Part 1 - AL-Tax
Part 1 - AL-Tax Part 1 - AL-Tax
IndexAccounting systemsemerging nations, 9, 341, 351–3standards, 184–5, 352–3tax evasion, 294Administrative Principles, EU, 151–2,155, 156, 160, 163–5Advance Pricing Agreements (APAs), 7,113–43actors, 133–41agreement issues, 120–4basic structure, 123–4concepts, 7, 113–43definition, 117, 118, 122economic conditions, 133–41governance-choice theory, 125–32implemented programs, 120–2institutional frameworks, 133–41nonadversarial coordination, 122–41OECD perspective, 117–20, 137–40role, 7, 117–25tax-base issues, 132–40usage factors, 133–41Advance ruling systems, 113, 119AETRs see Average ETRsAgricultural companies, Brazil, 325,332–6Ali, Paul U., 7, 8, 9, 97–110, 311–22Andorra, 254–6Anguilla, 255–61APAs see Advance Pricing AgreementsArgentina, 9, 270–86, 305, 341–9Armenia, 294Arm’s length principle (ALP), 7, 115–16,120, 131, 147–69, 221–4, 228–32company types, 152–6, 159–63functions, 149–69methods, 164–9risk analysis, 156–67Asia, 8, 267–87country analysis, 280–7Index of Economic Freedom, 269,282–7tax envy, 276–8tax misery/happiness study, 8, 269,274–87tax rates, 270–3tax reforms, 274see also Individual countriesAsset dilution ratio, 222, 228Asset sales, securitization, 7, 99–110Asset specificity, asymmetric information,129–32Asymmetric information, bureaucraticgovernance, 129–32Attenuation bias, 56Audits, 136–41, 151–2, 165, 244, 353Australia, 101, 103, 105, 259, 270–86Austria, 184–91, 212–33, 242, 251–61,270–86Autarky case, income-tax competition,79–80, 83–5, 87Auto loan securitization, 105Average ETRs (AETRs)competitive pressures, 6, 13–14, 24–8,36, 214–15concepts, 6, 13–14, 22–31, 34–6,189–92, 214–15cost of production (AETRC), 34–5macro/micro data, 29–30marginal ETRs (METRs), 22–4, 36355
IndexBacchetta, P., 242, 246–8Backward-looking ETRsconcepts, 13–14, 22, 28–35forward-looking ETRs, 28–9, 31Bahamas, 258–62Bahrain, 257–60Balance sheets, 7, 99–110Balance-of-payments constraints, 346Bankruptcy remoteness, securitization,100–2, 109–10Banks, 99–110, 174, 241–62, 319–20,352–3Basinger, S., 46, 48–9, 51, 60–2, 67Bearer securities, money laundering, 319Belgium, 184–91, 212–33, 242, 251–61,270–86Bermuda, 258–62Bertrand competition, 75Besley–Coate citizen-candidate model,50–1Binding rulings, Advance PricingAgreements (APAs), 124–5Bonds, 253–7, 260–1, 319Bounded rationality, 126, 129–30Brazil, 9, 259, 270–86, 323–36, 339–54accounting systems, 352–3agricultural companies, 325, 332–6banks, 352–3juros sobre capital próprio law (JSCP),325–36Mercosur experiment, 342–50multinational corporation valuations, 9,323–36PIS/COFINS, 334–6tax rates, 329, 341–3, 346–51, 353tax reforms, 341–53trade agreements, 9–10, 341–53Brem, Markus, 7, 111–46, 147–69British Virgin Islands, 255, 260Brokers, money laundering, 319–20Brownian motion, 25–6Budgets, 79–89, 91–4, 127–8, 149–52,157, 160–9, 216–17, 346–53Bulgaria, 294Business cycles, backward-looking ETRs,22C&IPE see Comparative and internationalpolitical economy modelsCaine, Michael, 276Cameron–Rodrik argument, 52–3Canada, 58, 119, 195, 257–60, 315–16, 321Capitalcost of capital, 