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sECurIty<br />

PKI Public Key<br />

Infrastructure<br />

CSCA: Country<br />

Signing Certificate<br />

Authority<br />

CVCA: Country<br />

Verifying Certificate<br />

Authority<br />

Hierarchy of digital certificates.<br />

Hierarchy of digital certificates<br />

for signing data in electronic<br />

identity documents.<br />

Hierarchy of digital certificates<br />

for read authorization of<br />

electronic identity documents.<br />

4.1 Password Authenticated Connection<br />

Establishment (PACE)<br />

Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE)<br />

ensures that the contactless rF chip in the new identity<br />

card cannot be read without explicit access, and that data<br />

are exchanged with the terminal device in encrypted form<br />

[Bender 2008].<br />

the password that can be used for PACE depends on the<br />

authorization certificate of the reader (terminal) device used.<br />

usually, this is the six-digit personal identification number<br />

(PIn), which is known only to the holder of the identity card.<br />

For reader devices with authorization certificates for<br />

sovereign use, e.g. border control, either a Machine<br />

readable Zone (MrZ) printed on the back of the new<br />

identity card or the six-digit card access number (CAn)<br />

printed on the front is sufficient.<br />

4.2 Extended Access Control (EAC),<br />

readers and EAC box<br />

Extended Access Control (EAC) comprises an array of<br />

protocols that are always executed in a specific order,<br />

depending on which electronic identity document is to be<br />

read [tr-03110].<br />

the EAC protocols include Chip Authentication (CA)<br />

and terminal Authentication (tA). the two protocols are<br />

executed together with Password Authenticated Connection<br />

Establishment (PACE) and Passive Authentication (PA).<br />

the purpose of Chip Authentication is to confirm that<br />

the chip is a real chip (and not a forgery or a clone) and to<br />

establish a secure connection between the chip and the<br />

reader, or between the chip and the service provider in the<br />

case of online authentication.<br />

Chip Authentication is based on Diffie-hellman key exchange,<br />

in which the reader or terminal device uses an<br />

ephemeral key pair and the chip a static pair. the chip’s<br />

public key is signed during the process of generating it<br />

(Passive Authentication – see section 4.3).<br />

the use of the signed key verifies the authenticity of the chip;<br />

at the same time, a strongly-encrypted and authenticated<br />

end-to-end channel is established between the chip and – in<br />

the case of online authentication – the service provider.<br />

the advantage of PACE is that the length of the password<br />

All data on the new identity card are treated as confidential<br />

has no effect on the security level of the encryption. In other<br />

and must be protected against being read by unauthorized<br />

words, even when the CAn or PIn are used, which are short<br />

persons. the terminal Authentication (tA) protocol was<br />

compared to the MrZ, the data on the rF chip of the electro-<br />

developed for this purpose. sensitive data can only be read<br />

nic identity card are strongly protected during transmission.<br />

when this protocol has been successfully executed on the<br />

reader. the rF chip in the identity document is designed so<br />

that it enables reading of specific data only when the reader<br />

10 11<br />

sECurIty

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