Global Fissile Material Report 2009: A Path to Nuclear Disarmament

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Separative Work Units (SWU) per year today, which is equivalent to a production rateof 150 kg of weapon-grade HEU per year. By the end of 2008, Pakistan’s total cumulativeproduction of HEU would have been about 2.4 tons, but 200–400 kg may havebeen consumed in the 1998 nuclear weapons tests. Our central estimate for Pakistan’scurrent stockpile of HEU is about 2.1 tons. 28India. India produces HEU for its naval propulsion program. It began testing a landbasedprototype naval reactor in 2000–2001 and in July 2009 launched its first nuclearsubmarine for sea trials. 29 The submarine is described as being powered by an 85 megawatt(thermal) (MWt) reactor. 30 Two more submarines are under construction, withtheir hull sections already having been built. Completion of the submarines will takeat least another five years. 31 There is some uncertainty about the level of enrichment ofthe fuel, with suggestions that it is be enriched to 30–45% uranium-235.Estimates of India’s HEU production depend on assumptions about its uranium enrichmentcapacity and whether it also produces HEU for weapons. In order to produceenough HEU by the end of 1999 to fabricate fuel for the land-based prototype submarinereactor core, India would have to have had a total enrichment capacity of at least3000 SWU/yr by then. 32 A 2007 estimate, citing Indian purchases of a large numberof centrifuge components, suggested that India could have an enrichment capacity ofabout 20,000 to 30,000 SWU/yr. 33 This capacity would be sufficient to produce 200–300 kg per year of HEU at 45% enrichment, or half this amount of 90% enriched HEUper year. This would give India enough separative capacity to produce HEU for foursubmarine cores by 2010.North Korea. In early September 2009, Korea News Service reported that the permanentrepresentative of the DPRK to the United Nations had submitted a letter to thepresident of the UN Security Council in late August 2009, noting that—among otherthings—“experimental uranium enrichment has successfully been conducted to enterinto completion phase.” 34Israel. We continue to assign to Israel an inventory of 100 kg of HEU, which may havebeen acquired covertly from the United States before 1966. 35 Israel also may have producedenriched uranium with laser or centrifuge technology, but information on thisprogram is very limited and it may have ended.South Africa. South Africa has a legacy stockpile of 400–450 kg of HEU that was part ofits weapons program and is currently under IAEA safeguards. 36 This is what remainsfrom an original stock of over 800 kg of HEU with an average enrichment of about80%. Since its research reactor has been converted to low-enriched uranium fuel, 37South Africa only uses HEU for a target material to produce molybdenum-99 for medical-isotopeuse. This use too could be converted to low-enriched uranium. 38Civilian Use of HEU. Since 1978, an international effort has been directed at convertingHEU-fueled reactors to low-enriched fuel in the Reduced Enrichment for Research andTest Reactor (RERTR) program. Almost all new reactors designed since that time use LEUfuel. By 30 September 2009, the RERTR program intended to have converted or partiallyconverted 68 research reactors and plans to convert another 40 reactors by 2014. 39There are many reactors whose conversion has not been seriously discussed, however—notably in Russia, which has yet to begin shutdown or conversion of almost 70 of itsown HEU-fueled research reactors, most of them little used. 40 There are also reactorsin the West that may resist conversion. 41 The world’s remaining research reactors consumeabout 800 kilograms of HEU per year—a significant reduction from more than14 Global Fissile Material Report 2009
1400 kg that were used annually in the early 1980s. We continue to assign about 70tons of HEU to the civilian research reactor fuel cycle, which includes about 10 tons(6.7 tons of 235 U in HEU) that are under IAEA safeguards in NPT non-weapon states andat least 1.3 tons under voluntary offer agreements in weapon states. 42Civilian uranium enrichment plants. There are currently civilian uranium enrichmentplants operating, under construction or planned in ten states. These enrichmentplants are intended to produce LEU for nuclear power reactor fuel, but could in principlequickly be turned to producing HEU for weapons. Appendix 1A lists all enrichmentplants and whether they are under or have been offered for International AtomicEnergy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. About half are under safeguards.The two new enrichment plants to begin initial testing and operation in 2009 wereAreva’s George Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant, located at the Tricastin Site inFrance, and Urenco’s Eunice plant in the United States. 43 Two additional new largescalecentrifuge enrichment plants are at various stages of development in the UnitedStates and could be completed over the next decade. 44 Also, in July 2009, Global LaserEnrichment (GLE) filed a U.S. license application for a large laser-enrichment plant tobegin commercial operation in 2012. 45 There were significant capacity increases at theUrenco enrichment plants in Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom,which together delivered an additional 1300 tSWU in 2008 compared to 2007. 46 Russiaalso has been increasing the capacity at its domestic enrichment plants, 47 as well as atthe centrifuge plant it supplied to China. In March 2009, Russia announced plans withToshiba to build an enrichment plant in Japan. 48Separated PlutoniumSince 1944, more than 60 dedicated reactors have been used by the nine weapon statesto produce plutonium for weapons purposes (IPFM estimate). As of 2009, nearly allof these reactors have been closed-down or dismantled and only India, Pakistan andperhaps Israel continue to produce plutonium for weapons. In addition, six countriesreprocess their commercial spent fuel today: France, India, Japan, and Russia are deeplycommitted to reprocessing; China is testing a pilot reprocessing plant and is contemplatingcommercial reprocessing; and the United Kingdom is on the verge of abandoningreprocessing.The global stockpile of separated plutonium is about 500 tons. It is divided almostequally between civilian and military stocks—the latter including material declaredexcess but not yet disposed (Figure 1.3). Separated plutonium exists mostly in nuclearweaponstates, but Japan and Germany also have significant stocks. The buildup ofcivilian stockpiles has slowed down with a dozen countries not renewing their contractsto have their spent fuel reprocessed by France, Russia and/or the UK and boththe United Kingdom and Japan having to shut down their reprocessing plants becauseof equipment problems.Weapons plutonium. Russia and the United States possess by far the largest stocks ofmilitary plutonium: 120–170 and 92 tons, respectively. Russia has declared 34 tonsof its weapon-grade plutonium excess for military purposes. 49 The United States hasdeclared excess 54 tons of separated government-owned plutonium, which includes9 additional tons of weapon-grade plutonium added in September 2007. 50 In 1998,the United Kingdom declared excess 0.3 tons of its 3.5-ton stockpile of weapon-gradeplutonium. 51Global Fissile Material Report 2009 15
