A. The U.S. Plutonium and
Page 50 and 51: of nuclear materials, including all
Page 52 and 53: also on all exports and imports of
Page 54 and 55: Appendix 3B.Estimating Plutonium-Pr
Page 56 and 57: Thermal power 20-25 MWt Effective c
Page 58 and 59: 4 Nuclear ArchaeologyVerification o
Page 60 and 61: Between 1992 and 1998, the U.S. Pac
Page 62 and 63: econstructed from the plant’s was
Page 64 and 65: Figure 4.5. Integrated operation of
Page 66 and 67: Figure 4.7. Fissile material produc
Page 68 and 69: • Traces of neptunium. Radioactiv
Page 70 and 71: • conduct all verification activi
Page 72 and 73: When necessary, the verification re
Page 74 and 75: The various aspects of verified war
Page 76 and 77: The numbers of warheads and compone
Page 78 and 79: Quantities of fissile materials in
Page 80 and 81: Figure 5.5. Nuclear-WeaponsIdentifi
Page 82 and 83: There has been considerable skeptic
Page 84 and 85: Below, the ongoing efforts in Russi
Page 86 and 87: down per year. At this blend-down r
Page 88 and 89: Until one or both of these strategi
Page 90 and 91:
Of those options, the study found t
Page 92 and 93:
With regard to the reprocessing of
Page 94 and 95:
weapon-grade plutonium at its Dimon
Page 96:
IPFM graphics redrawn from Bulletin
Page 100 and 101:
Any new production of HEU for react
Page 102 and 103:
The IAEA could similarly use instru
Page 104 and 105:
2007. 327 Russia continues to produ
Page 106 and 107:
The fusion research facility ITER i
Page 108 and 109:
in fact, produce tritium in reactor
Page 110 and 111:
On the other hand, some argue that
Page 112 and 113:
Although we are assuming a world wi
Page 114 and 115:
Countries with reprocessing. Countr
Page 116 and 117:
Figure 8.6. Enrichment level of the
Page 118 and 119:
Transition PeriodThe discussion so
Page 120 and 121:
9 Societal VerificationThe concept
Page 122 and 123:
After the war, Szilard and others e
Page 124 and 125:
The historical record with regard t
Page 126 and 127:
The limitations of the safeguards s
Page 128 and 129:
Understandably, states that provide
Page 130 and 131:
Appendix AFissile Materials and Nuc
Page 132 and 133:
high-density spherical mass. The co
Page 134 and 135:
Figure A.4. The fast-neutron critic
Page 136 and 137:
IsotopeCritical Mass[kg]Half Life[y
Page 138 and 139:
Appendix BWorldwide Locations ofNuc
Page 140 and 141:
IndiaCountry Location/Name Region/P
Page 142 and 143:
RussiaCountry Location/Name Region/
Page 144 and 145:
Country Location/Name Region/Provin
Page 146 and 147:
14.Military Power of the People’s
Page 148 and 149:
44.The French company Areva is plan
Page 150 and 151:
73.An industry source specified 9.1
Page 152 and 153:
102.United Nations Security Council
Page 154 and 155:
Chapter 3. Declarations of Fissile
Page 156 and 157:
153.The design of the UK’s 50 MWe
Page 158 and 159:
185.For example, graphite of the Fr
Page 160 and 161:
210.Robert Norris and Hans Kristens
Page 162 and 163:
237.Arms Control and Nonproliferati
Page 164 and 165:
263.See e.g. Report on the Savannah
Page 166 and 167:
dissolved, leaving 753 tons of LWR
Page 168 and 169:
311.See e.g. Mycle Schneider and Yv
Page 170 and 171:
343.H. A. Feiveson, Latent Prolifer
Page 172 and 173:
368.A. Glaser, “Characteristics o
Page 174 and 175:
398.A recent U.S. Air Force survey
Page 176 and 177:
IPFM Members, Other Contributors to
Page 178 and 179:
Li Bin (Beijing, China, shared memb
Page 180 and 181:
Annette Schaper (Frankfurt, Germany
Page 182 and 183:
Other Contributors to Global Fissil
Page 184 and 185:
SGS Research and Administrative Sta
show all

Global Fissile Material Report 2009: A Path to Nuclear Disarmament

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?