Part 1 - AL-Tax
Part 1 - AL-Tax Part 1 - AL-Tax
Chapter 8and tax authorities. In addition, the proposal leaves untouched tax rates and hencetax competition – or possibly even reinforces it by making the tax base moretransparent.Ideally, designing a common consolidated corporate tax base offers the possibilityto rethink the way we tax companies. Current systems in place in theEuropean Union often lack desirable features. It is important that the EuropeanUnion reflects on sound economic principles, such as neutrality across investorsand sources of financing, equity across firms, simplicity, enforceability, and stabilityof revenues (Gorter and de Mooij, 2001; European Commission, 2004b; CEPS,2005), and at the same time, reflect on how best to collect taxes (source-based versusresidence-based taxation) and how best to integrate corporate taxation with personalincome taxation. Obviously, there is as yet no obvious way to alleviate all distortions,since governments are faced with trade-offs in multiple dimensions. Thereare several alternative corporate tax systems with their merits and demerits (cashflowtaxation, Allowance for Corporate Equity, Comprehensive Business Income Tax,Dual Income Tax, etc.) which deserve to be debated (for a discussion, see Cnossen,2001; Devereux and Sørensen, 2005). The European Union may also want to reflecton profit-shifting issues, notably the size of the problem and possible remedies,such as thin capitalization rules (the CCCTB working group may start reviewingthe issue in early 2007).Finally, the European Union may also want to examine whether the absence ofbilateral tax treaties between some Member States creates double-taxation problemsand whether the current systems discriminate between domestic and nonresidentinvestors when dividends are paid. This could potentially lead to an EU modeltax convention or an EU multilateral treaty, which could also cover additionalissues that create tax barriers but are not reviewed in this article – for instance,the taxation of workers having activity in several countries. In any case, the EuropeanCommission has announced that it will issue a Communication in 2006 to explainits strategy in this field. And important as these issues may be, they should notovershadow the overriding goal: To bring the work on a common consolidated taxbase to fruition.AcknowledgmentsI thank Michel Aujean, Sophie Bland, Declan Costello, Marco Fantini, and Jean-Pierre De Laet for helpful comments. Remaining errors or omissions and the interpretationsare those of the author only.199
International Taxation HandbookNotes1. There may also be the feeling within Member States that, having lost monetary policy instruments,fiscal policy – although constrained by the 3% deficit rule of the Stability and GrowthPact – is one of the few macroeconomic policy tools, along with supply-side policies, left at theirdisposal.2. Note that different levels of tax-to-GDP ratios are due to the different proportions of each economicfunction in GDP and hence do not necessarily reflect a higher taxation of labor. When reported asa share of their own tax base (instead of GDP), the same trends emerge, although in less pronouncedform (the ratio for labor, for example, does not diminish as fast). In addition, the implicit rates onlabor and on capital appear much closer. These rates are called the backward-looking macro-effectivetax rates (or sometimes implicit tax rates).3. Including large and homogeneous jurisdictions, perfectly competitive markets, jurisdictions thattake as fixed the after-tax rate of return on capital and the tax rates in the other jurisdictions, fixedpopulations and land, identical preferences and incomes for all residents in each jurisdiction,fixed aggregate level of capital stock which is mobile, a single good produced by the capital andland factors, publicly provided private goods with no spillover effects, two local tax instruments,and maximization of welfare of identical residents (see Zodrow, 2003).4. Note that the assessment becomes even more complicated if one takes into account the results ofthe tax literature on vertical tax competition (when, for example, the EU level would compete withMember States on the same tax base) and/or on partial tax coordination (as countries may alsocompete on other noncoordinated tax bases, for example mobile labor).5. The annual EU 2006 budget amounts to €112 billion (1.01% of the Gross National Income (GNI)of the enlarged EU). About 40% of the budget goes to the Common Agricultural Policy and aboutanother 40% goes to the poorer regions of the Union, to fishing communities, and to regions facingparticular problems of high unemployment and industrial decline (European Commission,2006b).6. In addition, validating previous theoretical findings (in particular, Wildasin, 2003), their resultsindicate that this positive relationship between tax burden and foreign ownership is strongest formore mature economies and for sectors with less mobile companies.7. Instead, the criteria for identifying potentially harmful measures include a significantly lower levelof effective taxation than the general level in the country concerned, tax advantages reserved fornonresidents only, tax incentives for activities isolated from the domestic economy, nontraditionalrules of taxation for multinational companies, and/or a lack of transparency.8. This methodology uses the King–Fullerton methodology of taxation of a hypothetical investmentusing a mix of sources of finance. The method was further developed by Devereux and Griffith(1998a) and is different from backward-looking effective tax rates that use real-life data to computeratios of tax paid on the tax base. For the respective merits and demerits of both methods,see Nicodème (2001).9. Other studies point to the effects of tax exporting (Huizinga and Nicodème, 2006) and larger incorporation(Gordon and MacKie-Mason, 1997; Goolsbee, 1998, 2004; Fuest and Weichenrieder, 2002;de Mooij and Nicodème, 2006). It could also be possible that the tax yield is insensitive to the taxrates, possibly because profit-shifting strategies are so efficient and widespread that profit isalready reported in low-tax jurisdictions.200
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Chapter 8and tax authorities. In addition, the proposal leaves untouched tax rates and hencetax competition – or possibly even reinforces it by making the tax base moretransparent.Ideally, designing a common consolidated corporate tax base offers the possibilityto rethink the way we tax companies. Current systems in place in theEuropean Union often lack desirable features. It is important that the EuropeanUnion reflects on sound economic principles, such as neutrality across investorsand sources of financing, equity across firms, simplicity, enforceability, and stabilityof revenues (Gorter and de Mooij, 2001; European Commission, 2004b; CEPS,2005), and at the same time, reflect on how best to collect taxes (source-based versusresidence-based taxation) and how best to integrate corporate taxation with personalincome taxation. Obviously, there is as yet no obvious way to alleviate all distortions,since governments are faced with trade-offs in multiple dimensions. Thereare several alternative corporate tax systems with their merits and demerits (cashflowtaxation, Allowance for Corporate Equity, Comprehensive Business Income <strong>Tax</strong>,Dual Income <strong>Tax</strong>, etc.) which deserve to be debated (for a discussion, see Cnossen,2001; Devereux and Sørensen, 2005). The European Union may also want to reflecton profit-shifting issues, notably the size of the problem and possible remedies,such as thin capitalization rules (the CCCTB working group may start reviewingthe issue in early 2007).Finally, the European Union may also want to examine whether the absence ofbilateral tax treaties between some Member States creates double-taxation problemsand whether the current systems discriminate between domestic and nonresidentinvestors when dividends are paid. This could potentially lead to an EU modeltax convention or an EU multilateral treaty, which could also cover additionalissues that create tax barriers but are not reviewed in this article – for instance,the taxation of workers having activity in several countries. In any case, the EuropeanCommission has announced that it will issue a Communication in 2006 to explainits strategy in this field. And important as these issues may be, they should notovershadow the overriding goal: To bring the work on a common consolidated taxbase to fruition.AcknowledgmentsI thank Michel Aujean, Sophie Bland, Declan Costello, Marco Fantini, and Jean-Pierre De Laet for helpful comments. Remaining errors or omissions and the interpretationsare those of the author only.199