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§ 24.2 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVEThey gave the states essential information about the fundraising to be conducted,so that they would have a basis for investigation and review shouldthere be suspicion of some abuse.During the ensuing years, some states decided to go beyond the concept oflicensing and began to affirmatively regulate charitable solicitations. This wasdone in part because of citizen complaints; another part was political grandstanding.The regulation worked its way into the realm of attempting to prevent“less qualified” (including out-of-the-mainstream) charities from soliciting inthe states.Structurally, the typical charitable solicitation statute originally did nothave much to do with actual regulation of the efforts of either the fundraisinginstitution or the fundraising professional. Rather, the emphasis was on informationgathering and disclosure of that information to ostensibly desirousdonors. As noted, its requirements were based on the submission of writteninformation (registration statements, reports, and the like) by charitable organizationsand their fundraising advisers; the typical statute also contained bondrequirements and granted enforcement authority to the attorneys general, secretariesof state, or other governmental officials charged with administeringand enforcing the law.Later, however, law requirements began to creep in that sounded more likeethical precepts. These requirements were more than just mechanics—they wentbeyond registration requirements, filing due dates, and accounting principles.They went beyond telling the charity and the professional fundraisers when todo something, and entered the realm of telling them how they must conduct thesolicitation and what they cannot do in that regard.From the regulators’ viewpoint, the apogee of this form of regulation camewhen the states could ban charitable organizations with “high” fundraising costs.(As noted below, this form of regulation ultimately was found to be unconstitutional.)This application of constitutional law rights to charitable solicitation actsleft the state regulators without their principal weapon. In frustration, they turnedto other forms of law, those based on the principle of “disclosure” (see below).In this aftermath, more state fundraising law developed. The registrationand annual reports became more extensive. The states tried, with limited success,to force charities and solicitors into various forms of point-of-solicitationdisclosure of various pieces of information. Some states dictated the contents ofthe scripts of telephone solicitors. This disclosure approach failed to satisfy theregulatory impulse. More frustration ensued.The regulators turned to even more ways to have a role in the charitablefundraising process. They started to micromanage charitable fundraising. Theybegan to substitute their judgment for that of donors, charities, and professionalfundraisers. Thus, they engendered laws that beefed up the recordkeepingrequirements, spelled out the contents of contracts between charities and fundraisingconsultants and solicitors, stepped into commercial co-ventures, andeven injected themselves into matters such as the sale of tickets for charitableevents and solicitations by fire and police personnel.The regulatory appetite still remained unsatisfied. Having accomplishedthe imposition of just about all of the law they could think of, they turned to 629

§ 24.2 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVEThey gave the states essential information about the fundraising to be conducted,so that they would have a basis for investigation and review shouldthere be suspicion of some abuse.During the ensuing years, some states decided to go beyond the concept oflicensing and began to affirmatively regulate charitable solicitations. This wasdone in part because of citizen complaints; another part was political grandstanding.The regulation worked its way into the realm of attempting to prevent“less qualified” (including out-of-the-mainstream) charities from soliciting inthe states.Structurally, the typical charitable solicitation statute originally did nothave much to do with actual regulation of the efforts of either the fundraisinginstitution or the fundraising professional. Rather, the emphasis was on informationgathering and disclosure of that information to ostensibly desirousdonors. As noted, its requirements were based on the submission of writteninformation (registration statements, reports, and the like) by charitable organizationsand their fundraising advisers; the typical statute also contained bondrequirements and granted enforcement authority to the attorneys general, secretariesof state, or other governmental officials charged with administeringand enforcing the law.Later, however, law requirements began to creep in that sounded more likeethical precepts. These requirements were more than just mechanics—they wentbeyond registration requirements, filing due dates, and accounting principles.They went beyond telling the charity and the professional fundraisers when todo something, and entered the realm of telling them how they must conduct thesolicitation and what they cannot do in that regard.From the regulators’ viewpoint, the apogee of this form of regulation camewhen the states could ban charitable organizations with “high” fundraising costs.(As noted below, this form of regulation ultimately was found to be unconstitutional.)This application of constitutional law rights to charitable solicitation actsleft the state regulators without their principal weapon. In frustration, they turnedto other forms of law, those based on the principle of “disclosure” (see below).In this aftermath, more state fundraising law developed. The registrationand annual reports became more extensive. The states tried, with limited success,to force charities and solicitors into various forms of point-of-solicitationdisclosure of various pieces of information. Some states dictated the contents ofthe scripts of telephone solicitors. This disclosure approach failed to satisfy theregulatory impulse. More frustration ensued.The regulators turned to even more ways to have a role in the charitablefundraising process. They started to micromanage charitable fundraising. Theybegan to substitute their judgment for that of donors, charities, and professionalfundraisers. Thus, they engendered laws that beefed up the recordkeepingrequirements, spelled out the contents of contracts between charities and fundraisingconsultants and solicitors, stepped into commercial co-ventures, andeven injected themselves into matters such as the sale of tickets for charitableevents and solicitations by fire and police personnel.The regulatory appetite still remained unsatisfied. Having accomplishedthe imposition of just about all of the law they could think of, they turned to 629

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