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CTA Report, Draft 1, ISP Review - US Chemical Safety and Hazard ...

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On February 20, 2003—the day of the explosion—<strong>CTA</strong> was scheduled to begin installing new makeup<br />

air units on lines 403 <strong>and</strong> 405.<br />

5.1.2 Line 405 Oven Temperature Controller<br />

Interviews with operators on line 405 <strong>and</strong> maintenance personnel, <strong>and</strong> a review of shift production logs<br />

revealed problems with the temperature controller for the curing oven as far back as December 20, 2002;<br />

the oven was running too hot. Production log entries noted that maintenance personnel had attempted to<br />

fix the controller on five occasions since December 2002.<br />

Four days prior to the explosion, the temperature controller was no longer regulating the oven temperature<br />

so controls were switched to manual by the line operators. The oven temperature was then controlled by<br />

opening <strong>and</strong> closing the access doors on the east <strong>and</strong> west sides of the oven. Since there was no spare<br />

controller available in the maintenance shop, an order for a new controller was placed with a supplier.<br />

5.1.3 Line 405 Baghouse<br />

<strong>CTA</strong> initially planned to replace the line 405 baghouse in 1996-97. Minutes from a December 1996 staff<br />

meeting indicate that two baghouse manufacturers were prepared to bid on the project. However, <strong>CTA</strong><br />

management opted not to fund the replacement of the baghouse at that time. A new cylindrical dust<br />

collector was erected in 2002 on a free-st<strong>and</strong>ing structure along the south wall of the facility to replace<br />

both the line 403 <strong>and</strong> 405 baghouses, but at the time of the explosion, it was not operational because new<br />

piping still needed to be connected.<br />

A few days prior to the explosion, line 405 operators were having problems with clogged bags in the<br />

baghouse. Operator statements <strong>and</strong> notations on shift production logs show that the baghouse was<br />

running at a high differential pressure, which indicated the bags were clogged. To unclog them, the bags<br />

had to be shaken repeatedly each shift. Operators also manually beat the bags with sticks during the line<br />

cleaning to remove the dust. They attributed the clogging problem to two causes:<br />

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