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sECurIty<br />

device (terminal) can demonstrate an explicit read authorization<br />

for these specific data (e.g. only date of birth). the<br />

Country Verifying Certificate Authority certificate (CVCA<br />

certificate) is stored on the rF chip to verify this authorization.<br />

this certificate forms the root of the Country Verifier<br />

Public Key Infrastructure (CV-PKI), a hierarchy of authorization<br />

certificates for reading sensitive data from identity<br />

documents.<br />

In Terminal Authentication, the reader (terminal) transmits<br />

its read authorization to the rF chip in the form of a<br />

terminal certificate. It also transmits the CVCA certificate<br />

and all certificates in the hierarchy between these two<br />

certificates. this enables the rF chip to verify the authenticity<br />

and integrity of the terminal’s certificate. A positive<br />

result requires that each of the subsequent certificates in the<br />

hierarchy is signed with the private key of its predecessor,<br />

starting with the CVCA certificate. the rF chip “knows” that<br />

this certificate is trustworthy because it was stored on the rF<br />

chip when it was manufactured.<br />

once the authenticity and integrity of the terminal<br />

certificate transmitted by the reader has been established,<br />

the rF chip must verify that this certificate was really issued<br />

for this device. to this end, the rF chip transmits a random<br />

number to the reader, which signs it with a private key<br />

belonging to the terminal certificate. the reader device<br />

then transmits the signed random number back to the<br />

rF chip. using the terminal device’s public key, which<br />

is contained in the terminal certificate, the rF chip can<br />

verify the signature of the random number and determine<br />

whether the possesses has the private key that matches the<br />

certificate.<br />

EAC box<br />

Key component for ID card amendment<br />

Reg<strong>ist</strong>ration office PC<br />

Authorization PKI<br />

Each reader that wants to access the data of the electronic<br />

identity card requires corresponding authorization certificates,<br />

each with their own private and public keys, which<br />

must be renewed regularly via a PKI. the EAC box provides<br />

these functions in an encapsulated form in an evaluated<br />

and certified environment and communicates with external<br />

components and services via standardized interfaces<br />

[tr-03131].<br />

once the electronic identity card has been introduced, the<br />

EAC box will be used as a reader device for changing address<br />

data on the eID at municipal reg<strong>ist</strong>ration offices. Further<br />

uses in addition to this scenario are conceivable (e.g. border<br />

control).<br />

12 13<br />

<br />

Flow control<br />

Crypto<br />

protocols<br />

Stored<br />

certificates<br />

and keys<br />

EAC box core<br />

sECurIty<br />

Card<br />

reader<br />

Display<br />

PIN pad<br />

Specification: BSI Technical Guideline TR-03131 “EAC-Box Architecture and Interfaces”<br />

Protection profile: “CC Protection Profile for Inspection Systems”<br />

Secure channel

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