The Management of Globalization in Singapore: Twentieth Century ...

Marystella Amaldas., Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University (Japan)This paper, however, highlights some of the social andeconomic dimensions of Singapore’s transition andadaptation to globalization in the last eight years of the newcentury.The paper has identified only some aspects ofglobalization for in-depth analysis. Being a global city allissues may be interrelated. The first part of the paperexamines the theoretical perspectives of globalization byusing the work of leading commentators on Singapore. Thenext section examines the parameters of globalization thatSingapore has imposed on itself. This is followed by a sectionon embracing global economic ethos while rejecting sociallyundesirable trends. The issue of immigration is examined inthe next section. The responses to the growing income-gap inthe context of globalization are taken up in the sixth section.The conclusion provides an overview of the strategies ofglobalization in Singapore.Many scholars regard globalization as a force whichwill inevitably bring about the decline (Held 1995), erosion(Hall 1991) or the end (Ohmae 1995) of the nation-state. Asthe argument goes, the process of globalization in its variousmanifestations is increasingly undermining the territorialboundedness, sovereignty and traditional role of the existingsystem of the modern nation-state. These processes, oftenperceived in terms of disjunctive cultural “flows” as theorizedby Appadurai (1996) and others, have necessitated therethinking of the nation-state. As a territorially andsymbolically bounded “imagined community” (Anderson1983), the result then is a call to think beyond the nationstate,emphasizing the transnational, deteritorialized andcosmopolitan forms of imagined communities.The objective of nation building in Singapore was tobring together the heterogeneous immigrant populationunder a common and collective banner of the nation-state.The government hoped that through this process a distinctlySingaporean identity would evolve and that the populationwould identify with the nation. Later, the government fearedthat Singaporeans were becoming too “Westernized” andlosing their “Asian” identity. It responded strongly byasserting and defending Singapore’s identity as an Asian983

The Management of Globalization in Singapore: Twentieth Century Lessons for theEarly Decades of the New Centurynation. It began promoting Confucian/ Asian values as acounter-discourse against Western ideas of modernity.Singapore’s territorially delineated national identity gave wayto the articulation of a broad regional-based “Asian” identity.By the early 1990’s the Singapore government began torealize that as a city-state it needed to embrace the world asits hinterland. The drive to globalize Singapore began inearnest with the government promoting and representing thecity-state as a cosmopolitan global city (Velayutham, 2007:52-148).So the construction of Singapore’s national identitywas largely driven by the state and not, as in much of thecolonized world, by grassroots movements and supported bythe population at large. The features of the modern Westernnation-states in contemporary societies are: that power isshared; rights to participate in government are legally orconstitutionally defined; representation is wide, state poweris fully secular and the boundaries of national sovereigntyare clearly defined (Hall 1984: 9-10). The Singaporean “state”has most of these features, in that a democratically electedgovernment runs the country, it is a secular state, and itsterritorial boundaries are clearly defined. However thehegemony of the dominant order (represented by the PAP) israrely contested. As Yao (2001, p. 5) argues:[I]n spite of their recent histories,nation-states in Southeast Asia areendowed with awesome coercivepower to impose their iron will ontheir societies. In this context, statepower is not merely an abstractentity but a sharp reality whichpermeates everyday experiences.From the time we pick up themorning paper, the moment we turnon the radio or television, the state isthere with its busy pronouncementsof another achievement of economicand national development, of anothervictorious crushing of politicaldissent which threatens nationalsecurity or misleads the public aboutthe doing of the government. Thus,984

