Part 1 - AL-Tax
Part 1 - AL-Tax Part 1 - AL-Tax
Chapter 7Further work is needed to clarify the approach. In particular, questions on how toeliminate the effects of risk insurance on the revenue and profit indicators have notbeen discussed. To a large extent, such costs determine the level of risk insurance,uniqueness, and routine. 10 While the risk premiums can be identified in principleand in size in the books of the related-party companies, available data from commercialdatabases do not provide information for such analysis. Hence, we always lackinformation on the comparability of the tested party and the ‘comparable’ third parties.The same effect applies, among others, for the market-based profitability of assetsdeployed, which in some cases is part of the costs assumed and in other cases not.The economic analysis of transfer pricing in international taxation is at a farfrom satisfying level. With respect to the increasing relevance of cross-borderbusiness in general, and the large share of such business conducted within multinationalgroup companies in particular, it is valuable to further elaborate on economicmodels to assess the nature and degree of the arm’s length structure oftransfer pricing cases. To our mind, topics such as vertical and horizontal profitallocation, function and risk profiles, or role of intangibles will gain relevance.Economic analysis of income allocation for tax purposes is, indeed, in need ofgreater theoretical and empirical foundation.AcknowledgmentsThis chapter has emerged from ongoing discussions on new transfer pricing documentationprovisions in Germany. The chapter was conceptualized and draftedduring the second author’s research and teaching visit to the Indian Institute ofManagement, Ahmedabad. The usual disclaimers apply.Notes1. Transfer pricing methods are transaction-based methods such as Comparable Uncontrolled PriceMethod (CUP), Cost Plus Method (C), Resale Minus Method (R), Transactional Net MarginMethod (TNMM). Examples of profit-based methods are Comparable Profit Method (CPM) andProfit Split Methods (PS), including the Residual Profit Split Method (RPS). Some countries alsoconsider Formula Apportionment using certain allocation factors (e.g. assets, sum of wage,turnover) as an appropriate transfer pricing method (TPM).2. In emerging countries such as India, significantly longer litigation periods are possible.3. To our knowledge, the largest transfer pricing dispute in 2006 was GlaxoSmithKline against US IRSwhich was finally settled at a US$3.1 billion additional tax change – the largest ever single paymentto the IRS (International Tax Review, 2006).167
International Taxation Handbook4. The 2003 documentation law of Germany was triggered by the Highest Tax Court (Bundesfinanzhof)decision in 2001 (BFH v. 17.03.2001, I R 103/00; BStBl 2004 II, 171), which ruled that Article92(2) of the Tax Procedures Act was not a sufficient legal basis for the tax administration torequest special documentation from the taxpayer on cross-border transfer pricing issues.5. Administrative Principles are called Verwaltungsgrundsätze or BMF-Schreiben. The German titleis: ‘Grundsätze für die Prüfung der Einkunftsabgrenzung zwischen nahestehenden Personen mitgrenzüberschreitenden Geschäftsbeziehungen in Bezug auf Ermittlungs- und Mitwirkungspflichten,Berichtigungen sowie auf Verständigungs- und EU-Schiedsverfahren’ (abbreviation:Verwaltungsgrundsätze Dokumentation und Verfahren).6. Recently, the administrative principles on advance pricing agreements were published on October5, 2006.7. Given a 2005 decision of the Highest Tax Court (BFH v. 06.04.2005, I R 22/04; IStR 2005, 598),some experts opine whether further administrative provisions on dealing with long-term lossesin the context of related-party business are necessary at all.8. In transaction cost economics, the choice of governance structures is determined by transactionalattributes (cf. Williamson, 1985; Oestreicher, 2000). Transactional attributes can be used as variablesto characterize the functional pattern of related-party business units. The following transactionalattributes are typically deployed: Uncertainty, frequency of coordination, specificity of assetsdeployed (among others, human specificity, physical specificity, time specificity, dedicated specificity),measurability of effort contributed by stakeholders (cf. Brem and Tucha, 2006b).9. We expect