Sunbelt XXXI International Network for Social Network ... - INSNA

Road Networks And Insurgent ViolenceCunningham, Dan; Schroeder, Robert; Everton, SeanCriminals, Gangs, Terrorists, and NetworksInsurgencies, epidemiologySAT.AM1This paper applies an epidemiological model to understand the relationship between road networks and insurgency in the Philippines. Conventional wisdomholds that transportation infrastructure, namely roads, is not only an indicator of development and sign of a government’s reach over its territory, but also apotentially critical component of any development strategy for countering insurgencies (Kilcullen 2009). Zhukov (2010) challenges this notion and utilizes anepidemiological model in which roads can in fact transmit insurgent violence from an “infected” village to a “susceptible” village. Just as road networks canbenefit a government or a counterinsurgent’s development policies, they can facilitate insurgencies by reducing an insurgency’s operational costs, permittingrapid access to and extraction from targets, easing day‐to‐day operations, and enabling deliveries of supplies to establish base camps (Zhukov 2010). We applyZhukov’s model to the southern Philippines by using the presence of Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) camps as an indicator of insurgent activity along withroad network data from the Philippines National Statistic Office (NSO). Our initial findings support Zhukov’s work and may begin to validate the idea that adevelopmental strategy centered on road infrastructure can present mixed results when dealing with an insurgency.Rules Of The Game: Generalized Exchange And Dominance Hierarchies In A Gang Homicide NetworkPapachristos, Andrew V.; Lewis, KevinCriminals, Gangs, Terrorists, and NetworksERGM/P*, Exchange, Gangs, Ucinet, Dominance, Crime NetworksSAT.AM1The modern street gang exists in a social milieu where social status is determined by the manner in which individuals and groups handle violence and thethreats thereof. Gang members frequently refer to street life—and the norms that guide it—as simply “the game.” Like other games, successfully participatingin the street game demands adherence to certain rules, such as the willingness to violently redress a threat, the avoidance of “weak” behaviors, the protectionof one’s friends, and so on. This paper combines ethnographic data and detailed police records to ascertain if the rules of the street game described by gangmembers in fact contribute to the relative social standing and perceived dominance of groups. Qualitative data are used to devise theoretically relevant rulesof the street game and, then, exponential random graph models are used to test the relatively prevalence and importance of said rules on observable patternsof gang violence. Results suggest that while some of the rules of the game are indeed good predictors of observable patterns of violence, many of the prizednorms of gang members have little empirical relation to group identity and status.