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§ 8.8 ASCERTAINABILITYmoney for an individual, for improvements on the decedent’s house as long asthis individual lived there, and for payment of this individual’s hospital, medical,dental, and income tax obligations. The government contended that the provisionsfor improvements to the home and for the individual’s personal incometaxes failed the ascertainability test. The trial court, however, concluded that anyexpenses with respect to the residence could be satisfied out of an income interest.The fact that the trust could pay for the income interest beneficiary’s unusualand exceptional expenses was neutralized by the facts of his age (87), independentsources of income, and insurance coverage. 257 On appeal, the appellatecourt agreed, sifting through the precedents to find ascertainability in “comfort”but not “happiness,” and an adequate standard in “accident, illness, or otherunusual circumstances” but not in “pleasure.” 258 It found that “improvements”to the house and the payment of income taxes were closely akin to “comfort” andallowed the charitable contribution deduction. 259Thus, when a trustee has considerable discretionary authority as to the makingof charitable contributions from the assets of an estate, the estate tax charitablecontribution deduction will not be available. 260 When the amount of thebequest is not uncertain and the bequest has a “legal reality” in the will, however,the estate tax charitable contribution deduction will be allowed. 261 By contrast,when a charitable remainder interest in a residuary trust created under adecedent’s will was deemed by the IRS not to be presently ascertainable, due tothe lack of specificity of charitable beneficiaries, the interest was found to beineligible for the estate tax charitable deduction. 262257 Wells Fargo Bank v. United States, 91-1 U.S.T.C. 60,067 (C.D. Cal. 1990).258 Wells Fargo Bank v. United States, 1 F.3d 830, 835 (9th Cir. 1993).259 The majority in this opinion wryly observed that the amount of the individual’s annual income taxes has nothingto do with “such untrammeled standards” as his “happiness” or “pleasure.” Id. at 836. The dissenter wrote:“While I am not absolutely immune from the pull of a sympathetic case, I have no power under tax laws toreform this ill-drafted will.” Id. at 837. The lines drawn in this area amount to fine distinctions indeed.260 See, e.g., First Trust Co. of St. Paul State Bank v. Reynolds, 137 F.2d 518 (8th Cir. 1943); Harbison v. UnitedStates, 2001-1 U.S.T.C. 60,398 (N.D. Ga. 2001); Delbridge v. United States, 89 F. Supp. 845 (E.D. Mich.1950); Lockett Estate v. Commissioner, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 1731 (1998).261 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9322025.262 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9531003. 265