Part 1 - AL-Tax

IndexIncome-tax competition (Cont.)quasi-utilitarian governments, 75–6,78–80, 86–9Rawlsian governments, 75–6, 78–85, 88skilled workers, 6, 73–94see also Tax competitionIndex of Economic Freedom, 269, 282–7India, 259, 270–86Indonesia, 270–86Inflation, 15, 18, 21, 47, 297, 314–15Information sharing, 8, 241–62coexistence model, 251–3confidentiality issues, 244–5, 248–9,251–4, 261game-theoretical models, 242, 245–8general principles, 242–5methods, 244–5reasons, 8, 241–2, 245–8reputation effect, 248revenue-sharing schemes, 246–8, 256–7theoretical studies, 242–3, 245–51treaties, 8, 244–5, 251–3see also SavingsInsider models, 353Institutions, 5, 9, 46–8, 60–7, 130–43,174–8, 216–17, 314–15Insurance products, money laundering,319Intangible assets, 116–17, 122, 163, 167Interdependence factors, 6, 45–68Interest, 15–19, 29, 193–4, 220–34,253–61, 328–36Intermediary results, arm’s lengthprinciple (ALP), 158–9International Financial ReportingStandards (IFRS), 8, 194–5International interdependence–politicaleconomy approach (II-PE), 52–4International taxationcountry analysis, 280–7evolution, 3–10, 223–34Index of Economic Freedom, 269, 282–7new principles, 5–6tax misery/happiness study, 8, 269,274–87theory, 5traditional scope, 5see also Tax...Internet, 5–6, 321Inventories, 17Investment funds, 260–1Ireland, 6, 184–91, 212–33, 255–8, 272–86Islamic position, tax evasion, 295–6Isle of Man, 256, 258, 320Italy, 184–91, 212–33, 255–9, 270–86Iversen–Cusack argument, 51–3Japan, 119, 257–60, 270–86Jersey, 256, 258, 320Jewish views, tax evasion, 294–5‘John Doe’ orders, money laundering,320–1Jorgenson model, 14, 17, 32, 36Juros sobre capital próprio law (JSCP),Brazil, 325–36Kantian ethics, 296–7Keen, M., 242, 243, 246–50Kehoe, P., 341–9Kehoe, T., 341–9King, M., 17, 18–20, 35–6Kirchgässner, G., 75, 89Kolmar, M., 242, 246, 248Korea, 119, 270–86, 349Kydland, F., 341Laborcapital-tax competition theoreticalmodel, 50–3corporate taxation ‘backstop’ hypothesis,216cost of production, 31–6362