yugoslavias implosion

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ChApter 5
multiethnic communities, but the content of each of those plans
reflected the reluctance of the United States and the eu to use military
force to uphold principles and goals they had declared in documents
such as the 1990 Paris Charter, which outlined a vision of a
pluralistic, democratic Europe in which conflicts would be handled
by political, not military, means.
At the time, it seemed to many observers that the absence of an
institutional framework for action might be compensated for by the
prevailing enthusiasm about a genuine integration of Europe. This
enthusiasm was, however, directed chiefly toward the former member-states
of the Warsaw Pact, leaving the developments in the Yugoslav
successor states practically neglected.
In those critical moments for Yugoslavia, the international community
paid lip service to Yugoslavia’s survival without considering
tougher measures on Milošević’s and Serbia’s obvious designs. Neither
was the ypa pressured to stay neutral.
Throughout the Yugoslav crisis, and particularly in its early
stages, the eu used the Yugoslav crisis as a test for its own concept
of a common foreign policy. Its mediating role was confirmed at the
summit of the g-7 by the csce and especially by the United States. At
the time, the Slovenian war was over and the ec (it did not become
the eu until November 1993) was insisting on “stopping the bloodshed
and turning to dialogue.” Guidelines for resolving the crisis
were stated in the ec Declaration from The Hague of August 6, 1991,
and later reconfirmed at the foreign ministers’ meeting on August
20. The guidelines were twofold: the establishment of a lasting ceasefire
under international monitoring; and negotiations based on two
principles—the inviolability of internal and external borders and
respect for human and minority rights.
Despite the attempt to reach a common and coordinated
approach, differences soon surfaced among ec members, not only
because of various historical, geographic, and ideological factors