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FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTSsimilar to the words “in trust for,” so that in selecting the phrase for the use of, Congresswas referring o donations made in trust or in a similar legal arrangement. 27The Court added that although this interpretation “does not require that the qualifiedorganization take actual possession of the contribution, it neverthelessreflects that the beneficiary must have significant legal rights with respect to thedisposition of donated funds.” 28The Court thus rejected the claim that a charitable deduction should beallowed when the charitable organization merely has “a reasonable ability tosupervise the use of contributed funds.” 29 It observed that the IRS “would facevirtually insurmountable administrative difficulties in verifying that any particularexpenditure benefited a qualified donee” were a looser interpretation of thephrase utilized. 30 The larger interpretation would, wrote the Court, “create anopportunity for tax evasion that others might be eager to exploit,” although theCourt was quick to note that “there is no suggestion whatsoever in this case thatthe transferred funds were used for an improper purpose.” 31The Court also found that the funds were not transferred “in trust for” thechurch. The money was transferred to the children’s personal bank accounts onwhich they were the sole authorized signatories. No trust or “similar legalarrangement” was created. The children lacked any legal obligation to use themoney in accordance with church guidelines, nor did the church have any legalentitlement to the money or a cause of action against missionaries who usedtheir parents’ money for purposes not approved by the church. Thus, the charitabledeductions were denied. 32Notwithstanding these three Supreme Court opinions, however, the donativeintent doctrine, as noted, has its adherents. For example, a court denied anestate tax charitable deduction to an estate because a trust, funded by the estate,from which the gifts were made, was modified solely to preserve the estate taxcharitable deduction. 33In that case, the decedent created a trust, which was funded with interestsin real property. This trust had charitable remainder beneficiaries, but the trustdid not qualify for the estate tax charitable contribution deduction 34 because itwas a defective (for tax purposes) split-interest trust. 35 Following the donor’sdeath, a successor trust was established, with equivalent funding of the incomeinterest beneficiaries outside the trust. The second trust became a wholly charitabletrust and the estate claimed a charitable deduction for the amounts that werepaid to the charitable beneficiaries. This process did not constitute a qualifying27 A discussion of gifts for the use of charitable organizations is in § 10.3.28 Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472, 483 (1990).29 Id. at 484–85.30 Id. at 485.31 Id.32 See also Cook v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 681 (1989); Brinley v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (CCH)734 (1983); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9405003.33 La Meres Estate v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 294 (1992).34 See § 8.3(b).35 See § 5.3. 62