Marystella Amaldas., Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University (Japan)those of us in Southeast Asia may beforgiven for overstating, out ofexperience and habit, the totalizingand systematic quality of the stateand its power.Yao’s overview of the state power and the role of states inSoutheast Asia applies to Singapore. The PAP governmenthas held power since 1959 with little effective opposition. ThePAP maintains its political and popular legitimacy byconstantly claiming to represent the collective interests of thenation. It has been peculiarly effective in repressing andsilencing any form of dissent as undermining the “nationalinterest”. Democratic elections are held once in every fiveyears in Singapore. These elections have been marked by asmall and weak political opposition, gaining little success.The PAP government has preserved its power primarily bydelivering on its election promises, by securing continuedeconomic growth and security, and investing in publichousing, education, healthcare and social security (Quah1990; Brown 1998).2. Parameters of GlobalizationIf Singapore’s policymaking style had to be summed up in aphrase, it would be the practice of selective globalization;that is, the conscious effort to encourage certain forms ofglobalization and to discourage others (Chong, 2006: 266).For example, the government, on the one hand, encourageseconomic globalization through the synchronization of localfinancial regulations and policies with internationalstandards while, on the other, energetically protects anAsian “conservative” society from the ills of satellite dishes,pornographic magazines, and other unwholesome globalcommodities.This constant oscillation between being globally openand locally particular has given rise to the Singaporeparadox. The city-state enjoys its status as one of the mostglobalized countries in the world in terms of migration,global finance, and telecommunications, and yet regularlygarners criticism from international human rightsinstitutions for its insistence on practicing its own brand of985

Marystella Amaldas., Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University (Japan)the license withdrawal looked like a step backwards. Fridae.Com’s pull-out may have mollified the majority ofconservative Singaporeans but it does little to show theinternational community that the city-state is culturallyexciting.Lastly was Warwick University’s decision not to set upcampus in Singapore. According to reports, the EconomicDevelopment Board invited the British university, onaccount of its vibrant research culture, to set up campus onthe island. After months of deliberation and feasibilitystudies, the university turned down the invitation, citing itsconcern over both financial costs and the lack of academicfreedom in Singapore. Predictably, it was the latter issue thatdogged the headlines. Whether overblown or not, theperceived lack of academic freedom has had economicconsequences for Singapore. This is the first time that apotential investor has publicly cited Singapore’s famed outerboundary markers (OB-markers), its emphasis on nonconfrontationalacademic analysis, and the government’sintolerance for dissent, as reasons for not coming. Theconsequences of this on the city-state’s education hubambitions will only unfold later.These incidents suggest that a nation-state and aglobal city require different management ethos. Conventionalarguments for cultural and ideological protectionism may sitwell with the character of nation-states, but are increasinglyincongruent with the functions of global cities. And since aglobal city cannot be willed into being but becomes one onlywhen others recognize it as such, all global cities requirecultural legitimacy from the international community oftransnational professionals, creative classes, andinternational opinion-shapers who have the power to conferit recognition. The competition to distinguish oneself as aglobal city is, in reality, the competition to win legitimacyand recognition from this international community. The factthat Singapore’s survival as a nation-state depends on itsstatus as a global city means that the government has littlechoice but to constantly shift gears between the national andthe global when it comes to policymaking, thus compelling itto send mixed signals to this international community.Casinos are allowed but satellite dishes are not, toplesscabaret shows are permitted but civil disobedience is not,987

The Management of Globalization in Singapore: Twentieth Century Lessons for theEarly Decades of the New Centuryand the list goes on. These discrepancies are at the heart ofthe dilemma facing Singapore at the dawn of the 21 stcentury---globalizing at one’s own pace and terms may beprudent for a small nation-state, but how much of thisprudence can an aspiring global city afford?Though Singapore actively seeks to mediateglobalization’s side effects such as structural unemploymentand terrorism, the PAP government has also made boldstrides towards opening up the city-state. One of the maintalking points of 2005 was PM Lee’s 18 April announcementthat two casinos both incorporated in larger “IntegratedResorts” (IRs) were to be built by 2009. One located in thesouthern island of Sentosa, and the other in downtownMarina Bay, these two casinos, though taking up no morethan 3 to 5 per cent of the total floor area of the IRs, havepolarized Singaporean society. Although the government hadstoically opposed casinos in the past because it was thoughtthat their ill effects outweighed their economic advantages, itwas now believed that casinos, and the larger IRs, could helpto boost tourist figures, which have been generally decliningover the years. Both the casinos and the IRs were necessary,it was also argued, to combat the strait-laced and sterilereputation that the city-state had garnered. Anotherargument presented to the public was that Singaporeangamblers often flocked overseas, and sometimes to the highseas, to gamble, which resulted in an estimated S$1.8 billionto S$2 billion loss in potential revenue.The idea to build a casino on Singaporean soil wasfloated to the public in 2004. The latter half of 2004witnessed an island-wide debate on the casino issue with thenational newspaper, government policy institutions, andother feedback organizations providing ample space for theairing of views from both the pro-and anti-casino camps. Theissue stirred up strong views from conservative groups,religious organizations, and economic pragmatists alike, andit is hard to think of another national issue that hasgenerated the same amount of public interest andparticipation. Eventually the public debate congealed into asimplistic contest between the conservative moralists andeconomic pragmatists with the former associated withsoftness and dogmatism, and the latter with hard-headedrationalism.988