Page 5: Table of ContentsAbout the IPFM 1Fo
Page 8 and 9: ForewordOver the past year, the imp
Page 12: Verified warhead dismantlement. A c
Page 17 and 18: China. Over the past year, there ap
Page 19: Figure 1.2. National stocks of high
Page 30 and 31: 2 Fissile Materials andNuclear Disa
Page 32 and 33: The number of nuclear weapon states
Page 34 and 35: Figure 2.3. An Advanced CruiseMissi
Page 36 and 37: discussed both rationing access to
Page 38 and 39: 3 Declarations of Fissile MaterialS
Page 40 and 41: Declarations of fissile material in
Page 42 and 43: Figure 3.2. History of U.S. plutoni
Page 44 and 45: If declarations are made early and
Page 46 and 47: Even without such concerns, it coul
Page 48 and 49: Appendix 3A. The U.S. Plutonium and
Page 50 and 51: of nuclear materials, including all
Page 52 and 53: also on all exports and imports of
Page 54 and 55: Appendix 3B.Estimating Plutonium-Pr
Page 56 and 57: Thermal power 20-25 MWt Effective c
Page 58 and 59: 4 Nuclear ArchaeologyVerification o
Page 60 and 61: Between 1992 and 1998, the U.S. Pac
Page 62 and 63: econstructed from the plant’s was
Page 64 and 65: Figure 4.5. Integrated operation of
Page 66 and 67: Figure 4.7. Fissile material produc
Page 68 and 69: • Traces of neptunium. Radioactiv
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• conduct all verification activi
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When necessary, the verification re
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The various aspects of verified war
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The numbers of warheads and compone
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Quantities of fissile materials in
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Figure 5.5. Nuclear-WeaponsIdentifi
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There has been considerable skeptic
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Below, the ongoing efforts in Russi
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down per year. At this blend-down r
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Until one or both of these strategi
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Of those options, the study found t
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With regard to the reprocessing of
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weapon-grade plutonium at its Dimon
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IPFM graphics redrawn from Bulletin
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Any new production of HEU for react
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The IAEA could similarly use instru
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2007. 327 Russia continues to produ
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The fusion research facility ITER i
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in fact, produce tritium in reactor
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On the other hand, some argue that
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Although we are assuming a world wi
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Countries with reprocessing. Countr
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Figure 8.6. Enrichment level of the
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Transition PeriodThe discussion so
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9 Societal VerificationThe concept
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After the war, Szilard and others e
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The historical record with regard t
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The limitations of the safeguards s
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Understandably, states that provide
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Appendix AFissile Materials and Nuc
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high-density spherical mass. The co
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Figure A.4. The fast-neutron critic
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IsotopeCritical Mass[kg]Half Life[y
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Appendix BWorldwide Locations ofNuc
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IndiaCountry Location/Name Region/P
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RussiaCountry Location/Name Region/
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Country Location/Name Region/Provin
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14.Military Power of the People’s
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44.The French company Areva is plan
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73.An industry source specified 9.1
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102.United Nations Security Council
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Chapter 3. Declarations of Fissile
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153.The design of the UK’s 50 MWe
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185.For example, graphite of the Fr
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210.Robert Norris and Hans Kristens
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237.Arms Control and Nonproliferati
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263.See e.g. Report on the Savannah
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dissolved, leaving 753 tons of LWR
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311.See e.g. Mycle Schneider and Yv
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343.H. A. Feiveson, Latent Prolifer
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368.A. Glaser, “Characteristics o
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398.A recent U.S. Air Force survey
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IPFM Members, Other Contributors to
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Li Bin (Beijing, China, shared memb
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Annette Schaper (Frankfurt, Germany
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Other Contributors to Global Fissil
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SGS Research and Administrative Sta
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Global Fissile Material Report 2009: A Path to Nuclear Disarmament

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