The Big Breach - Index of

The Big Breach; From Top Secret to Maximum SecurityCompliments of http://www.192.comDebbie was one. They worked closely with OND, a detachment of vettedBritish Telecom engineers seconded to MI6 to set up the intercepts.Each UKZ officer was a talented linguist, often the master of five orsix difficult languages, and worked at state-of-the-art computers muchadmired by visiting liaison services. On a good day, they could process20 or so conversations, though less if the language was difficult orthe take quality poor.Under the terms of the 1975 IOCA (Interception of Communications Act) awarrant should be given only if the target is breaking UK law or if theinterception yields intelligence. Under these terms, I felt nocompunction about reading the transcripts of an Iranian terrorist or aRussian intelligence officer. But we had many intercepts running whichdid not fall into either category. Even our intercepts on Kiddie andConstantine were not within its spirit - they would break UK law onlyif they exported proliferation material from the country, and neveronce did we issue a CX report as a result of one of their telephonetranscriptions. Perhaps what they were doing was slightly amoral but itwas not our job to pass judgement on that. Unlike every other countryin the western world, warrants for telephone intercepts in Britain aresigned not by a judge but by the Home Secretary or Foreign Secretary,explaining why the intelligence services could obtain so many warrants.MI6 abused the privilege of the IOCA in other ways too. Thetranscribers in VBR were supposed to ignore personal chit-chat andcondense only relevant operational intelligence into the pink FLORIDAreports for distribution to Vauxhall Cross. This obligation enabled MI6successfully to persuade the Treasury that it was necessary to keep thetranscribers isolated in VBR, rather than incorporating them into thenew building. Nevertheless, one day a colleague threw a pink FLORIDAreport on my desk, chuckling, `Have a good laugh at this!' The targetwas a transvestite in his spare time and the FLORIDA reported hisintimate conversation, line by line, with his boyfriend. Admittedly, itwas an amusing document but it added nothing to our understanding ofthe operation and was a clear breach of the act.Meanwhile BELLHOP had just taken a new and interesting twist. Badger,as overall head of the operation, was responsible for its coordinationwith foreign liaison services. The extent to which information on theoperation was shared depended on the perceived trustworthiness of theother intelligence service and the extent to which they could bring tothe table useful intelligence of their own. MI6 were always warm andcordial with CIA liaison because the Americans had such fabulousresources. Badger's relationship with the DST on BELLHOP was also goodand they cooperated energetically if they were asked to help out. ButBadger could never establish the same level of easy cooperation withMossad. It was always a puzzle why they were so uncooperative, for weexpected them to be keenly interested in penetrating the attempts ofIran, their most feared enemy, to obtain chemical weapons. But meetingswith them were tense affairs, with little given away by either side.The section suspected that Mossad had another hidden agenda that wewere not privy to. This suspicion was reinforced when Badger showedthem copies of the weapons plant that we had obtained from the searchof Kiddie at Stansted. They feigned interest, but it was not convincingand Badger came away suspicious that the Israelis already had their owncopies.page- 135 - To purchase the original limited edition hardback version of this bookplease call 08000 192 192 or go to http://www.192.com