Marystella Amaldas., Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University (Japan)Sensitive to criticisms and constantly alert to threatsto social order, the government has, in its usual efficientmanner, announced several safety net features. Firstly, todampen the gambling appetite of locals, Singaporeans will becharged an entrance fee of S$100 per day, or S$2,000 peryear. Foreigners and tourists will enter free of charge. Thegovernment’s initial suggestion to allow only Singaporeans ofa requisite income was quietly dropped after charges ofelitism were leveled. Secondly, gambling on credit will beprohibited. Thirdly, Singaporeans will be able to excludethemselves or their family members from entry. Those onfinancial assistance programmes will be automaticallybarred. Fourthly, the Casino Control Bill was to be preparedas early as 2006 to spell out the operational and regulatoryground rules, while in 2007 or the year after, a regulatorybody for the casinos will be born. The decision to cap casinorevenue at 50 per cent of total IR earnings was rescindedafter protests from potential IR operators. Fifthly, thegovernment has promised assistance to counseling andrehabilitation centers in the combat against gamblingaddiction.The lesson of the casino issue is that the PAPgovernment is willing, and capable, of forsaking long-heldcompetition principles for economic gains. Unprecedentedlevels of regional competition and a worrisome economy havepaved the way for this ideological U-turn.If the casinos demonstrated the government’s ability tomake U-turns, other events highlighted its ability to refuse toaccede to certain global trends and politics. On 13 May 2005,38-year-old Singaporean Shanmugam Murugesu was hangedfor trafficking 1 kilogram of cannabis from neighboringMalaysia into Singapore. The run-up to 13 May saw acampaign conducted by various groups and individuals fromthe arts and academic communities to save Murugesu fromthe gallows. Among the events organized to promoteawareness of Murugesu’s plight were candlelit vigils, pressconferences, petitions, prayer sessions, and an appeal to thePresident for clemency, which was rejected. Murugesu wasduly hung on 13 May. The police only permitted an antideathconcert at the Substation to go ahead on 18 Augustafter the organizers removed all images of Murugesu;989

The Management of Globalization in Singapore: Twentieth Century Lessons for theEarly Decades of the New Centurypresumably because the government did not want himturned into a martyr.A similar case that had international dimensions wasthat of Australian citizen Nguyen Tuong Van. Nguyen wasarrested on transit at Changi Airport in December 2002 with396 grams of heroin. Nguyen’s case came to attention whenhis appeal to the President for clemency was rejected inOctober. Sections of the Australian liberal media played upthe story while some Australian politicians predictablyindulged in Singapore-bashing with “Chinese rogue port city”among the more colorful descriptions of the city-state(Grattan, Gordon and Button, 2005). Meanwhile, on a moreconstructive note, local civil activists sought to raise debateover the death penalty. All these, however, were to no avail.Even letters from the Australian Foreign Minister AlexanderDowner to his Singapore counterpart George Yeo failed tochange the government’s mind. Nguyen was hung on 2December 2005.According to PM Lee, this uncompromising stance is to,firstly protect citizens from drugs and, secondly, to ensurethe country does not become a transit centre. Suchresistance to external pressures wins the governmentlegitimacy from many Singaporeans, who believe in thedirect link between capital punishment and low crime rates.Nonetheless, there is a growing section of vocal Singaporeanswas oppose the death penalty, ensuring that the issue will bere-visited over and over again.Other examples of resistance to external pressuresinclude the government’s defense of Singapore’s press. In aglobal survey on press freedom, Singapore was ranked 140out of 167 countries by an international NGO, ReportersWithout Borders. The ranking itself was of little consequencebut the minor debate it stirred provided the government theopportunity to reiterate that “an unfettered press that actsirresponsibly can be destructive”, and to conclude that“Singapore’s model of government and the media has givenour country a clean government, social equity and harmony,and as a result, a strong economy” (Stanley Low, 2005).4. Immigration and Foreign Talents990