14–17, 27–8, 181, 183,328–9demand/supply functions, 15–17flight threats, 45–68, 197, 215–16,242–3, 254, 314‘golden rule’ path, 29Capital asset pricing model (CAPM), 328Capital endowment, 60–7Capital flows, 5–6, 8–9, 16–17, 45–7,182–5, 196–7, 215, 241–2, 348–53Capital gains, treatment, 13, 219–24, 296–7Capital income effective tax rates, 11–41,328–9see also Effective tax ratesCapital mobility, 45–68, 181–2, 197, 215,218, 241–2, 248, 344, 348–53capital tax rates, 60–7, 181–2, 215, 218flight threats, 45–68, 197, 215–16,242–3, 254, 314Capital-account openness, 60–7Capital-tax competition, 6, 43–72, 75, 88,180, 215, 270–86, 328–36, 351–3interdependence factors, 6, 45–68open economy–comparative politicaleconomy approach (OE-CPE), 52–3,56–7(open economy) comparative andinternational political economymodels (C&IPE), 52–60356
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IndexBacchetta, P., 242, 246–8Backward-looking ETRsconcepts, 13–14, 22, 28–35forward-looking ETRs, 28–9, 31Bahamas, 258–62Bahrain, 257–60Balance sheets, 7, 99–110Balance-of-payments constraints, 346Bankruptcy remoteness, securitization,100–2, 109–10Banks, 99–110, 174, 241–62, 319–20,352–3Basinger, S., 46, 48–9, 51, 60–2, 67Bearer securities, money laundering, 319Belgium, 184–91, 212–33, 242, 251–61,270–86Bermuda, 258–62Bertrand competition, 75Besley–Coate citizen-candidate model,50–1Binding rulings, Advance PricingAgreements (APAs), 124–5Bonds, 253–7, 260–1, 319Bounded rationality, 126, 129–30Brazil, 9, 259, 270–86, 323–36, 339–54accounting systems, 352–3agricultural companies, 325, 332–6banks, 352–3juros sobre capital próprio law (JSCP),325–36Mercosur experiment, 342–50multinational corporation valuations, 9,323–36PIS/COFINS, 334–6tax rates, 329, 341–3, 346–51, 353tax reforms, 341–53trade agreements, 9–10, 341–53Brem, Markus, 7, 111–46, 147–69British Virgin Islands, 255, 260Brokers, money laundering, 319–20Brownian motion, 25–6Budgets, 79–89, 91–4, 127–8, 149–52,157, 160–9, 216–17, 346–53Bulgaria, 294Business cycles, backward-looking ETRs,22C&IPE see Comparative and internationalpolitical economy modelsCaine, Michael, 276Cameron–Rodrik argument, 52–3Canada, 58, 119, 195, 257–60, 315–16, 321Capitalcost of capital, 14–17, 27–8, 181, 183,328–9demand/supply functions, 15–17flight threats, 45–68, 197, 215–16,242–3, 254, 314‘golden rule’ path, 29Capital asset pricing model (CAPM), 328Capital endowment, 60–7Capital flows, 5–6, 8–9, 16–17, 45–7,182–5, 196–7, 215, 241–2, 348–53Capital gains, treatment, 13, 219–24, 296–7Capital income effective tax rates, 11–41,328–9see also Effective tax ratesCapital mobility, 45–68, 181–2, 197, 215,218, 241–2, 248, 344, 348–53capital tax rates, 60–7, 181–2, 215, 218flight threats, 45–68, 197, 215–16,242–3, 254, 314Capital-account openness, 60–7Capital-tax competition, 6, 43–72, 75, 88,180, 215, 270–86, 328–36, 351–3interdependence factors, 6, 45–68open economy–comparative politicaleconomy approach (OE-CPE), 52–3,56–7(open economy) comparative andinternational political economymodels (C&IPE), 52–60356
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