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IntErFACEs
3. Application software for
users – AusweisApp
In order to use their new identity card on line, users require
a software that serves as the interface between the ID, the
card reader and the service provider’s eID server. this software,
called “AusweisApp” (“Ausweis” is the German word
for “ID document”), will be available free of charge on a
web portal of the German Federal Ministry of the Interior
(https://www.ausweisapp.bund.de) for the operating
systems Windows, Linux and Mac os.
In addition to utilizing the identification function of the
new ID cards, AusweisApp also enables qualified electronic
signature with multiple signature cards, both conventional
contact type cards and contactless devices like the new
ID card. Functions of the German health card are also
supported.
AusweisApp is an implementation of the technical Guideline
eCard-API Framework [tr-03112], which defines easy-touse,
uniform interfaces for communication between card
readers, cards and applications (web-based and local).
4. Security mechanisms for the
identification function of the
new ID card
the security mechanisms and resulting It infrastructures for
the new ID card ensure protection of personal data, proof of
the authenticity of the identity document and proof against
forgery.
special attention has been given to solutions for securing the
contactless interface between the ID card and the terminal –
which, among other things, must meet the requirements for
qualified electronic signatures.
the following protocols and other measures for achieving
the aforementioned security objectives were developed
under the active leadership and participation of the BsI.
8 9
Abbreviation
Full name Purpose
PACE Password
Authen ticated
Connection
Establishment
EAC Extended Access
Control
CA: Chip
Authentication
TA: Terminal
Authentication
PA Passive
Authentication
RI Restricted
Identification
sECurIty
Access control, protects the
RF chip from being read at a
distance.
Extended access control,
comprising two subprotocols.
Establishment of a secure link and
detection of “cloned” RF chips.
Authentication of terminal
device for reading sensitive data
from RF chip.
Validation of authenticity and
integrity of the data on the RF chip.
Generation of chip- and providerspecific
pseudonyms.