The Management of Globalization in Singapore: Twentieth Century Lessons for theEarly Decades of the New CenturyTwo other areas of possible social stress relate tostructural unemployment and to a widening income gap inSingapore's globalized economy. These by-products ofglobalization are common to most developed economies. It iswidely accepted that globalization benefits an elite, whilecreating income gaps between them, the middle class, andthe lowest earners in society. The example of Singapore hadin the past bucked this trend: growth and globalization inSingapore had raised the standards of living for the vastmajority of its people, and provided nearly full employment.If further globalization accelerates income disparities andunemployment for some, such trends will require politicalattention and the crafting of appropriate policy responses.The government's response to the widening income gapwas, therefore, to reinforce the idea of meritocracy, afoundational idea in the imagining of modern Singapore, toemphasize that those who work hard can get ahead in life,regardless of their background. This emphasis has broughtmore focus on the education policy, not just for its own sake,but as a vital complement to the globalization process.The rationale for Singapore's immigration policy hasbeen articulated by former Prime Minister Goh, thus: "I seeforeign talent, or global talent, not as a quick fix to make upfor the shortage of local workers. This is a long-term strategyto enable Singapore to sustain its vitality, competitiveness,and prosperity. If we can absorb a steady inflow of globaltalent into Singapore, our ideas and outlook will stay freshand vibrant, and we can be a competitive, global player" (YapMui Teng, 2001). However, Goh has himself articulated whatmust have been on the minds of many Singaporeans -- thatSingapore could not rely only on foreigners. In the PrimeMinister's words: "…we will bring in foreigners and newimmigrants. They will complement our needs, but theycannot replace us". Apart from the need for nationalservicemen, some political issues associated with a largeimmigrant population could be whether they would stay intimes of trouble and the issue of divided loyalty (for whichreason Singapore has been reluctant to allow dualcitizenship). The above are quite apart from the question ofconflict and competition for resources, particularly whentimes are difficult. As an example, Singaporeans are already992

Marystella Amaldas., Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University (Japan)beginning to worry about unemployment when thepopulation is increased to 5.5 million, part of which wouldundoubtedly be made up of immigrants. Seventy-eight percent of those polled by a Channel News Asia/Gallup poll feltthat Singapore should restrict the number of foreign workersas the population expands. How this will work out in view ofthe expected increase in structural unemployment remainsto be seen.The management of the consequences flowing from thedecision to attract more talented migrants has become apolitical challenge in the economic sphere. With globalizationforces creating more acute income inequalities and placing ahigh premium on talent, Singaporeans at both ends of theskills spectrum fear for their future. At the lower end, thepossibility of cheaper labour from neighboring countries hascreated the pressure to improve skills more effectively. At thehigher end, Singapore’s push into higher value-addedindustries has also storm skills deficit. Better educatedSingaporeans have become vocal aloud being placed at adisadvantage in an increasingly competitive job market.There is also concern aloud on the impact of sizablemigration on the formation of Singapore’s national andcultural identity, and on the state’s management of ethnicdiversity (Koh, 2003: 230-256).5. Measures to Combat GlobalizationSingapore, being a country that conducts regularelections every five years, has an electorate that demandsresponses from the government. In order to respond to theelectorate, the Singapore government undertook twomeasures to counter the ill-effects of globalization. Theseincluded the reform of education and steps to reduce the illeffects of unemployment and falling incomes.Education in Singapore has moved in the past fewyears away from rote learning for students, to increasinglyemphasize new elements. Perhaps the most notable of theseelements is creative and critical thinking. The government993

