Part 1 - AL-Tax
Part 1 - AL-Tax Part 1 - AL-Tax
appearance of future competitors attracted by extraordinary rents in the industry.Let us consider that assumption, and to model the pre-tax rate of return as a geometricBrownian motion with drift:dp αp dt σp dz (2.18)where dz is the increment of a Wiener process, α 1 is the drift parameter, andσ the variance parameter. Given that the project is expected to generate economicrents in the beginning, new similar projects will come and reduce the economicrent, a fact that is modeled with a negative trend.As an example of a geometric Brownian motion with negative drift, we presentin Figure 2.4 a sample path of equation (2.18) with a drift rate of 5% per year anda standard deviation of 25% per year. The graphic is built with monthly timeintervals.Now the expected NPV of the project is (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994):and the expected NPVT:pE[ NPV* ] ⎡ E ptte( ρδπ )⎤0∫dt⎣⎢ 0⎦⎥ρδπ αChapter 2⎡ E[ NPVT ] E τ( ptt δ)e ( ρδπ )⎤∫dt A⎣⎢0⎦⎥τδπρδπ pA0 .ρδπα 0.140.120.100.080.060.040.020.0055 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00Figure 2.4Geometric Brownian motion with negative drift25
International Taxation HandbookTherefore, the expected AETR is now:( τ A)( ) ( p ) A( )E[ AETR] ρδπτ ρπδτ ρδπ α.pp 0 ( ρδπ )The parameter α reflects the expected rate of decline in the economic rent of theproject. Whether the expected average tax is higher or smaller than expression (2.15)depends on country or industry specific values. Nevertheless, we can state the followingproposition.Proposition 7 In the absence of personal taxes, when taxable income is smaller(larger) than true economic income, the E[AETR] is smaller (larger) than the AETR,and when taxable income is equal to true economic income, the E[AETR] is equal tothe AETR, to the METR, and to the statutory tax rate.Proof For E[AETR] AETR, we need that δτ A(r δ) and the proof follows asin Proposition 2.As we can see in Figure 2.4, we are assuming a continuous decline in the rateof return to zero. Nonetheless, this fall in returns has a natural floor imposed bythe rational expectation of the entrant firm as to the pre-tax rate of return for themarginal investment (p˜ in equation (2.16)). This lowest value will function as areflecting barrier, because once it is touched the entry of competitive firms willstop. The expected NPV in this case will be:p0E[ NPV ] Cp0 γ,ρδ π α(2.19)where γ 0 is the negative root of the fundamental quadratic r δαξ σ 2 ξ(ξ 1)/2 φ(ξ). The first term in equation (2.19) is the expected NPV when returnscontinue towards zero and the second term is the increase in value because newentries will stop before zero. Using the Smooth Pasting Condition (for a discussionof the calculation of expected present values, see Dixit, 1993), we can calculate thevalue of the constant C:F( pɶ) 00 Cp 1γ ɶ γ 1 0ρδπα pɶ1γ1C γρδπ α 0.26
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International <strong>Tax</strong>ation HandbookTherefore, the expected AETR is now:( τ A)( ) ( p ) A( )E[ AETR] ρδπτ ρπδτ ρδπ α.pp 0 ( ρδπ )The parameter α reflects the expected rate of decline in the economic rent of theproject. Whether the expected average tax is higher or smaller than expression (2.15)depends on country or industry specific values. Nevertheless, we can state the followingproposition.Proposition 7 In the absence of personal taxes, when taxable income is smaller(larger) than true economic income, the E[AETR] is smaller (larger) than the AETR,and when taxable income is equal to true economic income, the E[AETR] is equal tothe AETR, to the METR, and to the statutory tax rate.Proof For E[AETR] AETR, we need that δτ A(r δ) and the proof follows asin Proposition 2.As we can see in Figure 2.4, we are assuming a continuous decline in the rateof return to zero. Nonetheless, this fall in returns has a natural floor imposed bythe rational expectation of the entrant firm as to the pre-tax rate of return for themarginal investment (p˜ in equation (2.16)). This lowest value will function as areflecting barrier, because once it is touched the entry of competitive firms willstop. The expected NPV in this case will be:p0E[ NPV ] Cp0 γ,ρδ π α(2.19)where γ 0 is the negative root of the fundamental quadratic r δαξ σ 2 ξ(ξ 1)/2 φ(ξ). The first term in equation (2.19) is the expected NPV when returnscontinue towards zero and the second term is the increase in value because newentries will stop before zero. Using the Smooth Pasting Condition (for a discussionof the calculation of expected present values, see Dixit, 1993), we can calculate thevalue of the constant C:F( pɶ) 00 Cp 1γ ɶ γ 1 0ρδπα pɶ1γ1C γρδπ α 0.26