Global Fissile Material Report 2009: A Path to Nuclear Disarmament

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In July 2009, the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba),signed by 52 countries, came into force after it was ratified by Burundi, meeting therequirement for 28 parties to do so. 18 Among its novel provisions, the treaty prohibitsattacks on nuclear facilities in the zone. The new treaties join those of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga,Bangkok, and Antarctica (Figure 1.1). All countries in the southern hemisphereare now in nuclear-weapon free zones.Figure 1.1. Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, 2009.There are now five nuclear weapons free zones,covering over 110 countries, including all thecountries in the Southern hemisphere.Highly Enriched Uranium StocksFigure 1.2 shows that more than 99 percent of the global stock of highly enriched uraniumis in the nuclear-weapon states. Only the United Kingdom and the United Stateshave made public the total sizes of their stocks of HEU. 19 Estimates of the remainingnational holdings are generally quite uncertain. According to these estimates, despitethe elimination of almost 500 tons of Russian and U.S. HEU by down-blending to lowenricheduranium, the global inventory still totals 1610 ± 300 tons—rounded to 1600tons elsewhere in this report.The main uncertainty in estimating the global total is due to a lack of information onRussia’s stockpile, which may have been as large as 1500 tons in the 1990s. A 20% uncertaintyis assumed in the figures for total stocks in China and Pakistan, and for themilitary stockpile in France, and 50% for India.Russia. Our central estimate of Russia’s stockpile continues to be based on a statementin 1993 by then Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov that “the 500 metric tonsof HEU that is up for sale represents somewhere around 40 percent of all reserves thatwe [Russia] possess.” 20 This implies a 1993 total stockpile of about 1250 tons of HEU,which is somewhat higher than what U.S. government and non-government expertshad previously assumed, but consistent with publicly available information on Russia’sfissile material production complex. As of June 2009, Russia had eliminated 367 outof 500 tons of weapon-grade HEU as part of its 1993 HEU deal with the United States,which is to be completed in 2013. 2112 Global Fissile Material Report 2009
Figure 1.2. National stocks of highly enricheduranium as of mid-2009. The numbers for the UnitedKingdom and United States are based on theirpublications. The civilian HEU stocks of France, theUnited Kingdom are based on their public declarationsto the IAEA. Numbers with asterisks arenon-governmental estimates, often with largeuncertainties. 22 Numbers for Russian and U.S.excess HEU are for June 2009. HEU in non-nuclearweapon (NNW) states is under IAEA safeguards. A20% uncertainty is assumed in the figures for totalstocks in China, Pakistan and Russia, and for themilitary stockpile in France, and 50% for India.United States. As of mid-2009, the United States had down-blended cumulatively about124 tons of highly enriched uranium 23 —mostly less than weapon-grade. Based on thedeclared total inventory of 741 tons from September 1996, this leaves 109 tons of excessHEU (mostly for blend-down), about 30 tons of civilian HEU (fresh and irradiated),about 100 tons of HEU in spent naval reactor fuel, which is to be disposed of as radioactivewaste, and about 380 tons of unirradiated HEU in the military stockpile. Thismilitary total includes about 250 tons available for weapons and 128 tons of fresh HEUreserved for naval propulsion. 24Pakistan. Pakistan may be the only country producing HEU for weapons today. It isbelieved to have first achieved the capacity to produce a significant quantity of HEU inthe early 1980s and to have built up its enrichment capacity using P-2 centrifuges andlater more advanced P-3 and P-4 designs. 25 There have been claims that, along withits Kahuta enrichment facility, Pakistan may have an enrichment plant at Gadwal. 26Reportedly near Wah, about 30 kilometers from Islamabad, Gadwal was described recentlyas a facility where already enriched uranium (presumably from Kahuta) is enrichedfurther to weapon-grade. 27Pakistan’s annual HEU production capacity is constrained by its limited domesticproduction of natural uranium and the need also to fuel its Khushab-I plutoniumproduction reactor. To address this problem, Pakistan may have started to use reprocesseduranium recovered from Khushab spent fuel as feed for its uranium-enrichmentprogram. We estimate Pakistan’s enrichment capacity to be on the order of 30,000Global Fissile Material Report 2009 13
Page 5: Table of ContentsAbout the IPFM 1Fo
Page 8 and 9: ForewordOver the past year, the imp
Page 12: Verified warhead dismantlement. A c
Page 17: China. Over the past year, there ap
Page 21 and 22: 1400 kg that were used annually in
Page 30 and 31: 2 Fissile Materials andNuclear Disa
Page 32 and 33: The number of nuclear weapon states
Page 34 and 35: Figure 2.3. An Advanced CruiseMissi
Page 36 and 37: discussed both rationing access to
Page 38 and 39: 3 Declarations of Fissile MaterialS
Page 40 and 41: Declarations of fissile material in
Page 42 and 43: Figure 3.2. History of U.S. plutoni
Page 44 and 45: If declarations are made early and
Page 46 and 47: Even without such concerns, it coul
Page 48 and 49: Appendix 3A. The U.S. Plutonium and
Page 50 and 51: of nuclear materials, including all
Page 52 and 53: also on all exports and imports of
Page 54 and 55: Appendix 3B.Estimating Plutonium-Pr
