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OTHER ASPECTS OF DEDUCTIBLE GIVINGreasonably knowledgeable willing seller for the property subject to any restrictionsimposed at the time of the contributions.” 23 Added the IRS: “Propertyotherwise intrinsically more valuable[,] that is encumbered by some restrictionor condition limiting its marketability or use, must be valued in light of suchlimitation.” 24In another instance, a person contributed to a tax-exempt university all ofthat person’s interests in a patent. The transfer agreement provided that the universitycould not sell or license the patent for a period of three years after thetransfer. This restriction did not result in any benefit to the donor, nor could thepatent revert to this donor under any circumstances. The IRS ruled that the contributionwas deductible, with the restriction reducing what would otherwise bethe fair market value of the patent and therefore reducing the amount of thedonor’s charitable deduction. 25 The IRS added that, had the donor received abenefit in exchange for the contribution, the value of the benefit would have furtherreduced the amount of this charitable contribution. 26In recent years, the courts have had to decide a substantial number of charitablegift “tax shelter” cases, in which property was sold to putative donors withthe expectation that the donors would hold the property long enough for it tobecome long-term capital gain property and then donate the property to charity,at a time when the value of the property had appreciated in relation to the originalpurchase price. These tax shelter cases frequently involve gifts of gems 27 orworks of art. 28 The courts have not looked favorably on these transactions. 29Some examples of court opinions that have addressed the question of thevaluation of property follow.• A case concerned contribution of a partial interest in property for conservationpurposes. 30• A case concerned the valuation of land and improvements contributed toa college. 31• A case concerned the valuation of a mineral interest contributed to a governmentalagency. 32• Two donors contributed wastewater treatment equipment to a university.The donors claimed a deduction of $201,000. The IRS asserted that thevalue of the property was $20,500. The court that heard the case settled,without explanation, on a deduction value of $75,000. On appeal, thisdecision was reversed and remanded. The appellate court wrote:Unlike the original judgment of Solomon, the true rationale of which has beenreadily apparent to generations of disinterested observers . . . the judgment23 Id.24 Id. See also Cooley v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 223 (1959), aff’d, 283 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1960).25 Rev. Rul. 2003-28, 2003-11 I.R.B. 594.26 See § 3.1(b).27 See § 9.2.28 See § 9.1.29 See, e.g., Anselmo v. Commissioner, 757 F.2d 1208 (11th Cir. 1985).30 Hilborn v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 677 (1985).31 Palmer Estate v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 66 (1985), rev’d & remanded, 839 F.2d 420 (8th Cir. 1988).32 Stark v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 243 (1985). 358