Contents

§ 10.1 VALUATION OF PROPERTYdonor was an expert with respect to the property; the court was of theview that he “had to have known that . . . [his appraiser’s] estimate washooey, the sort of number ginned up to put one over on the revenooers.” 72• A payment made in settlement of a claim for tortious interference with aninheritance was held not to qualify as a charitable contribution because novalue was added for the benefit of the charity; that is, the charity would havehad to pay the amount in settlement over to noncharitable beneficiaries. 73• A court determined the value of wild game animal trophy mounts contributedto various charitable organizations. 74• An individual donated a boat to a charitable organization, claiming acharitable deduction based on a fair market value of $75,100; a courtupheld the IRS’s determination that the value of the boat was $22,125. 75• A court upheld the disallowance of a $1.6 million charitable deductionclaimed by a partnership that sold its interest in real property to a university.The purchase price was $9 million; the deduction, however, was based on a$12.2 million value, determined using the value-in-use method, which thecourt rejected because it did not reflect the property’s fair market value. 76• An individual contributed stamp collectibles and religious articles to acharity, claiming a fair market value for this property of $949,030; a courtsustained the IRS’s conclusion that the property’s value was $12,973. Thedonor’s testimony as to value was rejected in part because he treated theproperty as though it had little value, storing it in a warehouse that “hada rodent problem and was very hot during the summer.” 77• A court concluded that the fair market value of a conservation easementgranted by an individual in 1993 to a charitable organization was $800,000and that the value of an amendment to the easement granted to the charityin 1994 was $290,000. 78• A court, for federal gift tax purposes, valued interests in a limited partnershipthat were assigned as gifts to individuals and to charitable organizations.The court found them to be merely economic rights withrespect to the partnership, rather than conferring partner status on theassignees; the court applied discounts for lack of control and lack of marketabilityof the interests. 79An issue that can arise is the value of property purchased out of the estate ofa bankrupt person and subsequently contributed to a charitable organization.An individual, for example, may purchase property from a bankruptcy court72 Van Zelst v. Commissioner, 100 F.3d 1259 (7th Cir. 1996), aff’g 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 435 (1995), cert. denied,522 U.S. 807 (1997).73 Lindberg v. United States, 927 F. Supp. 1401 (D. Colo. 1996), aff’d, 99-1 U.S.T.C. 60,334 (10th Cir. 1999).74 Robson v. Commissioner, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2574 (1997).75 Sergeant v. Commissioner, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 133 (1998).76 Arbor Towers Assocs. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 2348 (1999).77 Jacobson v. Commissioner, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 930, 931 (1999).78 Strasburg v. Commissioner, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1697 (2000).79 McCord v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 358 (2003). 363