The Management of Globalization in Singapore: Twentieth Century Lessons for theEarly Decades of the New Centurybudgets of the crisis years and after have recognized the newimportance of education with increased funding.One of the best ways of achieving that is to catch themyoung -- before the mind becomes too set. While many adulteducation programmes are going on around the country toinduct the older generation into the world of computers andthe Internet, the biggest and most productive effort is beingchanneled into the education system. In fact, a slogan hasbeen coined by the government to reflect this focus: ThinkingSchools, Learning Nation. Though some might wonder if itshould not be the other way round, the government is keento make "learning schools" -- which is perhaps a traditionalway of thinking of schools --into "thinking schools" -- whichis perhaps what many have criticized Singapore schools ofnot being! Singapore has taken specific and sustainablesteps to align the education system to meet the challenges ofthe new century. The master plan for IT in Education, drawnup in 1997 by the Ministry of Education (MOE), set out cleargoals and specific milestones for the schools. The goalsinclude enhancing creative thinking, lifelong learning, andsocial responsibility. The milestones include completing corecomputer training for teachers in every school by the year2000, and achieving a 2:1 ratio between pupils andcomputers in schools, with 30 per cent of curriculum timedevoted to IT-based learning by 2002 (Tay, 2001).In addition to providing hardware and softwareinfrastructure to transform the education system, the MOEis also focusing on the more important aspect of curriculumdevelopment and teaching. Information technology is seen asa means to expand and enrich the learning process itself.School children are now routinely doing project work thatnecessitates surfing the net and looking for materials thatare normally not available within Singapore itself. They arealso exposed to different technological possibilities inassembling and presenting these materials in ways neverbefore done. In the process, they are not only learningdifferent things but also learning things differently. There arealso virtual classrooms now whereby pupils may remain intheir respective homes but join their classmates incyberspace with the teacher conducting lessons through thecomputer or a nifty hand-held device called Edupad. Several994

Marystella Amaldas., Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University (Japan)libraries are digitizing their collections to create virtual booksthat could be accessed anywhere, anytime. All these seem toadd to the children's ability to learn independently, to thinkinnovatively, and even to cooperate constructively. These areattributes that any Intelligent Island would considerprerequisites.Beyond the formal education sector and schools,worker upgrading and the learning of new skills, includingthe smaller and medium-sized enterprises, have receivedmore emphasis. Schemes to help achieve this include theManpower Development Assistance Scheme to help those inthe work-force to upgrade their skills and knowledgecontinuously; and the Lifelong Learning Endowment Fundannounced by Prime Minister Goh in August 2000, with abudget of $1 billion, to help equip workers with the skills totake on existing and new jobs, create new products andservices, and capture new markets in this stage of economicdevelopment.Managing income inequality need not mean reducingincome inequality. It can be also about making “transparentattempts to reduce the real and imagined frustrations arisingout of growing or high inequality. Managing may takevarious forms: national public discussions, ensuring equalityin education and other opportunities, use of targeted andgeneral subsides and various other forms of assetredistribution, the extent of redistribution being a function ofpolitical will, economic imperatives and stage ofdevelopment” (Bhanoji Rao, 1996 : 360). However, Fields(1993 Cited in Shandre, 2009: 232) notes that for the effectsof economic growth to be broad-based, there must bemechanisms for transmitting gains throughout the economyand especially to the poor. Since the poor have only theirlabour to sell, economic growth can only reach the poor if itincreases the demand for their labour or providecomplementary inputs that make their labour moreproductive. Singapore government followed the twin solutionof maintaining a sustainable economic growth whilecomplementing it with a sound policy to manage inequality.Education policy and the public housing upgradingprogramme were used to improve the earning capacity of thepopulation and enhance their wealth holdings in the form of995