that, subject to the thresholds applied, most tested parties follow the company type‘hybrid’. It is a matter of presentation in the course of the transfer pricing analysis to demonstrateif a related party is structured into legal, operative, or hierarchical group structures (cf.Brem and Tucha, 2006a).10. We hypothize that for income allocation purposes and demonstrating arm’s length behavior towardstax authorities, the analytical problem of cost allocation and cost design over the related partiesof a group (including the problem of differences in cross-country accounting principles) plays agreater role than the question of assigning a certain profit margin (as a percentage) to the respectivefunctions. The reason is that the basis of any percentage margin is the cost. So, designing – ormanipulating – the cost basis can have a significantly larger impact than turning the margin screw,especially if that function is allocated in a high-tax jurisdiction in which in practice stable butsmall cost plus markups may be assigned to “satisfy” the revenue service.ReferencesBrem, M. and Tucha, T. (2005). The Organization of the Multinational Firm: Perspectives on GlobalTransfer Pricing. BNA Tax Planning International – Transfer Pricing, 6(12):6–10.Brem, M and Tucha, T. (2006a). Transfer Pricing: Conceptual Thoughts on the Nature of theMultinational Firm. Vikalpa, 31(2):29–43.Brem, M. and Tucha, T. (2006b). Transfer Pricing in Related-party Value Chains: Value ChainPricing, Related-party Organization, Arm’s Length Principle, and Tax Risk Management.Conference Paper presented at the International Conference of Logistics, Hamburg University ofTechnology, 15–16 September 2006.The Economist (2001). Globalisation and Tax. Special Report, 29 January.168
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Chapter 7Further work is needed to clarify the approach. In particular, questions on how toeliminate the effects of risk insurance on the revenue and profit indicators have notbeen discussed. To a large extent, such costs determine the level of risk insurance,uniqueness, and routine. 10 While the risk premiums can be identified in principleand in size in the books of the related-party companies, available data from commercialdatabases do not provide information for such analysis. Hence, we always lackinformation on the comparability of the tested party and the ‘comparable’ third parties.The same effect applies, among others, for the market-based profitability of assetsdeployed, which in some cases is part of the costs assumed and in other cases not.The economic analysis of transfer pricing in international taxation is at a farfrom satisfying level. With respect to the increasing relevance of cross-borderbusiness in general, and the large share of such business conducted within multinationalgroup companies in particular, it is valuable to further elaborate on economicmodels to assess the nature and degree of the arm’s length structure oftransfer pricing cases. To our mind, topics such as vertical and horizontal profitallocation, function and risk profiles, or role of intangibles will gain relevance.Economic analysis of income allocation for tax purposes is, indeed, in need ofgreater theoretical and empirical foundation.AcknowledgmentsThis chapter has emerged from ongoing discussions on new transfer pricing documentationprovisions in Germany. The chapter was conceptualized and draftedduring the second author’s research and teaching visit to the Indian Institute ofManagement, Ahmedabad. The usual disclaimers apply.Notes1. Transfer pricing methods are transaction-based methods such as Comparable Uncontrolled PriceMethod (CUP), Cost Plus Method (C), Resale Minus Method (R), Transactional Net MarginMethod (TNMM). Examples of profit-based methods are Comparable Profit Method (CPM) andProfit Split Methods (PS), including the Residual Profit Split Method (RPS). Some countries alsoconsider Formula Apportionment using certain allocation factors (e.g. assets, sum of wage,turnover) as an appropriate transfer pricing method (TPM).2. In emerging countries such as India, significantly longer litigation periods are possible.3. To our knowledge, the largest transfer pricing dispute in 2006 was GlaxoSmithKline against US IRSwhich was finally settled at a US$3.1 billion additional tax change – the largest ever single paymentto the IRS (International <strong>Tax</strong> Review, 2006).167