yugoslavias implosion

campaign in late 1991 and early 1992, when it became clear that Bosnia
and Herzegovina was not going to remain in Yugoslavia, Tanasković
interpreted the Muslim population’s appeal to Turkey for help
as a “tacit reversion to the role of renegade as of yore,” noting that
to a Serb “a renegade is the worse enemy.” Tanasković asserted that
“threatening a Serb with a Turk is archetypally worse and more illomened
that threatening him with Germans.” 85 Much was made
of Islamic fundamentalism as a greater threat to Yugoslavia than
Serb-Croat relations. Instances of the realization of Islamic ideas in
Sandžak and Bosnia were pointed out, though the emphasis was on
the Albanians. An Albanian threat was repeatedly warned against
because it meant the disappearance of Christian churches, cemeteries,
population, and the building of mosques and the spreading of the
Islamic way of life. 86
As part of the preparations for war, Serbs dealt at length with the
subject of lay fundamentalism, alleging that fundamentalists held
power in their hands and were pursuing their goals “in a perfidious
way, under the guise of the interests of the Muslim community
within the framework of the Yugoslav community.’ 87
During the anti-Muslim campaign, which gained momentum
in the 1990s, Muslims were warned that any “formation of a coalition
[on their part] with Ustasha Croatia and Ustashe parties in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, to help them gain the upper hand in Herceg
Bosna on paper, will be considered illegal and a declaration of war
to all Serbs.” 88 At the same time, warnings were uttered that “there
will never again be any room in these parts for Turkey, for Asia.” 89
It was pointed out that “Muslims are genetically a corrupt people
85 Epoha, June 7, 1992, p . 22 .
86 Miroljub Jevtić, ‘Islam bez maske’ (Islam without a mask), Intervju, September 15, 1989 .
87 Miroljub Jevtić, ‘Alahove vojske’ (Allah’s armies), Duga, September 9–22, 1989 .
88 Vuk Drašković’s speech at Gacko, August 19, 1990 .
89 Ibid .
85
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