The Management of Globalization in Singapore: Twentieth Century Lessons for theEarly Decades of the New Centuryassets. These were targeted at the middle and lower incomegroups of the population living in public housing, as thehigher income group living in private apartments andbungalows were perceived as having done well on their ownability. The housing upgrading programme were targeted atthe older HDB flats that represent the greater proportion ofthe lower income population.In January 2001, Singaporeans received a firstpayment of the CPF Top-up promised in August 2000. TheCPF Top-up is a tangible way of sharing the nation's successwith Singaporeans and, for the first time, was structured togive more to those in the lower income groups. Other rebateson taxation and government charges were also given, againtargeting the poorer households and lower income taxpayers.Efforts to help pensioners, to some degree, and for themedical care of the elderly and poor were also strengthened.The Minister for Finance, Dr Richard Hu, set thecontext in his Budget Speech 2001 (Tay, 2001: 218).While we make these adjustments toanticipate and embrace global trendsand changes, we must continue to bemindful of our local context: those whocan run faster should pave the way forthe rest; however, those who may beunwittingly left behind must not be leftwith no help.There has been a growing realization in Singapore thatthe imperatives of trying to enter the new economy and totransform Singapore -- with a more creative and criticallyaware work-force and citizenry, considerable socioeconomicchange and adjustment, and a widening income gap -- havesocial and political implications. Immigration, education,and social assistance policies have therefore becomeimperatives, setting new directions, and receiving morefunding.The government also set up the Work ForceDevelopment Agency (WDA) in 2003 to facilitate and increasethe employability of vulnerable workers in the economy. Theobjective of WDA is to promote the employability and996

Marystella Amaldas., Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University (Japan)increase the relevance of local workers by re-tooling andtraining them. In addressing the widening gap betweenskilled and unskilled workers, a Ministerial Committee onlow wage workers announced in January 2006 the WorkfareApproach to support the low wage workers in the labourmarket. The Workfare framework is based on four principles:continued economic growth and job creation for Singapore;efforts to help low wage workers must reinforce Singapore’sstrong work ethic; increasing opportunities for upwardmobility should be the main means to help low wageworkers; and, focus on raising the skills and know-how ofthe next generation to create hope for their own future. Toachieve these outcomes, a $1 billion Workfare package wasapproved by the government. The key component of theWorkfare bonus is for the employed or self-employed localworker to have at least six months of continues employmentand earn an average monthly income of $1,500 or less(Shandre, 2009: 236).As the Singapore economy moves into higher valueaddedgoods due to globalization, the widening income gapamongst its population becomes the key political challenge.The rate of accumulation of human capital througheducation and training needs to keep pace with the risingdemand for more skilled workers as the economy moves onto a higher value-added industrial structure. This willincrease the wages of skilled workers relative to low skilledworkers and increase the income inequality and vulnerabilityof local workers to the global trends. This suggests thateducation alone would be inadequate to manage incomeinequality in the future. Singapore may need more socialwelfare schemes to balance economic growth and thewidening economic gap. (Bilveer Singh, 2008: 313-330)6. ConclusionIncreasingly the challenge for the modern Singaporemetropolis is one of coping with the task of never endingbuilding. As Singapore has learnt, there is no completiondate for building the Intelligent Island. Even as one part isbeing built, another part becomes obsolete, or worse still,what one is building becomes obsolete even beforecompletion. This is the nature of information and997

The Management of Globalization in Singapore: Twentieth Century Lessons for theEarly Decades of the New Centurycommunication technologies. The most famous of thecomputer-related laws, Moore's law, which stated thatcomputing power doubles every eighteen months, is itselfbecoming outdated. Thus, the Intelligent Island may neverbe completed but it seems likely to flourish even in anunfinished state.Singapore has an excellent track record of being ableto survive and thrive despite its constraints as a smallcountry that lacks natural resources. The key performanceindicator of good governance is not efficiency but rather theability to weather a sudden turn of events. Singapore hasproven capable of this kind of resilience. It is a state thatweathered crises such as the Asian financial crisis in 1997-98 and epidemics such as SARS.Summarily, as Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew said inan interview with the International Herald Tribune, despitegood times, Singapore's survival is not guaranteed. Unlike anageing population and the issue of longevity that can bedealt with through adjustments in Central Provident Fundschemes, there are more tricky imperfections that requiregreater attention. Being governed like a corporation that cangauge its success by its wealth is insufficient because thethreat of radicalism cannot be countered throughaccumulation of wealth. The danger from extremistideologies can be managed by strengthening social resilienceto augment hard security.Clearly the founding of Singapore and its formation asa modern nation-state were inextricably connected to globalprocesses such as colonialism, migration, the emergence ofthe postcolonial interstate system and capitalism (Gupta,1997). The forces of global capitalism have largelycontributed to the reshaping of the Singapore city-state incomplex and contradictory ways. In response, the PAPgovernment has employed a range of strategies. Some ofthese strategies implemented in the last decade of thetwentieth century were highlighted in this paper as havingproduced effects in the first decade of this century.Speaking at the National Day Rally 2005 -commemorating the nation’s fourth decade of independence -Singapore’s newest and third Prime Minister, challengedSingaporeans yet again to think about its future.998

