CTA Report, Draft 1, ISP Review - US Chemical Safety and Hazard ...

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Location Damage Cause Line 402 Metal wall panel separating lines 402 and 403 pushed westward Line 401 North wall of chemical room East wall of plant north of loading dock South wall of plant near new cylindrical dust collector West wall of plant near south wall North wall of plant near west corner Production area Baghouses on lines 403 and 405 Dust collectors on lines 401 and 402 Metal panels of blend room enclosure, particularly in northeast portion, permanently deformed outward Steel columns in blend room permanently bent to west Concrete block masonry firewalls on south end collapsed or severely deformed Building roof above blend room enclosure destroyed Sliding door bent and concrete block wall deformed Higher explosion overpressure in vents through wall panel Higher explosion overpressure inside blend room due to confinement Higher explosion overpressure generated in confined area between blend room roof and ceiling Higher explosion overpressure from line 401 Metal curtain wall pushed outward Higher explosion overpressure from line 405 vented outside building Metal curtain wall pushed outward Higher explosion overpressure from line 405 vented outside building Metal curtain wall pushed outward Higher explosion overpressure from line 401 vented outside building Loading dock door bent Higher explosion overpressure from line 401 vented outside building Charred combustible material adhered to vertical surfaces; horizontal surfaces, covered by combustible material, primarily charred at exposed exterior surfaces Bags burned up Fires inside baghouses Access doors on dust collectors blown off Slow burning of combustible phenolic resin material throughout production area; hot gases freely expanding throughout building prevented large overpressures from developing outside of blend rooms and confined areas above blend room roofs Higher pressure inside dust collectors due to fire or venting of explosion overpressure 102
APPENDIX B: Laboratory Testing of Phenolic Resin CSB contracted with Safety Consulting Engineers, Inc. (SCE), 27 for explosibility, ignitability, and reactivity testing of the phenolic resin used at CTA. Samples were taken of Borden Chemical Durite SD- 52SS and residual resin dust from production lines 401, 402, 403, and 405. The explosion characteristics of the phenolic resin were then compared with other common combustible dusts, as described in Sections B.1 to B.6. B.1 Explosion Severity The explosion severity test determines the deflagration parameters of a combustible dust-air mixture. The parameters measured are maximum pressure (Pmax) and maximum rate of pressure rise (dP/dt)max. Data obtained from this test method provide a relative measure of deflagration characteristics for calculation of the deflagration index, Kst. This index is the maximum dP/dt (dP/dtmax) normalized to a 1 m³ volume. The dust material was first dried and then tested in a U. S. Bureau of Mines 20-liter explosibility test chamber per ASTM E1226-00, Standard Test Method for Pressure and Rate of Pressure Rise for Combustible Dusts (2000c). The 20-liter chamber was equipped with an air nozzle to disperse the material dust and two electrodes for connecting two squib (SOBBE) igniters (2 × 5 kJ = 10 kJ of stored ignition energy) to a voltage source. The chamber was equipped with a pressure transducer to measure the pressure output of an explosion. The data is collected by a high-speed computer-based data acquisition system. The pressure transducer is calibrated (psig/volts) at various pressures using a pressure test gauge. 27 The information in Appendix B is adapted from a report prepared by SCE, Schaumburg, Illinois, on the testing and analysis of phenolic resin used at the CTA facility. 103
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KEY ISSUES: U.S. CHEMICAL S AFETY A
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5.1.2 Line 405 Oven Temperature Con
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9.1 FM Global Guidelines...........
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Figures 1 Simplified Layout of CTA
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ACC American Chemistry Council Acro
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Executive Summary A February 20, 20
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1.0 Introduction At approximately 7
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2.0 Key Findings 1. Combustible phe
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3.0 Facility Description 3.1 CTA Ac
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eams. Nonload-bearing masonry block
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Thirteen-foot-high freestanding enc
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4.0 Process Description The product
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4.1.2 Mat-former and Baghouse In th
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Circulating fans and dampers direct
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• Manually striking baghouse bags
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5.0 Incident Description 5.1 Pre-In
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• The line was one week past due
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forklift with a semi-enclosed cab d
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panels and lights down inside the b
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occurred in the southeast corner of
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5.3.3 Firefighting Activities 5.3.3
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5.4 Incident Aftermath The CTA inci
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6.0 Understanding Combustible Dust
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As depicted in Figure 11 (Eckhoff,
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Figure 12. Mechanism for a dust fir
Page 51 and 52: 7.0 Reconstructive Analysis To dete
Page 53 and 54: urned clean but otherwise intact an
Page 55 and 56: 7.1.2 Other Possible Initiating Eve
Page 57 and 58: Table 3 Borden Chemical Black Pheno
Page 59 and 60: 7.3 Line 405 Equipment Testing CSB
Page 61 and 62: determine if those products are haz
Page 63 and 64: that the phenolic resin could explo
Page 65 and 66: A 1998 internal Borden Chemical mem
Page 67 and 68: • Characterize new and existing p
Page 69 and 70: CTA that phenolic resins, when susp
Page 71 and 72: CTA department supervisors were res
Page 73 and 74: 8.5 Work Practices 8.5.1 Production
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Page 77 and 78: 8.7 Incident Investigations The inc
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Page 81 and 82: Data Sheet 6-9 also states: Clean o
Page 83 and 84: Table 5 Insurance Company Dust Issu
Page 85 and 86: standards (Appendix D). Kentucky OS
Page 87 and 88: 10.2.2 Division of Building Codes E
Page 89 and 90: 11.0 Combustible Dust Hazard Study
Page 91 and 92: 4. The Borden Chemical product stew
Page 93 and 94: 13.0 Recommendations CSB developed
Page 95 and 96: Kentucky Office of Occupational Saf
Page 97 and 98: BY THE U.S. Chemical Safety and Haz
Page 99 and 100: Lawson, Robert G., 1984. Beverly Hi
Page 101: APPENDIX A: Fire and Explosion Dama
Page 105 and 106: B.2 Minimum Explosible Concentratio
Page 107 and 108: B.4 Propagating Brush Discharge Ign
Page 109 and 110: Material Corona Charge Voltage (kV)
Page 111 and 112: APPENDIX C: Equipment Testing Line
Page 113 and 114: II controllers, only manufactured a
Page 115 and 116: Therefore, at any given time, it wa
Page 117 and 118: APPENDIX D: NFPA Guidelines In prom
Page 119 and 120: D.2 Other Pertinent NFPA Codes D.2.
Page 121 and 122: APPENDIX E: HMIS Rating System The
Page 123 and 124: APPENDIX F: Simplified Organization
Page 125 and 126: Subtree A Second dust explosion abo
Page 127: Subtree C Most CTA personnel had a
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