Page 56 and 57: Thermal power 20-25 MWt Effective c
Page 58 and 59: 4 Nuclear ArchaeologyVerification o
Page 60 and 61: Between 1992 and 1998, the U.S. Pac
Page 62 and 63: econstructed from the plant’s was
Page 64 and 65: Figure 4.5. Integrated operation of
Page 66 and 67: Figure 4.7. Fissile material produc
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• Traces of neptunium. Radioactiv
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• conduct all verification activi
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When necessary, the verification re
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The various aspects of verified war
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The numbers of warheads and compone
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Quantities of fissile materials in
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Figure 5.5. Nuclear-WeaponsIdentifi
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There has been considerable skeptic
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Below, the ongoing efforts in Russi
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down per year. At this blend-down r
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Until one or both of these strategi
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Of those options, the study found t
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With regard to the reprocessing of
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weapon-grade plutonium at its Dimon
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IPFM graphics redrawn from Bulletin
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Any new production of HEU for react
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The IAEA could similarly use instru
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2007. 327 Russia continues to produ
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The fusion research facility ITER i
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in fact, produce tritium in reactor
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On the other hand, some argue that
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Although we are assuming a world wi
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Countries with reprocessing. Countr
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Figure 8.6. Enrichment level of the
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Transition PeriodThe discussion so
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9 Societal VerificationThe concept
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After the war, Szilard and others e
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The historical record with regard t
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The limitations of the safeguards s
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Understandably, states that provide
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Appendix AFissile Materials and Nuc
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high-density spherical mass. The co
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Figure A.4. The fast-neutron critic
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IsotopeCritical Mass[kg]Half Life[y
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Appendix BWorldwide Locations ofNuc
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IndiaCountry Location/Name Region/P
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RussiaCountry Location/Name Region/
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Country Location/Name Region/Provin
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14.Military Power of the People’s
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44.The French company Areva is plan
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73.An industry source specified 9.1
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102.United Nations Security Council
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Chapter 3. Declarations of Fissile
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153.The design of the UK’s 50 MWe
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185.For example, graphite of the Fr
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210.Robert Norris and Hans Kristens
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237.Arms Control and Nonproliferati
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263.See e.g. Report on the Savannah
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dissolved, leaving 753 tons of LWR
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311.See e.g. Mycle Schneider and Yv
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343.H. A. Feiveson, Latent Prolifer
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368.A. Glaser, “Characteristics o
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398.A recent U.S. Air Force survey
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IPFM Members, Other Contributors to
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Li Bin (Beijing, China, shared memb
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Annette Schaper (Frankfurt, Germany
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Other Contributors to Global Fissil
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SGS Research and Administrative Sta
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Global Fissile Material Report 2009: A Path to Nuclear Disarmament

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