eTrust CA-Top Secret Security for z/OS and OS ... - SupportConnect

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Mapping of Foreign EnvironmentsREALMNAME—a fully qualified Kerberos trust relationship of the followingform:/…/local_realm/krbtgt/foreign_realm/…/foreign_realm/krbtgt/local_realmwhere the values:local_realm—represents the web-address of the local default realm in theKerberos configuration fileforeign_realm—represents the web-address of the foreign realm in the Kerberosconfiguration file.KERBPASS—a password used to validate the trust relationship.Let us suppose that we wish to establish a trust relationship betweenTRUSTWORTHY.CA.COM with MAJESTERIAL.CLIENT.COM for which wewill employ the label MAJESTY in the SDT. Locally, we would define thefollowing:TSS ADD(SDT) REALM(majesty)REALMNAME(‘/…/trustworthy.ca.com/krbtgt/majesterial.client.com’)PASSWORD(xylofone)and,TSS ADD(SDT) REALM(trustyca)REALMNAME(‘/…/majesterial.client.com/krbtgt/trustworthy.ca.com’)PASSWORD(marimba)In the foreign system, a set of parallel definitions is required so that eachconnection in the conversation maintains identical passwords:TSS ADD(SDT) REALM(kingart)REALMNAME(‘/…/trustworthy.ca.com/krbtgt/majesterial.client.com’)PASSWORD(xylofone)and,TSS ADD(SDT) REALM(troubador)REALMNAME(‘/…/majesterial.client.com/krbtgt/trustworthy.ca.com’)PASSWORD(marimba)Notice that the REALM operands are merely labels of convenience, and do nothave to match between the two systems. However, the password for each trustrelationship must be identical for identical REALMNAME specifications.1–88 Cookbook
Mapping of Foreign EnvironmentsMapping Foreign Principal NamesForeign principal names are defined on CA-Top Secret to indicate the realm fromwhich the foreign user will be mapped into a local ACID. The following format isused for this fully qualified reference./…/foreign_realm/foreign_principal_nameThe foreign_principal_name should be defined in the foreign_realm as a localprincipal in that system. The foreign_principal_name need not be identical withits associated ACID in the foreign system.The local ACID need not be defined as a Kerberos local principal. It serves as asurrogate for security activities by the foreign principal in the local environment.The KERBLINK label provides a convenient reference in the SDT to identify therelationship. The command to link these entities is given below:TSS ADD(SDT) KERBLINK(kerblink)LINKNAME(‘/…/foreign_realm/foreign_principal_name’) KERBUSER(surrogat)KERBLINK—1-8 character label for the SDT record identifying the foreignprincipal relationshipLINKNAME—a fully qualified foreign principal name. Theforeign_principal_name must be defined as a local_principal_name in the foreignsystem.KERBUSER—a local ACID defined to CA-Top Secret. This ACID need not existat the time that the SDT record is defined. When the foreign principal attempts toinitiate a session with the local realm, however, the ACID must be defined or anerror will result.Suppose that two foreign realms have been defined,MAJESTERIAL.CLIENT.COM and COLLOSSAL.SUCCESS.COM and we wish toestablish trust relationships locally for Kerberos principals king5 in the firstrealm, using the following command:TSS ADD(lscess1) KERBNAME(king5)major_major_majorIn the second realm, using the following command:TSS ADD(lclint1) KERBNAME(major_major_major).On the second realm, where king5 is foreign defines a foreign principal “king5”from the originating foreign realm MAJESTERIAL.CLIENT.COM and associatesthat principal locally with ACID “client1” in the local TSS.TSS ADD(SDT) KERBLINK(kclint1) LINKNAME(‘/…/majesterial.client.com/king5’)KERBUSER(client1)Implementing eTrust CA-Top Secret in a z/OS or OS/390 Environment 1–89
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eTrust CA-Top Secret ® Securityfo
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Defining SYSTEM LOGGER to eTrust CA
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PERMITIn eTrust CA-Top Secret, all
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Indexcomponent names for z/OS and O
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OpenEdition MVS supportACIDs needed
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