The Big Breach - Index of

The Big Breach; From Top Secret to Maximum SecurityCompliments of http://www.192.com`Interesting, if true.' The biro had run out of ink at the `f' and theanonymous author had not bothered to get a new pen, scratching theremaining letters into the paper. I was looking at the `customercomments' box at the bottom of my first CX report, which had just comeback to my in-tray. I issued it a week earlier after debriefing asmall-time British businessman who had just returned from a businesstrip to the Ural mountains. He'd been shown some industrial diamondsthat his Russian contact said were made in a controlled explosion, thesame method which I had experimented with unsuccessfully in SouthAfrica. Back in Century House, I mentioned it to H/SOV/OPS. `I'd writethat up as a CX report,' he said, holding his head slightly to one sidein affected sincerity. I didn't greatly trust Fowlecrooke and suspectedthat his advice was more to make me feel useful than for any genuineneed for such minor intelligence.I wrote it up as a CX report, classified `TOP SECRET, UK EYES A', andsent it off to R/CEE/D, the requirements officer responsible forissuing technical reports from the East European controllerate. Hegraded it `two star' and forwarded it to the relevant desk in the DIS.A two-star grading meant that the information was only of minorinterest and would be seen only by a junior desk officer; a three-starmight influence the thinking of a head of a Foreign Office or Ministryof Defence department; a four-star would perhaps be seen by a permanentsecretary of a Whitehall department, and a five-star grading would beseen by the government at cabinet level. Most of MI6's CX output gottwo-star gradings, and the reports were usually returned by scepticaland largely disinterested customers bearing the `interesting, if true'dismissal. Considerable store was placed on an officer's ability toextract high-grade CX from a source, and every overseas station andhead office UK station was given annual CX production targets. Settingtargets in this way was open to abuse, since MI6 itself judged thestar-grading of each report and its accuracy was dependent on theintegrity of the officer who drafted it. As in any walk of life, thescruples of MI6 officers varied. Some had reputations as `CXembellishers' and others pressured R officers to increase the gradingof their reports. The problem was widespread, but few cheats wereexposed. One who was went down in MI6 folklore.During the '70s, when Britain was negotiating its entry to the EuropeanCommon Agricultural Policy, the tactics and negotiating position of theFrench government were an important requirement. The head of the Parisstation, H/PAR, made his number two, PAR/1, responsible for thisintelligence and he successfully recruited an agent in the Frenchagricultural ministry. Soon a steady stream of two- and three-star CXstarted flowing. A few eyebrows were raised in Century House at thefinancial demands of PAR/1's new informant, but his productivity gavegood value for money. Over the next 18 months, this agent became themainstay of intelligence production by the Paris station. When PAR/1'stwo-year tour in Paris came to an end, the handover to his successor atfirst went smoothly. But every time a meeting was arranged to introducethe star agent, PAR/1 would announce some excuse to cancel it.Eventually Head Office became suspicious and an SBO (Security BranchOfficer) was sent out to Paris to interview PAR/1. He cracked andconfessed to what his colleagues had started to fear. Like GrahamGreene's agent in Our Man In Havana, he had invented the agent and allthe meetings, fabricated the CX and pocketed the agent's salary. He waspage- 65 - To purchase the original limited edition hardback version of this bookplease call 08000 192 192 or go to http://www.192.com