Part 1 - AL-Tax
Part 1 - AL-Tax Part 1 - AL-Tax
Chapter 10economics of information sharing, studies alternative instruments to tax crossbordercapital income, and touches upon the ‘third country’ issue. Section 10.4 analyzesthe EU savings tax directive. Finally, Section 10.5 summarizes and concludes.10.2 General principles of information sharing10.2.1 The fundamental need for informationThe need for taxpayer-specific information on capital income taxes arises from theuniversal use of the residence principle in the taxation of cross-border savings (thesource principle – see below – is used in the taxation of income from foreign direct(or active) investment). Under the residence principle, income tax is ultimatelypayable to the country in which a taxpayer (that is, a natural person or company)resides, perhaps with some credit or exemption for taxes paid in the country ofsource. 5 If effectively enforced, the residence principle ensures capital-export neutralitybecause pre-tax rates of return on capital are equalized across jurisdictions.In other words, it does not discriminate between financial capital according towhere it is located (because otherwise output could be increased by shifting capitalfrom where its marginal return is low to where it is high). Consequently, the residenceprinciple yields global production efficiency in the Diamond and Mirrlees(1971) sense. In contrast, the source principle – under which income tax ispayable to the country in which the income is generated – yields differing pre-taxrates of return on capital, potentially giving rise to tax competition among countries(for a comprehensive overview of tax competition studies, see Wilson, 1999).Consequently, investment will be distorted in favor of locations with low tax rates.In practice, the conditions underlying the Diamond–Mirrlees theorem are farfrom trivial. It requires that an economy’s pure profits be fully taxed away. Evenmore stringent conditions need to be imposed in an international setting. On thelatter, Keen and Wildasin (2004) demonstrated that when countries cannot makelump-sum transfers between each other, production inefficiencies (in the form ofsource-based taxes) may need to be introduced to move around the world’s secondbestutility frontier.The merits of the residence principle are of interest here only because it providesa welfare-theoretic underpinning of information sharing. 6 To enforce residencetaxation, countries must have information on their residents’ capitalincome (and potentially assets) abroad. Many countries legally require taxpayersto disclose details of such income to the tax authorities of their country of residence,but the possibility of fraudulent or no declaration is all too evident. 7243
International Taxation HandbookTo address this, countries may wish to have access to alternative sources of informationin the country of source, requiring the participation of the foreign taxauthority (and third parties such as commercial banks). Implementing full informationsharing and eliminating any existing creditable source tax yields an‘ideal’ tax system in the sense of being socially optimal, which is to be preferredover a pure source tax.10.2.2 Basic principles of information sharingGenerally, tax authorities of countries employ three ways to share case-specifictax information with each other. The most common form is information exchangeupon request, where a country passes information in response to a specificrequest related to a taxpayer. The second form concerns automatic exchange –typically being the largest in volume – which mainly pertains to informationabout routine, periodic payments, such as interest and dividends paid to nonresidents.The third type, spontaneous exchange of information, often occurs in thecourse of an audit when one tax authority uncovers details that it thinks may beof interest to its counterpart in the taxpayer’s country of residence. Noncasespecificinformation is also regularly exchanged between tax authorities. Forexample, tax authorities may – under the heading of administrative assistance –wish to share their auditing experiences in a particular sector.Most countries have laws that protect the confidentiality of information that taxauthorities have gathered about a particular taxpayer. As a result, a country cannotprovide information about a taxpayer to another country without a legal instrumentpermitting such disclosure. Information exchange has been carried out under threetypes of treaties: (i) Bilateral double-income taxation treaties, which include aninformation-sharing clause modeled after Article 26 of the OECD model tax convention;(ii) Bilateral information-sharing treaties such as those concluded between theUSA and various Caribbean jurisdictions; (iii) Multilateral mutual assistance orinformation-sharing treaties such as the Mutual Assistance directive. 8 Under thosetreaties, countries are expected to rely on their domestic sources before making aspecific request to a treaty partner. Such requests have to be precise; They shouldinclude details about the taxpayer in question, the fiscal year, the transaction(s)under scrutiny, and the relevance of the information being sought. All of theserequirements are designed to prevent countries from overburdening each other withdemands, and to ensure that taxpayer information is disclosed only when necessary.Tax authorities are typically not compensated for the ordinary costs of informationprovision, because information sharing is viewed as a matter of reciprocity.244
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International <strong>Tax</strong>ation HandbookTo address this, countries may wish to have access to alternative sources of informationin the country of source, requiring the participation of the foreign taxauthority (and third parties such as commercial banks). Implementing full informationsharing and eliminating any existing creditable source tax yields an‘ideal’ tax system in the sense of being socially optimal, which is to be preferredover a pure source tax.10.2.2 Basic principles of information sharingGenerally, tax authorities of countries employ three ways to share case-specifictax information with each other. The most common form is information exchangeupon request, where a country passes information in response to a specificrequest related to a taxpayer. The second form concerns automatic exchange –typically being the largest in volume – which mainly pertains to informationabout routine, periodic payments, such as interest and dividends paid to nonresidents.The third type, spontaneous exchange of information, often occurs in thecourse of an audit when one tax authority uncovers details that it thinks may beof interest to its counterpart in the taxpayer’s country of residence. Noncasespecificinformation is also regularly exchanged between tax authorities. Forexample, tax authorities may – under the heading of administrative assistance –wish to share their auditing experiences in a particular sector.Most countries have laws that protect the confidentiality of information that taxauthorities have gathered about a particular taxpayer. As a result, a country cannotprovide information about a taxpayer to another country without a legal instrumentpermitting such disclosure. Information exchange has been carried out under threetypes of treaties: (i) Bilateral double-income taxation treaties, which include aninformation-sharing clause modeled after Article 26 of the OECD model tax convention;(ii) Bilateral information-sharing treaties such as those concluded between theUSA and various Caribbean jurisdictions; (iii) Multilateral mutual assistance orinformation-sharing treaties such as the Mutual Assistance directive. 8 Under thosetreaties, countries are expected to rely on their domestic sources before making aspecific request to a treaty partner. Such requests have to be precise; They shouldinclude details about the taxpayer in question, the fiscal year, the transaction(s)under scrutiny, and the relevance of the information being sought. All of theserequirements are designed to prevent countries from overburdening each other withdemands, and to ensure that taxpayer information is disclosed only when necessary.<strong>Tax</strong> authorities are typically not compensated for the ordinary costs of informationprovision, because information sharing is viewed as a matter of reciprocity.244