CTA Report, Draft 1, ISP Review - US Chemical Safety and Hazard ...

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Raftery, Monica, 1975. Explosibility Tests for Industrial Dusts, Fire Research Technical Paper No. 21, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London, United Kingdom. U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, 2004. Investigation Report, Dust Explosion, West Pharmaceutical Services, Inc., Kinston, North Carolina, January 29, 2003, Report No. 2003-07- I-NC, September 2004. 100
APPENDIX A: Fire and Explosion Damage Table A-1 lists damage at the CTA facility as a result of the February 20, 2003, fire and dust explosions. The damage is broken down by specific plant area and likely cause. Table A-1 Fire and Explosion Damage Location Damage Cause Line 405 South of line 405 Between lines 403 and 405 Line 403 Concrete block masonry firewall on east side partially collapsed and pushed eastward Metal panels detached at south end of partially enclosed area above blend room deformed in southward direction Explosion overpressure originated in area between oven and wall and in partially enclosed area above blend room and below ceiling Higher explosion overpressure in partially enclosed area above blend room and below ceiling Damage to building roof above line Higher explosion overpressure inside plant in this area Ceiling panels and lights pushed downward Wall and polycarbonate panels of blend room deformed and pushed out in westward direction Combustible material inside curing oven burned away; metal conveyor burned clean and free of debris; no explosion damage observed inside oven Concrete block masonry firewalls surrounding room directly south of line and near raw material storage area permanently deformed Fire scorching in area where no masonry walls extend to ceiling; residual burnt resin material attached to open-web steel joists Concrete block masonry firewall in open bay between lines collapsed Metal panels above east wall of blend room pushed westward Oven exhaust line and thermal oxidizer inlet line separated Higher explosion overpressure in partially enclosed area above blend room Higher explosion overpressure inside blend room Burning of accumulated phenolic resins and some chain oil inside oven Higher explosion overpressure in room south of line Path of fire traveled from production area into raw material storage area Damage consistent with large rebound movement of wall aided by wrap-around pressure Higher explosion overpressure east of line Higher explosion overpressure inside thermal oxidizer piping 101
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KEY ISSUES: U.S. CHEMICAL S AFETY A
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5.1.2 Line 405 Oven Temperature Con
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9.1 FM Global Guidelines...........
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Figures 1 Simplified Layout of CTA
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ACC American Chemistry Council Acro
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Executive Summary A February 20, 20
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1.0 Introduction At approximately 7
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2.0 Key Findings 1. Combustible phe
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3.0 Facility Description 3.1 CTA Ac
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eams. Nonload-bearing masonry block
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Thirteen-foot-high freestanding enc
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4.0 Process Description The product
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4.1.2 Mat-former and Baghouse In th
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Circulating fans and dampers direct
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• Manually striking baghouse bags
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5.0 Incident Description 5.1 Pre-In
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• The line was one week past due
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forklift with a semi-enclosed cab d
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panels and lights down inside the b
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occurred in the southeast corner of
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5.3.3 Firefighting Activities 5.3.3
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5.4 Incident Aftermath The CTA inci
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6.0 Understanding Combustible Dust
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As depicted in Figure 11 (Eckhoff,
Page 49 and 50: Figure 12. Mechanism for a dust fir
Page 51 and 52: 7.0 Reconstructive Analysis To dete
Page 53 and 54: urned clean but otherwise intact an
Page 55 and 56: 7.1.2 Other Possible Initiating Eve
Page 57 and 58: Table 3 Borden Chemical Black Pheno
Page 59 and 60: 7.3 Line 405 Equipment Testing CSB
Page 61 and 62: determine if those products are haz
Page 63 and 64: that the phenolic resin could explo
Page 65 and 66: A 1998 internal Borden Chemical mem
Page 67 and 68: • Characterize new and existing p
Page 69 and 70: CTA that phenolic resins, when susp
Page 71 and 72: CTA department supervisors were res
Page 73 and 74: 8.5 Work Practices 8.5.1 Production
Page 75 and 76: operating the oven with the doors o
Page 77 and 78: 8.7 Incident Investigations The inc
Page 79 and 80: • Excessive accumulations of comb
Page 81 and 82: Data Sheet 6-9 also states: Clean o
Page 83 and 84: Table 5 Insurance Company Dust Issu
Page 85 and 86: standards (Appendix D). Kentucky OS
Page 87 and 88: 10.2.2 Division of Building Codes E
Page 89 and 90: 11.0 Combustible Dust Hazard Study
Page 91 and 92: 4. The Borden Chemical product stew
Page 93 and 94: 13.0 Recommendations CSB developed
Page 95 and 96: Kentucky Office of Occupational Saf
Page 97 and 98: BY THE U.S. Chemical Safety and Haz
Page 99: Lawson, Robert G., 1984. Beverly Hi
Page 103 and 104: APPENDIX B: Laboratory Testing of P
Page 105 and 106: B.2 Minimum Explosible Concentratio
Page 107 and 108: B.4 Propagating Brush Discharge Ign
Page 109 and 110: Material Corona Charge Voltage (kV)
Page 111 and 112: APPENDIX C: Equipment Testing Line
Page 113 and 114: II controllers, only manufactured a
Page 115 and 116: Therefore, at any given time, it wa
Page 117 and 118: APPENDIX D: NFPA Guidelines In prom
Page 119 and 120: D.2 Other Pertinent NFPA Codes D.2.
Page 121 and 122: APPENDIX E: HMIS Rating System The
Page 123 and 124: APPENDIX F: Simplified Organization
Page 125 and 126: Subtree A Second dust explosion abo
Page 127: Subtree C Most CTA personnel had a
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