Part 1 - AL-Tax
Part 1 - AL-Tax Part 1 - AL-Tax
Chapter 77.4.2 Selection of the type of arm’s length analysisAs stated above, the Administrative Principles 2005 offer two variables, ‘functionaltype’ and ‘comparability’, to select the appropriate arm’s length test mechanism.The functional type has the features determinable risk versus coordinateduncertainty, while comparability measures uniqueness and can be assessed between‘yes, comparable’ and ‘no, not comparable’. Though a given sample of cases mayshow continuous distribution of observations on these two variables, at present wesuggest a dichotomous value type, as provided in Paragraph 3.4.10.2 of AdministrativePrinciples 2005. Figure 7.3 shows the basic types of arm’s length analysissubject to functional type and comparability.7.4.3 Functional type: Risk versus uncertaintyThe variable ‘functional type’ characterizes the organizational unit of a valuechain (e.g. related party or center unit) as to whether the risk is determinable andcan be quantified or whether it is uncertain and not quantifiable (or not quantified).In this model, the ‘prudent businessman’ includes risk in a cost calculation(either as cost factor or as insurance coverage cost), while uncertainty is dealt withFunction type(governing risk)Risk(determinable)Uncertainty(coordinated by entrepreneur)Routine partyHybrid partyComparableactivityYesDatabase-driven arm’s lengthtest(e.g. profit margins on basis ofC + , R − or TNMM)(comp. Tz. 3.4.10.2 a)Cost calculation andbudget-actual assessmentprior year-end(comp. Tz. 3.4.10.2 c)(functional density,functional scope)Hybrid partyEntrepreneurNoCost calculation andbudget-actual assessmentprior year-end(comp. Tz. 3.4.10.2 c)Allocation of residual profit tononroutine functions of thevalue chain(comp. Tz. 3.4.10.2 b)Figure 7.3 Basic types of arm’s length analysis as proposed by the German AdministrativePrinciples 2005161
International Taxation HandbookRiskRoutine functionComparable tasksand functionsComparableNot comparableUncertaintyRiskUncertaintyNonroutinefunctionFigure 7.4Determination of routine and nonroutine functionsas a residual in the company’s profit (cf. Paragraph 3.4.10.2a, AdministrativePrinciples 2005).From a transaction cost economics perspective, a transaction between two partieswill be economically feasible if the contract provides both parties with sufficientsafeguard against hazards. If, however, the governance of a transaction is toocomplex because of transactional hazards, opportunism, and/or unforeseeableincentive structures, the transaction might preferably be internalized and, hence,does not take place between two parties – notwithstanding whether they are membersof the same multinational group or third parties. This is what transaction costeconomics suggests as hierarchical coordination within the same organizationalunit (cf. Sansing, 1999; Oestreicher, 2000; Grossman et al., 2003; Brem and Tucha,2005). Hence, the contractual safeguard deals with the hold-up problem whicharises if specific investments are necessary for generating certain goods or services.From this perspective, it follows that the coordination of goods or services ispreferably carried out within the entrepreneurial unit (integration) if, for example,highly specific assets in physical and/or human capital are necessary and thehazards of opportunistic behavior and incentive structure cannot be governed bymeans of a contract between the two parties. The entrepreneur, hence, seeks togovern the uncertainty by means of hierarchical and internal coordination. Acontractual safeguard of such uncertainty is not possible because an insurer cannotbe found or insurance is economically not sound because of prohibitivelyhigh costs. On the other hand, the transactional relationship between the ‘entrepreneurialunit’ and another related party (or another business unit) of the samemultinational organization is coordinated externally through a contract. 8162
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International <strong>Tax</strong>ation HandbookRiskRoutine functionComparable tasksand functionsComparableNot comparableUncertaintyRiskUncertaintyNonroutinefunctionFigure 7.4Determination of routine and nonroutine functionsas a residual in the company’s profit (cf. Paragraph 3.4.10.2a, AdministrativePrinciples 2005).From a transaction cost economics perspective, a transaction between two partieswill be economically feasible if the contract provides both parties with sufficientsafeguard against hazards. If, however, the governance of a transaction is toocomplex because of transactional hazards, opportunism, and/or unforeseeableincentive structures, the transaction might preferably be internalized and, hence,does not take place between two parties – notwithstanding whether they are membersof the same multinational group or third parties. This is what transaction costeconomics suggests as hierarchical coordination within the same organizationalunit (cf. Sansing, 1999; Oestreicher, 2000; Grossman et al., 2003; Brem and Tucha,2005). Hence, the contractual safeguard deals with the hold-up problem whicharises if specific investments are necessary for generating certain goods or services.From this perspective, it follows that the coordination of goods or services ispreferably carried out within the entrepreneurial unit (integration) if, for example,highly specific assets in physical and/or human capital are necessary and thehazards of opportunistic behavior and incentive structure cannot be governed bymeans of a contract between the two parties. The entrepreneur, hence, seeks togovern the uncertainty by means of hierarchical and internal coordination. Acontractual safeguard of such uncertainty is not possible because an insurer cannotbe found or insurance is economically not sound because of prohibitivelyhigh costs. On the other hand, the transactional relationship between the ‘entrepreneurialunit’ and another related party (or another business unit) of the samemultinational organization is coordinated externally through a contract. 8162