Global Fissile Material Report 2009: A Path to Nuclear Disarmament

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3 Declarations of Fissile MaterialStocks and ProductionSeveral nuclear weapon states have already made public some quantitative informationabout their inventories of fissile materials and nuclear weapons. The United Kingdomhas declared aggregate numbers of its military HEU and plutonium inventories. TheUnited States also provided historical production by year and site, including selectedisotopic characteristics of the materials produced. With regard to nuclear weapon-arsenals,all five NPT weapon states have declared or otherwise made public their stockpilesof total or deployed nuclear weapons: the United States specified the exact number ofdeployed strategic warheads, while China, France, and United Kingdom have given upperbounds of their stockpiles or made other statements that allow a good estimate oftheir total or deployed weapons. 121Declarations are valuable as confidence-building measures even without verification.Increasing amounts of background information and verification will be essential, however,if the declarations are to serve as a basis for deep cuts in nuclear arsenals. Chapter4 discusses verification approaches to fissile material declarations in greater detail,while Chapter 5 lays out the concepts of verified warhead dismantlement. Here, wefocus on some precedents, the desirable content of declarations, and the sequencing ofinformation release.Even without verification arrangements in place, declarations are useful. Expertsfrom other governments and international agencies, and independent analysts willbe able to assess the internal consistency of a declaration and cross-check it with intelligenceor publicly available information. This is particularly true for declarationsof historic fissile material production, which will be the main focus of this chapter.Why Declarations MatterIn 1993, the United States Department of Energy made an initial declaration of thetotal quantity of HEU that the United States had produced. Several justifications for thedeclaration were offered including: 122“As a result of this declassification, the American public will haveinformation that is important to the current debate over propermanagement and ultimate disposition of uranium. The releaseof this information should encourage other nations to declassifysimilar information.32 Global Fissile Material Report 2009
The quantities may aid in public discussions of issues related touranium storage safety and security. […][The data] could have valuable nonproliferation benefits by makingpotential International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards arrangementseasier to implement.”In its March 2006 public report on HEU, the United Kingdom made an explicit connectionbetween its declaration and nuclear disarmament, stating that: 123“ The UK believes that transparency about fissile material acquisitionfor defence purposes will be necessary if nuclear disarmamentis to be achieved; since achieving that goal will depend onbuilding confidence that any figures declared for defence stockpilesof fissile material are consistent with past acquisition anduse. This report is a contribution to building such confidence.”Independent analysts have also emphasized the importance of declarations and theroles they can play in various arms-control contexts, 124 including in reducing the discriminatorynature of the nonproliferation regime, in which NPT weapon states are notlegally required to report their nuclear material holdings to the International AtomicEnergy Agency (IAEA). Preparing declarations and making them public would requirenuclear weapon states to review their records and audit their inventories, and to be heldaccountable for how they manage their fissile material holdings. Extending declarationsof fissile materials to all states would strengthen the nonproliferation regime andsupport efforts to assure the physical security of nuclear materials.Figure 3.1. The U.S. Plutonium and HEU Declarationsof 1996 and 2001. 125 Both studies provide arather detailed account of fissile material productionand consumption by year and site. Appendix 3Adiscusses the methodology used to produce thesestudies and some of the difficulties encountered.The publication of the 2001 HEU report was delayeduntil 2006, apparently because of security concerns,and only released after a series of Freedom of InformationAct appeals by the Federation of AmericanScientists.Global Fissile Material Report 2009
Page 5: Table of ContentsAbout the IPFM 1Fo
Page 8 and 9: ForewordOver the past year, the imp
Page 12: Verified warhead dismantlement. A c
Page 17 and 18: China. Over the past year, there ap
Page 19 and 20: Figure 1.2. National stocks of high
Page 21 and 22: 1400 kg that were used annually in
Page 30 and 31: 2 Fissile Materials andNuclear Disa
Page 32 and 33: The number of nuclear weapon states
Page 34 and 35: Figure 2.3. An Advanced CruiseMissi
Page 36 and 37: discussed both rationing access to
Page 40 and 41: Declarations of fissile material in
Page 42 and 43: Figure 3.2. History of U.S. plutoni
Page 44 and 45: If declarations are made early and
Page 46 and 47: Even without such concerns, it coul
Page 48 and 49: Appendix 3A. The U.S. Plutonium and
Page 50 and 51: of nuclear materials, including all
Page 52 and 53: also on all exports and imports of
Page 54 and 55: Appendix 3B.Estimating Plutonium-Pr
Page 56 and 57: Thermal power 20-25 MWt Effective c
Page 58 and 59: 4 Nuclear ArchaeologyVerification o
Page 60 and 61: Between 1992 and 1998, the U.S. Pac
Page 62 and 63: econstructed from the plant’s was
Page 64 and 65: Figure 4.5. Integrated operation of
Page 66 and 67: Figure 4.7. Fissile material produc
Page 68 and 69: • Traces of neptunium. Radioactiv
Page 70 and 71: • conduct all verification activi
Page 72 and 73: When necessary, the verification re
Page 74 and 75: The various aspects of verified war
Page 76 and 77: The numbers of warheads and compone
Page 78 and 79: Quantities of fissile materials in
Page 80 and 81: Figure 5.5. Nuclear-WeaponsIdentifi
Page 82 and 83: There has been considerable skeptic
Page 84 and 85: Below, the ongoing efforts in Russi
Page 86 and 87: down per year. At this blend-down r
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Until one or both of these strategi
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Of those options, the study found t
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With regard to the reprocessing of
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weapon-grade plutonium at its Dimon
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IPFM graphics redrawn from Bulletin
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Any new production of HEU for react
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The IAEA could similarly use instru
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2007. 327 Russia continues to produ
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The fusion research facility ITER i
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in fact, produce tritium in reactor
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On the other hand, some argue that
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Although we are assuming a world wi
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Countries with reprocessing. Countr
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Figure 8.6. Enrichment level of the
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Transition PeriodThe discussion so
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9 Societal VerificationThe concept
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After the war, Szilard and others e
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The historical record with regard t
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The limitations of the safeguards s
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Understandably, states that provide
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Appendix AFissile Materials and Nuc
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high-density spherical mass. The co
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Figure A.4. The fast-neutron critic
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IsotopeCritical Mass[kg]Half Life[y
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Appendix BWorldwide Locations ofNuc
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IndiaCountry Location/Name Region/P
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RussiaCountry Location/Name Region/
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Country Location/Name Region/Provin
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14.Military Power of the People’s
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44.The French company Areva is plan
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73.An industry source specified 9.1
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102.United Nations Security Council
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Chapter 3. Declarations of Fissile
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153.The design of the UK’s 50 MWe
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185.For example, graphite of the Fr
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210.Robert Norris and Hans Kristens
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237.Arms Control and Nonproliferati
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263.See e.g. Report on the Savannah
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dissolved, leaving 753 tons of LWR
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311.See e.g. Mycle Schneider and Yv
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343.H. A. Feiveson, Latent Prolifer
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368.A. Glaser, “Characteristics o
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398.A recent U.S. Air Force survey
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IPFM Members, Other Contributors to
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Li Bin (Beijing, China, shared memb
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Annette Schaper (Frankfurt, Germany
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Other Contributors to Global Fissil
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SGS Research and Administrative Sta
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Global Fissile Material Report 2009: A Path to Nuclear Disarmament

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