CTA Report, Draft 1, ISP Review - US Chemical Safety and Hazard ...
CTA Report, Draft 1, ISP Review - US Chemical Safety and Hazard ...
CTA Report, Draft 1, ISP Review - US Chemical Safety and Hazard ...
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
• Physical marks (e.g., fire patterns) left by the fire.<br />
• Physical debris <strong>and</strong> damage, which indicated the direction <strong>and</strong> relative force of the<br />
explosions.<br />
• Observations reported by persons who witnessed the fire or explosions, or who were aware of<br />
conditions at the time.<br />
7.1.1.1 Point of Origin<br />
CSB confirmed the conclusions of ATF <strong>and</strong> the State Fire Marshal that the fire <strong>and</strong> initial explosion<br />
originated at the line 405 oven. Based on eyewitness accounts <strong>and</strong> examination of physical evidence,<br />
CSB determined that the initial explosion’s point of origin was likely in the aisle on the east side of the<br />
line 405 oven, near the south end. A number of employees stated that they saw the initial flash at this<br />
location.<br />
The partially collapsed concrete block masonry firewall east of the oven also provided evidence of the<br />
location of the initial explosion. A metal cabinet along the wall had been knocked over <strong>and</strong> was found<br />
lying against the oven.<br />
In contrast, the west side of the oven received only fire damage rather than explosion damage. Also,<br />
burned resin deposits were on the exhaust hood located over the conveyor where the fiber mat enters the<br />
oven. Rolls of facing <strong>and</strong> empty spindles were burned but otherwise intact. The metal ducts that<br />
extended above the oven were warped <strong>and</strong> discolored—signs of extreme heat <strong>and</strong> external fire, but not<br />
explosion damage.<br />
CSB also examined the interior of the oven; virtually all the combustible material that likely had been<br />
inside was burned away (Figure 13). In contrast, the interior of the ovens on lines 401, 402, <strong>and</strong> 403<br />
contained accumulations of resin powder/fiberglass debris. The chain-driven oven flights for 405 were<br />
52