The Big Breach - Index of

The Big Breach; From Top Secret to Maximum SecurityCompliments of http://www.192.comA month or so later he re-emerged in Johannesburg under his real name,working as an American investment consultant. He rented a small twobedroomdetached house with swimming pool in the affluent suburb ofParkview and set himself up as a consultant in investment opportunitiesin the emerging economy of post-apartheid South Africa. His house wasconveniently close to the homes of MI6's two most important agents inSouth Africa, a senior army officer and a senior government official.Both had been recruited early in their careers but had risen to suchprominence that no member of the MI6 station in Pretoria could safelycontact them. Milton met these two agents twice a month at his home orsometimes overtly in bars and restaurants in the plusher parts ofJohannesburg. Their meetings would most probably pass unnoticed but ifanybody asked they would have been told perfectly plausibly that Miltonwas merely offering investment advice. Indeed, Milton genuinelyinvested their considerable agent salaries for them, so that theiradded wealth would not be noticed by colleagues or even their wives andfamily. The CX Milton gathered from the meetings was encrypted usinghighly secure but commercially available PGP encryption software, thensent to London over the internet.The system was simple, cheap and completely secure. Even had the SouthAfrican security services become suspicious of Milton, they would neverhave found a shred of evidence to prosecute him or his agents.As well as Russia, UKA was responsible for mounting natural coveroperations into the rest of Eastern Europe. From the end of the ColdWar until early 1992, Russia had been the only country of anysubstantial interest. But a new concern was rising rapidly inprominence. Yugoslavia was breaking up and Croatia and Slovenia hadalready been recognised by the European Community as independentstates. MI6's coverage of the region was increasingly stretched becauseeach newly independent state needed a station.Apart from the two officers already in the Belgrade station, MI6 hadonly one other competent Serbo-Croat speaker, but he had just finisheda lengthy Finnish course in preparation for a three-year posting toHelsinki. Personnel department were reluctant to waste this investmentby reassigning him to the Balkans, so several other officers werethrown into intensive Serbo-Croat courses, but it would take at leastnine months before they would be competent enough to take up overseaspostings. In the meantime, the efforts of the stretched Belgradestation would have to be augmented by UKA. Since none of us spoke anySerbo-Croat, there was a limit to what we could do. At best, we couldperhaps take over some of the English-speaking agents of the station.Russel sent me down to the floor below to see P4, the desk officer incharge of Balkan operations.P4 took up the post when it had been a quiet backwater job before theproblems in Yugoslavia had started in earnest. Prior to that, he hadworked for a spell in Northern Ireland before MI5 took overresponsibility for the province, then served without distinction invarious quiet European liaison posts and briefly as `Mr Halliday' -where I had first come across him. P4 had made a mark in the officeonly with his dress sense, which would have made a Bulgarian taxidriverwince. He was known ubiquitously in the office as `String Vest',though `Flapping Flannels' or `Woolly Tie' would have suited himpage- 90 - To purchase the original limited edition hardback version of this bookplease call 08000 192 192 or go to http://www.192.com