The Big Breach - Index of

The Big Breach; From Top Secret to Maximum SecurityCompliments of http://www.192.comThey have made it difficult for me to get fulfilling employment andhave actively sought to disrupt my career plans. This ceaselessharassment has ironically left me with no choice except to publish thisbook. Once my story is in the open, MI6 will find it difficult toexaggerate the threat posed by me and thereby persuade allied policeand intelligence services to act against a `terrorist'. I hope that itmay put an end to the dispute and allow me to move forward in life.I chose to publish first on the Internet, because it is the only meansto circumvent MI6's gagging orders or other persuasive methods. Shortlyafter I sent my manuscript to a UK publisher, Fourth Estate, theirpremises were raided by special branch police and their computersconfiscated. Fourth Estate declined to publish this book and other UKpublishers were put on notice that they would face serious legal andillegal action if they attempted to do so. An American publisher Iapproached quickly received a menacing visit by the FBI, acting onbehalf of MI6, and was persuaded to drop the project. The FBI thenrecruited an American literary agent to gather intelligence on myintentions and waste my time and money. Publishers I spoke to inAustralia and New Zealand also received threatening visits from theirrespective security services. Even the Swiss literary agent whoinitially brokered a publishing deal was hit by a swingeing injunctionand was forced to withdraw his services. I have also offered on threeoccasions to submit the manuscript of this book for vetting but MI6 hasmerely responded with menacing letters threatening me with imprisonmentor used my admission of having a text as justification to confiscate mycomputers.This waste of time, money and resources would have been avoided in thefirst instance if MI6 were properly accountable to the government. Thebelief amongst senior MI6 officers that they are above the law,encapsulated in the head of personnel's claim that `nobody can tell theChief what to do', was the cause of this debacle. If the Chief wereaccountable, he would have ensured that personnel officers were trainedin employment law and that professional personnel management practiceswere in place within the service. (Ironically, the Spycatcher debacleof the 1980s was also caused by shoddy personnel management; MI5refused to allow Peter Wright to transfer pension credits from hisprevious employment in another branch of the civil service, resultingin his disaffection.) The way to stop a repeat of similar farces in thefuture is not to spend large amounts of public money wielding a bigstick to punish miscreants, but to prevent disputes in the first placeby implementing sympathetic and fair management practices. This willonly happen when the Chief, and the entire service, is reallyaccountable to democratically elected government.A step towards greater democratic accountability was taken when theParliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee, chaired by Tom KingMP, was given limited powers to examine the activities of theintelligence services. But its role remains entirely advisory, andattempts by King to extend its powers have been resisted by MI6, whopay only lip service to his recommendations. In his 1998 annual reportto the Prime Minister, amongst several other criticisms of MI6, Kingmade an indirect reference to me, writing, `recent experiences on bothsides of the Atlantic underline the importance of having a range ofeffective measures for dealing with staff problems as they arise'. Kingwas also referring to the case of Edward Lee Howard, a CIA officer whopage- 234 - To purchase the original limited edition hardback version of this bookplease call 08000 192 192 or go to http://www.192.com