Part 1 - AL-Tax

Part 1 - AL-Tax Part 1 - AL-Tax

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Chapter 3and its consensus-democracy score (Lijphart, 1999). 14 For each country, Hays(2003) used the average tax rate, i.e. the average of the dependent variable, y, inthe N 1 other countries as the spatial lag. In other words, all the off-diagonalelements of the spatial weighting matrix from equation (3.8) are set to 1/(N 1).For Hays’s original purposes, this spatial lag controls for the possibility that theobserved changes in capital taxation are being driven by tax competition betweencountries. 15 Hays estimated the model using OLS and reported panel-correctedstandard errors (PCSEs).For their part, Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) estimated spatial-lag models totest the following hypotheses derived from their theoretical model of tax competition:(1) Countries will undergo tax reform more frequently if the political costsof such reforms are low and/or the decisiveness of reforms in determining thepatterns of investment flows is high; (2) Countries will engage in tax reform whenthe political costs of reform in competitor countries is low; (3) The domesticpolitical costs of reform and the decisiveness of reform will determine the sensitivityof countries’ tax policies to tax changes in their competitors. Basinger andHallerberg (2004) included both spatially weighted X variables and spatiallyweighted Y variables (i.e. spatial lags) on the right-hand side of their regressionmodels. Hypothesis 1 is operationalized with a set of domestic X variables; Theytested Hypothesis 2 using a set of spatially weighted X variables and Hypothesis3 with the spatial lags interacted with domestic X variables.The dependent variable in their empirical analysis is the change in the capitaltaxrate. In addition to the Mendoza et al. (1997) capital-tax rates, the same variableHays (2003) used, Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) considered also the top marginalcapital-tax rates (of both central government and overall). They identifiedtwo kinds of domestic political costs as independent variables: Transaction andconstituency costs. Ideological distances between veto players were used to measuretransaction costs. The greater the ideological distance between politicalactors that can block policy change, the harder is altering the status quo (in thiscase, adopting capital-tax reform). Partisanship was used to measure constituencycosts; The constituency costs associated with capital-tax reform will be higherwhen left governments are in power. A third independent variable of interest, thedegree of capital mobility, was measured using capital controls on outflows(based on Quinn’s data). The degree of capital mobility determines the decisivenessof capital taxes in determining the location of international investments.Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) used four different spatial-weighting matrices:A symmetric 1/(N 1) weighting matrix, which makes the spatial lag for eachunit equal to the simple average of the Y values in the other units (as in Hays),61

International Taxation Handbookand three weighted averages using, respectively, GDP, FDI, and Fixed CapitalFormation (FCF) as weights. The last three spatial-weighting matrices have cellentries that differ across columns, but the rows are identical. For example, forevery country (row) in the sample, the USA (column) – because of its large GDP,capital stock, and flows of FDI – is weighted more heavily than Finland (anothercolumn), but the effect of American tax rates on other tax rates is the same for allcountries (in every row). American tax rates (column) have the same effect onCanada (row) as they do on Austria (another row), for example. These spatialweights are time varying (because the GDP, FDI, and FCF of each country changesover time). Like Hays, Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) included country-fixedeffects in their models, but, unlike Hays, they did not lag the dependent variabledirectly. They did include the lagged level of the tax rate, though, which makestheir model with changes as the dependent variable essentially the same as apartial-adjustment (lagged-dependent-variable) model in levels like the one Haysestimates. Finally, Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) also estimated their models byOLS with panel-corrected standard errors.Both Hays (2003) and Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) found the coefficient onthe spatial lag to be positive and statistically significant – i.e. both found strongevidence of tax competition. The problem with both analyses, however, is thatneither accounts for the endogeneity of the spatial lag, which renders biased andinconsistent the S-OLS estimator used. As we showed in Franzese and Hays(2004, 2006), the simultaneity bias in these circumstances would be toward exaggerationof the strength of interdependence and would also entail an induceddownward bias in the estimated effects of common conditions. Furthermore,both may have underspecified the common-conditions sorts of arguments theyinclude as well, which, again as we showed in Franzese and Hays (2004, 2006),would tend further to depress those estimated effects and inflate the estimatedstrength of interdependence. We therefore conduct now a reanalysis of Hays’s(2003, p. 99) 16 regressions using a new spatial-weight matrix and two consistentestimators – spatial two-stage least squares and spatial maximum likelihood(Tables 3.1 and 3.2). We also re-estimate the regressions, including a set of perioddummies to control better for common shocks (Table 3.3). 17 The results show thatHays may have overestimated the coefficient on the spatial lag with consequencesfor some of the other estimates. In particular, the original results for themediating effect of the capital endowment on capital-account openness are notvery robust across alternative estimators. However, the consensus democracyresults are robust and tend to be even stronger (i.e. larger coefficients and higherlevels of statistical significance) when the consistent estimators are used.62

International <strong>Tax</strong>ation Handbookand three weighted averages using, respectively, GDP, FDI, and Fixed CapitalFormation (FCF) as weights. The last three spatial-weighting matrices have cellentries that differ across columns, but the rows are identical. For example, forevery country (row) in the sample, the USA (column) – because of its large GDP,capital stock, and flows of FDI – is weighted more heavily than Finland (anothercolumn), but the effect of American tax rates on other tax rates is the same for allcountries (in every row). American tax rates (column) have the same effect onCanada (row) as they do on Austria (another row), for example. These spatialweights are time varying (because the GDP, FDI, and FCF of each country changesover time). Like Hays, Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) included country-fixedeffects in their models, but, unlike Hays, they did not lag the dependent variabledirectly. They did include the lagged level of the tax rate, though, which makestheir model with changes as the dependent variable essentially the same as apartial-adjustment (lagged-dependent-variable) model in levels like the one Haysestimates. Finally, Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) also estimated their models byOLS with panel-corrected standard errors.Both Hays (2003) and Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) found the coefficient onthe spatial lag to be positive and statistically significant – i.e. both found strongevidence of tax competition. The problem with both analyses, however, is thatneither accounts for the endogeneity of the spatial lag, which renders biased andinconsistent the S-OLS estimator used. As we showed in Franzese and Hays(2004, 2006), the simultaneity bias in these circumstances would be toward exaggerationof the strength of interdependence and would also entail an induceddownward bias in the estimated effects of common conditions. Furthermore,both may have underspecified the common-conditions sorts of arguments theyinclude as well, which, again as we showed in Franzese and Hays (2004, 2006),would tend further to depress those estimated effects and inflate the estimatedstrength of interdependence. We therefore conduct now a reanalysis of Hays’s(2003, p. 99) 16 regressions using a new spatial-weight matrix and two consistentestimators – spatial two-stage least squares and spatial maximum likelihood(Tables 3.1 and 3.2). We also re-estimate the regressions, including a set of perioddummies to control better for common shocks (Table 3.3). 17 The results show thatHays may have overestimated the coefficient on the spatial lag with consequencesfor some of the other estimates. In particular, the original results for themediating effect of the capital endowment on capital-account openness are notvery robust across alternative estimators. However, the consensus democracyresults are robust and tend to be even stronger (i.e. larger coefficients and higherlevels of statistical significance) when the consistent estimators are used.62

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