Part 1 - AL-Tax

International Taxation HandbookHuber, B. (1999). Tax Competition and Tax Coordination in an Optimum Tax Model. Journal ofPublic Economics, 71(3):441–458.Kirchgässner, G. and Pommerehne, W. (1996). Tax Harmonization and Tax Competition in theEuropean Union: Lessons from Switzerland. Journal of Public Economics, 60(3):351–371.Martimort, D. (1999). Renegotiation Design with Multiple Regulators. Journal of Economic Theory,88(2):261–293.Martimort, D. and Stole, L. (2002). The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common AgencyGames. Econometrica, 70(4):1659–1673.Mirrlees, J. (1971). An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation. Review of EconomicStudies, 38(2):175–208.Page, F. and Monteiro, P. (2003). Three Principles of Competitive Nonlinear Pricing. Journal ofMathematical Economics, 39(1):63–109.Rochet, J.-C. and Stole, L. (2002). Nonlinear Pricing with Random Participation. Review of EconomicStudies, 69(1):277–311.Stiglitz, J. (1982). Self-selection and Pareto Efficient Taxation. Journal of Public Economics,17(2):213–240.Wildasin, D. (1991). Income Redistribution in a Common Labor Market. American Economic Review,81(4):757–773.Wildasin, D. (1994). Income Redistribution and Migration. Canadian Journal of Economics,27(3):637–656.Wilson, J. D. (1999). Theories of Tax Competition. National Tax Journal, 52(2):269–304.Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1See Stiglitz (1982).Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2The program of government B:max U B1 ,s.t.⎛ I ⎞ ⎛B I ⎞1 B1UB1ννUB2 0,⎝⎜ω1⎠⎟⎝⎜ω2⎠⎟ ⎛ I ⎞ ⎛B2I ⎞B2UB2ννUB1 0,⎝⎜ω2⎠⎟⎝⎜ω⎟1⎠⎡ ⎛ ⎞pP U U U I B11 1( A1, B1)B1ν ⎝⎜ω 1⎠⎟ ⎤ ⎡⎛ I BIB1 p2P2( UA2, UB2)UB2ν ⎣⎢⎦⎥⎝⎜⎣⎢ω22⎞ ⎤I ⎠⎟B2 0.⎦⎥90