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FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS• The otherwise unexplained denial of admission or readmission to aschool of children of parents who are financially able, but who do notcontribute to the schoolMoreover, in other cases, although no single factor may be determinative, a combinationof several factors may indicate that a payment is not a charitable contribution.In these cases, both “economic and noneconomic pressures placed uponparents” are taken into account. 73 The factors that the IRS will ordinarily takeinto consideration, but will not limit itself to, are:• The absence of a significant tuition charge• Substantial or unusual pressure to contribute applied to parents of childrenattending a school• Contribution appeals made as part of the admissions or enrollment process• The absence of significant potential sources of revenue for operating theschool other than contributions by parents of children attending theschool• Other factors suggesting that a contribution policy has been created as ameans of avoiding the characterization of payments as tuitionNonetheless, the IRS concluded: “However, if a combination of such factors is notpresent, payments by a parent [to a school attended by a child of the parent] willnormally constitute deductible contributions, even if the actual cost of educatingthe child exceeds the amount of any tuition charged for the child’s education.” 74A federal court of appeals upheld the IRS’s disallowance of a charitablededuction for tuition payments made to a religious school, where the children ofthe payors were in attendance, rejecting the arguments that there was a gift or thatenactment of the rules as to intangible religious benefits changed the law in thisarea. 75 A set of parents claimed charitable contribution deductions for a portion oftheir tuition payments, with the “gift” element ostensibly being equal to the proportionof the school day allocated to religious education. The appellate courtruled that the additions to the tax law of charitable giving of the charitable giftsubstantiation requirements 76 and the quid pro quo contribution rules 77 did notchange the substantive definition of a charitable contribution, but rather added“procedural provisions regarding the documentation of tax return information.”These rules include exceptions for contributions for which solely religious benefitsare received. 7873 Id. at 47–48.74 Id. at 48. See also Haak v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 1087 (D. Mich. 1978); Yoshihara v. Commissioner, 78T.C.M. (CCH) 789 (1999).75 Sklar v. Commissioner, 282 F.3d 610 (9th Cir. 2002), aff’g 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1815 (2000).76 See § 21.1(b).77 See § 22.2.78 One of the arguments advanced by the appellants in Sklar v. Commissioner, 282 F.3d 610 (9th Cir. 2002), wasthat their theory as to deductibility of the tuition payments is in accord with the IRS’s “policy” of permittingmembers of the Church of Scientology to deduct payments for certain services, as stated in a 1997 closingagreement. The appellate court stated in dicta that this policy is in violation of the Internal Revenue Code orthe Establishment Clause. 282 F.3d at 618–20. The IRS issued an information letter explaining that tuition paymentsto religious schools are not deductible as charitable gifts (INFO 2004-0091). 68