CTA Report, Draft 1, ISP Review - US Chemical Safety and Hazard ...

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K st (bar-m/sec) 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 117 128 156 165 Cornstarch SD-52SS + Carbon Black #2 Polyethylene Pittsburgh Pulverized Coal Dust Figure 14. Explosion severity of Durite SD-52SS compared with other common combustible dusts. 7.2.2 Prepared Laboratory Samples Dust that settled in the CTA production area was typically a mixture of phenolic resin and small fiberglass fibers. Samples of ground fiberglass and phenolic resin were mixed in varying percentages in the CSB contractor’s laboratory and tested. The test results show that as the fiberglass content increased, the mixtures remain explosible, but explosion severity decreased (Figure 15). Kst (bar-m/sec) 200 150 100 50 0 0 30 Percent of Fiberglass in Resin/Fiberglass Mixture 50 Figure 15. Explosivity testing results for resin/fiberglass mixtures. 58
7.3 Line 405 Equipment Testing CSB identified equipment on line 405 that required testing, including: • Oven temperature controller. • Gas piping and manifold components. • Electrical components near the point of origin of the fire. A CSB contractor tested these components. In some cases, fire and explosion damage prevented CSB from drawing useful conclusions. Results of the testing are presented below and in Appendix C. Holes for wiring in the burner temperature control box allowed fiberglass, dust, and oily material to enter and accumulate on electrical connections. This debris may have contributed to the failure of the temperature controller. CSB could not determine if this actually impacted the operation of the controller because loss of electric power in the facility and failure of the backup battery erased the controller memory. Therefore, no historical data were available regarding the operating temperatures of the oven prior to or during the incident. Line 405 distribution gas piping and oven manifold components were tested to determine whether they released natural gas (Section 7.1.2.1 and Appendix C). No leaks were found that would have released gas into the building. Electrical components near the point of origin of the fire and explosion were tested to see if they were ignition sources. No evidence was found in line 405 electrical boxes or associated wiring from the oven oiling system that indicated they were a source of ignition. 59
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KEY ISSUES: U.S. CHEMICAL S AFETY A
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5.1.2 Line 405 Oven Temperature Con
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9.1 FM Global Guidelines...........
Page 7 and 8: Figures 1 Simplified Layout of CTA
Page 9 and 10: ACC American Chemistry Council Acro
Page 11 and 12: Executive Summary A February 20, 20
Page 13 and 14: 1.0 Introduction At approximately 7
Page 15 and 16: 2.0 Key Findings 1. Combustible phe
Page 17 and 18: 3.0 Facility Description 3.1 CTA Ac
Page 19 and 20: eams. Nonload-bearing masonry block
Page 21 and 22: Thirteen-foot-high freestanding enc
Page 23 and 24: 4.0 Process Description The product
Page 25 and 26: 4.1.2 Mat-former and Baghouse In th
Page 27 and 28: Circulating fans and dampers direct
Page 29 and 30: • Manually striking baghouse bags
Page 31 and 32: 5.0 Incident Description 5.1 Pre-In
Page 33 and 34: • The line was one week past due
Page 35 and 36: forklift with a semi-enclosed cab d
Page 37 and 38: panels and lights down inside the b
Page 39 and 40: occurred in the southeast corner of
Page 41 and 42: 5.3.3 Firefighting Activities 5.3.3
Page 43 and 44: 5.4 Incident Aftermath The CTA inci
Page 45 and 46: 6.0 Understanding Combustible Dust
Page 47 and 48: As depicted in Figure 11 (Eckhoff,
Page 49 and 50: Figure 12. Mechanism for a dust fir
Page 51 and 52: 7.0 Reconstructive Analysis To dete
Page 53 and 54: urned clean but otherwise intact an
Page 55 and 56: 7.1.2 Other Possible Initiating Eve
Page 57: Table 3 Borden Chemical Black Pheno
Page 61 and 62: determine if those products are haz
Page 63 and 64: that the phenolic resin could explo
Page 65 and 66: A 1998 internal Borden Chemical mem
Page 67 and 68: • Characterize new and existing p
Page 69 and 70: CTA that phenolic resins, when susp
Page 71 and 72: CTA department supervisors were res
Page 73 and 74: 8.5 Work Practices 8.5.1 Production
Page 75 and 76: operating the oven with the doors o
Page 77 and 78: 8.7 Incident Investigations The inc
Page 79 and 80: • Excessive accumulations of comb
Page 81 and 82: Data Sheet 6-9 also states: Clean o
Page 83 and 84: Table 5 Insurance Company Dust Issu
Page 85 and 86: standards (Appendix D). Kentucky OS
Page 87 and 88: 10.2.2 Division of Building Codes E
Page 89 and 90: 11.0 Combustible Dust Hazard Study
Page 91 and 92: 4. The Borden Chemical product stew
Page 93 and 94: 13.0 Recommendations CSB developed
Page 95 and 96: Kentucky Office of Occupational Saf
Page 97 and 98: BY THE U.S. Chemical Safety and Haz
Page 99 and 100: Lawson, Robert G., 1984. Beverly Hi
Page 101 and 102: APPENDIX A: Fire and Explosion Dama
Page 103 and 104: APPENDIX B: Laboratory Testing of P
Page 105 and 106: B.2 Minimum Explosible Concentratio
Page 107 and 108: B.4 Propagating Brush Discharge Ign
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Material Corona Charge Voltage (kV)
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APPENDIX C: Equipment Testing Line
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II controllers, only manufactured a
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Therefore, at any given time, it wa
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APPENDIX D: NFPA Guidelines In prom
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D.2 Other Pertinent NFPA Codes D.2.
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APPENDIX E: HMIS Rating System The
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APPENDIX F: Simplified Organization
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Subtree A Second dust explosion abo
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Subtree C Most CTA personnel had a
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