12.07.2015 Views

Contents

Contents

Contents

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS
  • No tags were found...

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

§ 3.1 MEANING OF GIFTreformation. 36 The IRS disallowed the charitable deduction claimed by theestate, and the Tax Court upheld the disallowance. The court found that thetrust “was an attempt to qualify the charitable bequests for the [estate tax charitable]deduction.” 37 The court added that “[t]here is no evidence indicating anontax reason” for the second trust, 38 and disallowed the deduction because thetrust “was modified for reasons independent of tax considerations.” 39 The courtadded that if it ruled to the contrary, it would be rendering the reformation proceduresuperfluous, because the trust could be retroactively amended.In another donative-intent case, a husband and wife granted to a charitableconservancy organization a scenic easement over 167 acres of their 407 acres ofproperty; they claimed a $206,900 charitable contribution deduction for the gift. 40On audit, the IRS disallowed the deduction, claiming, in part, that the donorslacked the requisite donative intent. The alleged absence of donative intent wasbased on the assertion that the donors made the gift of the scenic easement for thesole purpose of maintaining their property’s value and to receive a tax deduction.The government made much of the fact that the donee conservancy group“recited the estimated tax advantages of a scenic easement conveyance” and thatthe donors sought reconveyance of the easement once the charitable deductionwas disallowed. 41The matter went to court, where it was found that the requisite donativeintent was present at the time the scenic easement was conveyed. The courtsaid that the federal tax law “permits deductions for bona fide gifts notwithstandingthe motivations of a taxpayer.” 42 The court wrote that, “[i]n order tobe entitled to a tax deduction, the taxpayer must not expect a substantial benefitas a quid pro quo for the contribution. 43 “However,” the court continued, the“charitable nature of a contribution is not vitiated by receipt of a benefit incidentalto the greater public benefit.” 44 While generally agreeing with the IRS’sconstruction of the facts, the court found that the donors’ decision to contributethe easement “would invariably encourage other neighboring landowners toimpose similar development restrictions on their property.” 45 The court alsofound that the donors believed that the imposition of a conservation easementon their property would diminish the value of the property. Thus, the court, inrejecting the IRS’s allegations, ruled that any benefit that inured to the donorsfrom the conveyance “was merely incidental to an important, public spirited,charitable purpose.” 4636 See § 8.7(b).37 La Meres Estate v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 294, 308 (1992).38 Id.39 Id.40 This type of gift is discussed in § 9.7.41 McLennan v. United States, 91-2 U.S.T.C. 50, 447, at 89, 644 (Cl. Ct. 1991).42 Id.43 Id.44 Id.45 Id.46 McLennan, 91-2 U.S.T.C. at 89,645. This opinion was affirmed. McLennan v. United States, 994 F.2d 839(Fed. Cir. 1993). 63

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!