Marystella Amaldas., Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University (Japan)What will Singapore be like 40 yearsfrom now? I can’t tell you. Nobody can.But I can tell you it must be totallydifferent Singapore because if it is thesame Singapore as it is today, we’redead. We will be irrelevant,marginalized, the world will bedifferent. You may want to be thesame, but you can’t be the same.Therefore, we have to remakeSingapore – our economy, oureducation system, our mindsets, ourcity (Lee Hsien Loong, 21 August2005).His words were no different from those echoed by hispredecessors, Goh Chok Tong and Lee Kuan Yew. Thechallenges facing Singapore whatever its guise maybe,whether it is economic, ideological, cultural, SARS, bird-fluvirus or terrorism remain the same, always threatening. Therelevance of Singapore rests upon its ability to adapt to itsever changing geographical, economic and culturalenvironment. In this, we can argue that the only certaintyabout Singapore’s future is that it is uncertain. But weshould be careful to distinguish between the Singaporeeconomy and the nation, and it is the former which faces thedanger of becoming irrelevant and marginalized. Of course,this separation is never made in Singapore. Thus the fragilityand the uncertainty of the state of the nation both ineconomic and cultural/symbolic terms are closely interlinkedin political discourse.The Singapore nation/global city is a powerfulsymbolic and material force. It offers the social hope ofbelonging, identity, sense of place, prosperity, opportunitiesand excitement for its citizens. The fostering of hope isnecessary in the context of Singapore where uncertaintiesprevail. Beyond the types of strategies found in Singapore 21and Remaking Singapore (improving the material quality oflife and building of heartware) as way of dealing with thechallenges of globalization, it is critical that the Singaporestate endeavors to cultivate both an active sense of belongingand ownership over the nation’s destiny and a sense of hopeamong its citizens. Most Singaporeans have internalized the999

The Management of Globalization in Singapore: Twentieth Century Lessons for theEarly Decades of the New Centuryanxieties of living in Singapore (also reproduced by the state)negating the social conditions that can activate hope as anenduring characteristic and approach to life (Hage, 2003). Itis vital that hope replaces the deep uncertainties thatcharacterize the socio-economic life of the Singapore citystate.For that to emerge the Singapore state must invest inproviding opportunities for its citizens not just to benefit fromthe nation’s economic success but to exercise theircitizenship and affective commitment to the nation.ReferencesAppadurai, Arjun. 1996. Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions ofglobalization. Minneapolis: University Minnesota Press.Anderson, Benedict, 1983. Imagined Communities: Reflection on the Originsand Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso, 1983.Bhanoji Rao, V.V., 1996. “Income Inequality in Singapore: Facts and Policies”in Lim Chong Yah (Editor), Economic Policy. Singapore: Addison – WesleyPublishing Company.Bilveer Singh. 2008, “SINGAPORE: Success at Home, Challenges fromAbroad”, Southeast Asian Affairs. Singapore: Institute of Southeast AsianStudies.Brown, David. 1998. “Globalization, Ethnicity and the Nation-State: The Case ofSingapore”, Australian Journal International Affairs 52, no. 1: 35-46.Fields, G. S., “Income Distribution in Developing Economies: Conceptual, Dataand Policy Issues in Broad – Based growth”, Second ADB Conference onDevelopment Economies, Manila, 26-28 November 1993.Gupta, Akhil, 1997. “The Song of the Nonaligned World: TransnationalIdentities and the Reinscription of Space in Late Capitalism” in Gupta, Akhil andFerguson James (eds.), Culture, Power, Place: Explorations in CriticalAnthropology. Durham: Duke University Press.Hage, Ghassan, 2003. Against Paranoid Nationalism: Searching for Hope in aShrinking Society. Annandale, NSW: Pluto Press.Hall, Stuart, 1991. “The Local and the global: Globalization and Ethnicity”, inAnthony D. King (ed.). Culture, globalization and the World-System. London:MacMillan Press Ltd.1000

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