Heller M, Woodin W.H. (eds.) Infinity. New research frontiers (CUP, 2011)(ISBN 1107003873)(O)(327s)_MAml_

enriching our theological understanding: two examples 287Pannenberg notes that Hegel’s abstract concept of the Infinite actually contains alogical paradox: the Infinite, while being the negation of the finite, also comprehendsthis negation in itself. “There appears to be no way of showing how we can combinethe unity of the infinite and the finite in a single thought without expunging thedifference between them. We cannot solve this problem, as Hegel thought, by thelogic of concept and conclusion” (Pannenberg 1991, p. 446). Instead, to resolve thisparadox, Pannenberg turns to theology’s understanding of God’s holiness, the Spiritof God, and the Johannine proclamation of God as love. Here he believes we can seethe paradox as resolved, for we come to understand that “[On the one hand] God givesexistence to the finite as that which is different from himself, so that his holiness doesnot mean the abolition of the distinction between the finite and the infinite ...(whileon the other hand) the unity of God with his creature ...isgrounded in the fact thatthe divine love eternally affirms the creature in its distinctiveness and thus sets asideits separation from God but not its difference from him” (Pannenberg 1991, pp. 400,446).With Pannenberg’s addition to Hegel’s concept of the true Infinite in place, we canreturn briefly to his discussion of the divine attributes, in which this revised conceptplays such a crucial role. To illustrate this role, let us focus on the definitional attribute,eternity, because it leads directly to Pannenberg’s argument for the doctrine of theTrinity. Pannenberg starts by adopting the definition of eternity that Boethius tookup from Plotinus: eternity is “the simultaneous and perfect presence of unlimitedlife.” 26 Pannenberg insists that eternity must not be reduced to either timelessness oreverlasting, unending time. A timeless concept of eternity would assume an “improper”concept of the infinite as defined simply by its opposition to the finite and wouldtherefore be itself merely finite (Pannenberg 1991, pp. 408, 412). An everlasting conceptof eternity would never allow for the simultaneous possession of all of its endless stringof isolated “present” moments. Instead, eternity must be such that all created thingsare simultaneously present to God in a way that preserves their intrinsic temporaldifferences. Pannenberg then makes a crucial move: such a view of eternity requires aTrinitarian doctrine of God. Specifically, the presence of all things to God with theirintrinsic temporality preserved is only possible “if the reality of God is not understoodas undifferentiated identity but as intrinsically differentiated unity. But this demandsthe doctrine of the Trinity” (Pannenberg 1991, p. 405).13.3.2.2 Cantor’s Concept of the Transfinites and AbsoluteInfinity as Fruitful Resources for Pannenberg’sConception of the InfiniteI believe that Cantor’s mathematical understanding of the relation between the finiteand the infinite, in turn, provides certain advantages for Pannenberg’s project over hisuse of Hegel, particularly in the way Cantor displays the analytic logic underlying boththe similarities and the differences between the finite, the transfinite, and AbsoluteInfinity.26 For his development of the doctrine of the Trinity, see Pannenberg (1991, chap. 5).