12MB PDF - Association for Mexican Cave Studies

Letters to the EditorTothe Editor:Because of some recent acrimoniousdebate about cave rescue in generaland the December 1978 Brincorescue in particular, the NationalCave Rescue Commission (NRC) hasbeen invited to comment on the subjectto Activities Newsletter readers.Cave-related aspects of the rescuewere discussed in an excellentarticle by Gill Ediger in ActivitiesNewsletter No.9 and it is not my intentto quibble over details therein.Some of the assumptions and conclusions,however, deserve comment. Wethink the rescue went very well, allthings considered, and we agree withGill that that resulted primarilyfrom the caliber of people involved.There are still some important lessonsto be learned from the rescue,however. Before getting into specifics,I think it is necessary tomake some general points about rescues.Everybody has to realize thatin-cave operations are only part ofthe overall rescue. Governmenttypes, local officials, non-cavingsearch and rescue groups, etc:, arenever going to do things entirelyto our liking. They are, in general,eager to listen to competent advice;but, they judge competence on thebasis of certifications, Air ForceRescue Communications Center recommendations,personal contact, andother such things that are of limitedinterest to most cavers. Anytimethe world of officialdom getsinvolved, they have to be interactedwith in a manner that makes sense tothem. That means they want a contactwho understands their jargonand their problems.Hindsight is always better thanforesight, but one has to actuallyact on the basis of information a­vailable at the time decisions have102to be made and live with the consequences.Decision makers thereforetend to behave conservatively whenthey can. If you want to do somethingunusual in a hurry, like flya truck and cavers into Mexico, youmust have already established contactswith high levels of officialdom,and they have to know you wellenough to trust you.Now, let me try to clear upsome specific items, with respectto the Brinco situation. What fewproblems the rescue did encounterstemmed primarily from the fact thatnobody at the cave knew much aboutthe "official" version of search andrescue operations. Terry Jones mayor may not have been needed in thecave, but he was needed on the surface.Better communications fromthe cave, using equipment that wasright there, could have avoided sendingin the backup group and wouldhave relieved a lot of anxiety backhere in the u.S. The resources atthe cave turned out to be capable ofcoping with the problems encountered,but how much margin was there? IfChris had been hypothermic, unconcious,or had a back injury, wouldeverything still have worked out aswell? Gill concludes that the successof the rescue without having aleader shows that leadership and"rescue squad mentality" are unnecessaryor even counterproductive. Iwill concede that in this particularset of circumstances with that particulargroup of people, it workedat least adequately. Implying thatsuch a process is best for other situationswith other people is totallyunjustified and even dangerous.I think that what we shouldlearn from the rescue is the "THESYSTEM", imperfect though it is,works. Neither the NCRC or the AirForce had ever actually planned fora rescue in Mexico, but most of theright people and equipment were deliveredto the right place in prettygood time. The more that caversare willing to organize along lines