yugoslavias implosion

80
ChApter 1
the Serbian nationalist program. Ivan Stambolić, the Serbian prime
minister, commented that the Memorandum “is the juncture of our
definite parting of the ways in Serbia and a prelude to a political
showdown.” 75
In trying to influence the outcome of the Yugoslav crisis through
the Memorandum, sanu wanted to reach policymakers. The sanu
Memorandum substantiated the allegation that Serbia and the Serbs
were in an unequal position in Yugoslavia. The Memorandum was at
once pro-Yugoslavia and anti-Yugoslavia in that it suggested a transformation
of the country—something Ćosić publicly advocated—
through recentralization. It also provided for the possibility of the
suggestion being rejected:
The unresolved question of Serbia’s statehood is not the only defect that
should be eliminated through constitutional amendment. Under the
1974 Constitution, Yugoslavia has become a very loose state community
in which consideration is being given to other alternatives, not only the
pro-Yugoslavia one, as testified to by the recent statements of Slovenian
economists and the earlier positions of Macedonian politicians. In
view of such considerations and of such thorough disintegration as has
already happened, one cannot but think that Yugoslavia stands in danger
of further decomposition. The Serb people cannot look to the future
serenely amid so much uncertainty. For this reason one must give all
the nations in Yugoslavia the opportunity to state their aspirations and
intentions. In such a case, Serbia could itself make a choice and define
its national interest. 76
The names of the Memorandum’s authors were not disclosed
immediately; they were revealed much later. The Memorandum
was first circulated as an informal paper and sanu tried to deny its
75 Ivan Stambolić, Koren zla (The Root of Evil) (Beograd:
Helsinki Committee for Human Rights , 2002)
76 Memorandum SANU (The SANU Memorandum), Odgovori i kritike (Replies
and Criticism), Kosta Mihajlović, Vasilije Krestić, SANU, Belgrade, 1995 .