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§ 3.1 MEANING OF GIFTof other related transactions, but instead regarded it as an integral part of a series oftransactions in which the individual benefited. Indeed, the court valued the interestspassing to the university at $276,500. At the same time, however, the courtfound that the individual received a quid pro quo from the transaction in theamount of $295,963. 67Several other court opinions contain applications of the quid pro quo rationalein this setting. 68 This rationale is, of course, that the transferor is receiving goods,services, and/or other benefits of value comparable to the money and/or propertytransferred, and thus the transaction is a purchase rather than a gift. 69This rationale is followed by the IRS. An illustration of the IRS’s applicationof these rules appears in its guidance concerning the deductibility of paymentsto a private school when the “donor” is a parent of a child attending the school. 70Basically, payments of tuition to a school are not deductible as charitable gifts. 71The general standard in this context is this:Whether a transfer of money by a parent to an organization that operates aschool is a voluntary transfer that is made with no expectation of obtaining acommensurate benefit depends upon whether a reasonable person, taking allthe facts and circumstances of the case into account, would conclude thatenrollment in the school was in no manner contingent upon making the payment,that the payment was not made pursuant to a plan (whether express orimplied) to convert nondeductible tuition into charitable contributions, andthat receipt of the benefit was not otherwise dependent upon the making ofthe payment. 72The IRS generally presumes that such payments are not charitable contributionswhen one or more of the following factors is present:• The existence of a contract under which the parent agrees to make a “contribution”and which contains provisions ensuring admission of the parent’schild• A plan allowing parents either to pay tuition or to make “contributions”in exchange for schooling• The earmarking of a contribution for the direct benefit of a particularstudent67 Signom v. Commissioner, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 2081 (2000).68 See, e.g., Stubbs v. United States, 428 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1009 (1971); JeffersonMills, Inc. v. United States, 367 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1966); Wegner v. Lethert, 67-1 U.S.T.C. 9,229 (D. Minn.1967); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. United States, 200 F. Supp. 91 (E.D. Wis. 1961); Seldin v. Commissioner,28 T.C.M. (CCH) 1215 (1969); Scheffres v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 234 (1969). Some old cases alsoare based on this rationale: e.g., Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34 (1937); Channing v. United States, 4F. Supp. 33 (D. Mass. 1933).69 A purchaser of a ticket to an event held by or for the benefit of a charitable organization who does not attendthe event is not the maker of a charitable gift, in that the purchaser receives a material benefit merely by havingthe right to decide whether to attend the event. Urbauer v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2492 (1992).70 Rev. Rul. 83-104, 1983-2 C.B. 46.71 Oppewal v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 1000 (1st Cir. 1972); DeJong v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir.1962), aff’g 36 T.C. 896 (1961). The IRS ruled that payments to a church made in expectation that the churchwill pay the tuition for the contributors’ children at a church-related school are not deductible as charitablegifts. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9004030. By contrast, a contribution to a school was held to qualify as a deductible giftnotwithstanding the fact that the donor’s grandchild then attended the school. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8608042.72 Rev. Rul. 83-104, 1983-2 C.B. 46, 47. 67