Sunbelt XXXI International Network for Social Network ... - INSNA

Networks, Collective Action, And State FormationConway, DrewAgent‐Based Models and Multi‐Agent SystemsGame Theory, Collective Action, Agent Based Models, Simulation GameFRI.PM2The study of state formation often focuses on building state capacity. The formation and subsequent bolstering of state capacity, however, are distinctlydifferent activities. While the study of state capacity building has provided considerable insight into the role of formal institutions in maintaining stablegovernance, the implicit assumption in this work is the existence of a state upon which to build capacity. The collective decision to formalize institutions into astate‐‐‐a necessary prior condition for building state capacity‐‐‐is rarely addressed. In the following paper the role of informal institutions; specifically, socialnetworks, in the process of state germination are explored. Using Afghanistan as a framework for the discussion of state formation through informal networks,the research presented below attempts to illustrate the importance of the structure of these networks, and the actors therein, in state formation. The paperbegins with a brief description of the role of informal institution and social networks in Afghanistan. Next, a provision point public goods game is presented asa basic model of the collective action problem inherent in state formation. Then, a network variant of this game is presented, which is implemented as acomputational model. In the final sections the results of simulations from the computational model are presented, with a discussion and conclusions.New Structural Hole Measures For Dynamic And Adaptive Social NetworksOh, PoongNetwork CharacteristicsNetwork Dynamics, Social Capital, Structural Holes, Brokerage, Closure, EquilibriumWED.PM1Since proposed by R. Burt (1992), the concept of structural holes has occupied a central position in social network analysis for examining competitiveadvantages of actors embedded in a network. Recently, Burt (2005) has further extended its conceptual utility and applicability by suggesting two newcontrasting concepts – network closure and brokerage – which bridge the conceptual and methodological gap between social network theory and social capitaltheory. However, a close examination of Burt’s formulation of structural holes reveals two hidden assumptions: (1) non‐diminishing marginal utility ofadditional ties, i.e., U(Xij) + U(Xik) = 2U(Xij) or 2U(Xik); and (2) equal utility of indirect ties to direct ties, i.e., U(Xikj) = U(Xij). These two assumptions are not onlyunrealistic but unable to capture the dynamic nature of social networks that evolve over time. From this perspective, this study attempts (1) to discuss thelimitations of the original structural hole measures due to the hidden assumptions, such as the convergence to infeasible equilibrium states (2) to extend theoriginal measures into more general situations by introducing a new parameter, heterogeneity index, h, (3) to demonstrate the theoretical relationships of thenew measures to existing notions, such as maximum carrying capacity at nodal level that emerges from structural constraints in evolutionary/ecologicalnetwork theory and the law of diminishing returns in the general rational choice theory. The findings of the present study deepen our understanding of theevolutionary mechanisms of social networks. The technical issues with the operationalization of the heterogeneity index, h, are also discussed.