yugoslavias implosion

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ChApter 1
cared about their life with the other Yugoslav peoples—with whom
they had a common history—the argument ran, they must divest
themselves of each other in order to “think of their survival.” The
discussion of amendments to the 1974 Constitution raised the question
of “historical accountability to the Serb people” and threw into
focus matters of the utmost importance (e.g., the question of Serbia’s
“identity and integrity, that is, the question of its unification under
international law”). 43 The 1974 Constitution was clearly a pretext to
raise the Serbian national issue on what Professor Radoslav Stojanović
termed “the objective fact that nations tend towards their unity.”
“Serb nationalism hoisted its banner when Serbia was confined
within the Pashalik of Belgrade, so another reduction of Serbia to a
Belgrade pashalik will rekindle Serb nationalism.” 44
The last decade of Tito’s rule was characterized by the domination
of Yugoslavia by the ypa, which exercised its constitutional role
as the guarantor of Yugoslavia’s integrity—with the 1974 Constitution,
the ypa was invested with a capacity to impose law and order if
necessary. Yet the ypa, which was assigned a major role in the defense
of the country under the system of Territorial Defense (adopted in
response to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia), was opposed to
the confederation of Yugoslavia and the creation of republic-states as
outlined in the 1974 Constitution. The attitude of the ypa toward the
1974 Constitution became similar to attitudes prevailing in Serbia.
Tito had consented to the 1974 Constitution because he believed
that he still had the main say in any arbitration; he believed his most
effective tool was the ypa, which could be used to quash dissident
opinion or behavior. In addition, Tito’s insistence that the lcy was
a cohesive factor in Yugoslavia prevented the country from becoming
a true federation in spite of the normative changes made to that
effect.
43 Pravni anali (Legal records), Beograd, 1971, No . 3, p . 232 .
44 Ibid . p . 266 .