yugoslavias implosion

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ChApter 1
“not of republicans,” but of the best republican cadres who would
address Yugoslavia’s problems objectively and contemplate non-republican
solutions to those problems. 56 Edvard Kardelj was of a
different opinion, arguing that federal agencies should not seek to act
as surpranational organs and should instead allow each republic to
decide who would represent it.
The struggle for Tito’s inheritance was conducted amid a
deep crisis to which the political and intellectual establishments
had no clear answer. Their lack of decisiveness and responsibility
and opportunism created room in which nationalists were able
to advance their national projects as pseudo-solutions to the economic
crisis. The general unpreparedness for change was augmented
by Yugoslavia’s sui generis position based on its geostrategic location
and the bipolar division of the world. This position gave Yugoslavia
a special role on the international political stage that was far greater
than its real importance and inculcated in the Yugoslav elites a narcissism
that blinded them to the fact that Yugoslavia was losing its
geostrategic relevance in the radically changing international scene.
Despite its estrangement from the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia
failed to find a formula that would set it on the road to becoming
a market economy. The Communist Party retained a tight grip
on its political monopoly and some parts of Yugoslavia were simply
unwilling to accept a market orientation and the laws of free market
economics. In addition, Serbian nationalists opposed every effort to
transform Yugoslavia before Tito’s death, hoping to be able to play a
crucial role once Tito was gone.
Freedom of Expression
The 1980s were characterized by the relaxation of constraints
and the raising of previously politically taboo questions amid
demands for free speech, to which authorities reacted in a confused
56 Borba, 22 September 1970 .