CTA Report, Draft 1, ISP Review - US Chemical Safety and Hazard ...

4. The Borden Chemical product stewardship program did not explicitly convey to CTA the
explosive hazards of phenolic resins.
The Borden Chemical phenolic resin MSDSs noted that the phenolic resins were combustible dusts
but did not explicitly warn that they could be explosive. Following the catastrophic explosion at the
Jahn Foundry in 1999—which involved one of Borden Chemical’s phenolic resins—Borden
Chemical did not enhance warnings on its MSDSs nor did it communicate the safety lessons of the
Jahn investigation to CTA.
5. The CertainTeed building design and CTA building modifications did not effectively address
the fire and explosion hazards associated with combustible dusts.
The NFPA 654 standard on combustible dust safety only applied to the plastics industry in 1972; it
did not cover operations such as CertainTeed’s. Nonetheless, following the building design
principles contained in the standard could have prevented or mitigated the incident at CTA. Those
principles include:
• Minimizing flat surfaces to prevent accumulation of combustible dusts.
• Installation of adequate firewalls and blast-resistant physical barriers and deflagration venting to
prevent the spread of fire and explosive forces beyond the production area.
CTA also did not use these principles when it made facility modifications.
12.2 Contributing Causes
1. The line 405 oven lacked fire detection devices and automatic sprinklers.
NFPA 86, Standard for Ovens and Furnaces (2003), recommends evaluating the need to install
automatic water sprinklers in ovens that accumulate appreciable quantities of combustible material.
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