Part 1 - AL-Tax
Part 1 - AL-Tax Part 1 - AL-Tax
Chapter 9EU’s objective is to ensure that states’ tax regimes do not contain discriminatoryrules that might distort the allocation of resources and the movement of peoplewithin the EU. In other words, the EU should coordinate members’ tax systems.What are the EU countries’ feelings on coordination? As mentioned earlier,European countries are torn between the middle- to long-term objective of coordinationand the need in the shorter term to stimulate their own economy, evenat the cost of taking resources from its own partners. On the one hand, most countriesare aware that tax competition taken to the extreme could excessively reducerevenue, thereby leading to an under-provision of public goods. For this reasonmany EU members (in particular, most of the older members) are willing to cooperateand set a minimum tax rate on mobile factors. On the other hand, countriesare still reluctant to lose control over fiscal tools by delegating part of their powerto the EU. To give an idea of this mixed and even contradictory feeling, let us lookat Italy’s White Paper for Reform of the Tax System (Italy’s Council of Ministers,2001). The White Paper claims the will to coordinate Italy’s system with aso-called ‘European tax model’. In particular, it states that ‘the reform has oneprincipal objective: To harmonize our tax system with the most efficient ones,implemented by industrialized countries, in particular the members of theEuropean Union’. Quite surprisingly, however, the paper also expresses the willto pursue its objectives in the ‘logic of tax competition’.With regard to the EU’s attempts to coordinate direct taxation, the 1980s sawthe failure to introduce a single fiscal system for the whole Community. Only in1990 were three important Directives introduced: The first concerning mergersand acquisitions (90/434/CEE), the second on double taxation of distributedincome between parent corporations and their foreign subsidiaries located inother states (90/435/CEE), and the third (adopted as a convention) aimed at eliminatingdouble taxation on dividends (90/436/CEE). These laws could becomethe pillars upon which a EU federal tax system could be founded. However,much has to be done to ensure a coordinated environment.The European Commission is aware of members’ mixed feelings about competitionand coordination. However, it forcibly points out that the fact that companiesmust conform to 25 or more different tax regimes remains the present causefor most existing tax problems in the internal market, as well as high compliancecosts. In Communication COM (2001) 582 final, the European Commissionstressed the need for more corporate tax coordination. This communicationdid not give any quantitative evaluation of the benefits that could arise fromincreased coordination. 5 On the contrary, it rationalized such reform on negativeterms, observing that the strong mobility of capital could cause excessive competition217
International Taxation Handbookin the Union, thus producing considerable welfare losses. Such losses may bedue to:1. The difficulty in calculating correct transfer prices to define the value oftransactions made within the same industrial group, by entities operatingfrom countries outside the EU.2. The double-tax burden that is generated when both the resident countryand the source country tax the same income.3. The existence of significant tax burdens for extraordinary operations (suchas, for example, mergers and reorganizations). 6In Communication COM (2001) 582 final, the European Commission assumedan intermediary position between coordination and competition. Indeed, on theone hand, it stressed the need to offer a common legal base; On the other, it implicitlyaccepted the existence of a reasonable degree of tax competition as long asthis encouraged Member States to become more efficient in managing theirresources.To pursue its objectives, the European Commission has placed much hope inthe work of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which is significantly contributingto the coordination of tax rules by eliminating causes of tax discriminationwithin the EU. However, it is quite clear that the ECJ per se cannot guarantee acoordinated system. For this reason the ratification of the Treaty of Nice (G.U.C.EC80, 10 March 2001) is another important pillar for future European strategy.According to Article 43 of the Treaty, a group of at least eight countries can startreinforced cooperation, as long as certain requisites are respected. In particular,this cooperation must be aimed at promoting Union and Community objectives,protecting and serving their interest, and reinforcing the integration process.Furthermore, cooperation must not be an obstacle or discrimination for commercialexchange between Member States.The Treaty of Nice implicitly allows EU members to go ahead with a two-speedEurope, in which each country could choose immediately to opt for coordination,or would be free to keep its own system unchanged. Even if a unified solutionbetween all states would probably be preferable, the possibility of reinforcedcooperation should not be a point of contention for at least two reasons.Firstly, there are varying degrees of integration between EU members that canjustify adopting tax and fiscal standards over different periods. Secondly, the veryfact that reinforced cooperation can be accomplished might paradoxically helpthe definition of a coordinated system shared by all Member States. As Bordignonand Brusco (2006) pointed out, each state is aware that late adhesion is generally218
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Chapter 9EU’s objective is to ensure that states’ tax regimes do not contain discriminatoryrules that might distort the allocation of resources and the movement of peoplewithin the EU. In other words, the EU should coordinate members’ tax systems.What are the EU countries’ feelings on coordination? As mentioned earlier,European countries are torn between the middle- to long-term objective of coordinationand the need in the shorter term to stimulate their own economy, evenat the cost of taking resources from its own partners. On the one hand, most countriesare aware that tax competition taken to the extreme could excessively reducerevenue, thereby leading to an under-provision of public goods. For this reasonmany EU members (in particular, most of the older members) are willing to cooperateand set a minimum tax rate on mobile factors. On the other hand, countriesare still reluctant to lose control over fiscal tools by delegating part of their powerto the EU. To give an idea of this mixed and even contradictory feeling, let us lookat Italy’s White Paper for Reform of the <strong>Tax</strong> System (Italy’s Council of Ministers,2001). The White Paper claims the will to coordinate Italy’s system with aso-called ‘European tax model’. In particular, it states that ‘the reform has oneprincipal objective: To harmonize our tax system with the most efficient ones,implemented by industrialized countries, in particular the members of theEuropean Union’. Quite surprisingly, however, the paper also expresses the willto pursue its objectives in the ‘logic of tax competition’.With regard to the EU’s attempts to coordinate direct taxation, the 1980s sawthe failure to introduce a single fiscal system for the whole Community. Only in1990 were three important Directives introduced: The first concerning mergersand acquisitions (90/434/CEE), the second on double taxation of distributedincome between parent corporations and their foreign subsidiaries located inother states (90/435/CEE), and the third (adopted as a convention) aimed at eliminatingdouble taxation on dividends (90/436/CEE). These laws could becomethe pillars upon which a EU federal tax system could be founded. However,much has to be done to ensure a coordinated environment.The European Commission is aware of members’ mixed feelings about competitionand coordination. However, it forcibly points out that the fact that companiesmust conform to 25 or more different tax regimes remains the present causefor most existing tax problems in the internal market, as well as high compliancecosts. In Communication COM (2001) 582 final, the European Commissionstressed the need for more corporate tax coordination. This communicationdid not give any quantitative evaluation of the benefits that could arise fromincreased coordination. 5 On the contrary, it rationalized such reform on negativeterms, observing that the strong mobility of capital could cause excessive competition217