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320<br />

ChApter 5<br />

the discrepancy between Western rhetoric and the West’s resolve<br />

to achieve something on the ground. Every resolution passed was<br />

ambiguous in that it gave unprofor no clear mandate to use force<br />

as and when necessary. The restrictions, which undermined the<br />

efficiency of the troops on the ground, were so numerous that the<br />

security of their troops on the ground became the primary concern<br />

of all the governments involved. For example, the mandate to ensure<br />

the security of Sarajevo airport made no reference to Chapter VII.<br />

The deployment of unprofor in Sarajevo was in consequence, the<br />

report underlined, conducted in accordance with regular peacekeeping<br />

rules. Without the cooperation of the parties involved, unprofor<br />

was unable to provide for their security. Another illustrative<br />

example concerns a Security Council resolution, which established<br />

safe-heaven areas although the unprofor mandate did not include<br />

any provision for their enforcement. Given a choice between 34,000<br />

additional troops to effect deterrence through muscle and a “light<br />

option” to deploy some 7,600 troops, the Security Council opted for<br />

the latter.<br />

Instead of supporting the newly emerging states, the eu sanctioned<br />

the survival of the new mock “states” imposed by Belgrade<br />

first in Croatia (Republika Srpska Krajina in 1991) and then in Bosnia<br />

(Republika Srpska in 1992). The fact that the Yugoslav Army attacked<br />

Slovenia and Croatia in June 1991 just three days after the departure<br />

of u.s. secretary of state James Baker from Slovenia showed<br />

that Milošević was confident that the u.s. threat to use military force<br />

was not likely to be carried out. In 1995, the Dayton Accords actually<br />

legitimized Republika Srpska. Serbia’s continuing policy of treating<br />

Republika Srpska as a Belgrade proxy has made it impossible so far to<br />

establish Bosnia and Herzegovina as a viable democratic state.“<br />

The Yugoslav crisis revealed Europe’s “military incapacity and<br />

political disarray.” Moreover, the Kosovo conflict exposed a transatlantic<br />

gap in military technology and the ability to wage modern

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